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Abstract:
The term structure of interest rate has long been a special topic of interest
in both academia and the financial market. A plethora of models developed in
both finance and macroeconomics literature are only partially useful for either
macroeconomic analysis or bond pricing, but not for both at the same time.
The second chapter of this thesis focuses on this issue from the macroeconomic
viewpoints. Firstly, we survey the important papers in term structure of interest
rates and asset pricing models and discuss their key features. We then examine
the ability of standard DSGE models at replicating the stylized bond pricing
facts especially focusing on the volatility of long-term bonds. Lastly, we survey
various recent modifications made to the DSGE models and investigate whether
and how each approach may (or may not) improve the ability of DSGE model
in terms of replicating key bond pricing facts, either under the expectations
hypothesis or with the help of term premium.
The third chapter focuses on nominal GDP growth-indexed bonds where
their nominal payoffs are fully indexed to nominal GDP growth of the issuing
country. The idea of indexing government debt to a country’s growth rate
goes back at least to the 1980s, and several papers have already illustrated
the potential benefits of issuing such bonds. However, most of the analysis
were conducted using partial equilibrium models. In addition, as there exists
no actual market for such an asset, only few analyses exist for the price of
growth-indexed bonds, and most of them are based on simple CAPM models.
In this chapter, on the contrary, we try to calculate the theoretical price of
nominal GDP growth-indexed bonds using a general equilibrium model. Based
on a medium sized New Keynesian DSGE model estimated with the U.S. mac-
roeconomic data, we show that the government may face lower borrowing cost
when replacing conventional nominal bonds with nominal GDP growth-indexed
iii
bonds, assuming the other premiums - such as novelty and liquidity premiums -
are negligible. As a by-product of the analysis, we also show such a change may
benefit the government by giving more room for countercyclical fiscal policy.
The fourth chapter examines the welfare effect of growth-indexed bonds
within the framework of new Keynesian DSGEmodel. Even though there already
exist papers that show issuing growth-indexed bond may help stabilize the
debt process and give more room for countercyclical fiscal policy, the analysis
on its welfare effect has not been actively conducted, especially within the
framework of general equilibrium model. It was mostly because the standard
DSGEmodels, where Ricardian equivalence holds, the choices of consumers are
immune to the source of government finance. This chapter examines whether
and how the use of growth-indexed bonds, instead of the conventional nominal
bonds, affects the business cycle and welfare when Ricardian equivalence does
not hold any more. More specifically, we augmented hand to mouth households,
distortionary income taxes, and Epstein-Zin type recursive preference to the
most widely used medium scale DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2007).
The results show that the growth-indexed bond can significantly increase the
welfare of the hand-to-mouth households by stabilising their consumption and




It is my great pleasure to acknowledge the support of all the people for the
completion of my thesis.
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitute to my supervisor,
professor Jagjit Chadha, not only for his insightful academic advice, but also
his encouragement throughout the course of my PhD days.
I would also like to thank all the members of staff at the University of Kent
who helped me in my supervisor’s absence. In particular, I would like to thank
Dr. Katsuyuki Shibayama for his precious advice on the last chapter of this
thesis. I am also grateful to my fellow doctoral students for their feedback,
cooperation and of course friendship.
I should mention that the Bank of Korea granted me study leave for my
PhD and financially supported for two years. The School of Economics at the
University of Kent also financially supported me for three years. I express my
gratitude for them.
My heartiest thanks belong to my family. Words can never express how
grateful I am to my parents-in-law for all the sacrifices they have made on
my behalf. I also thank to my parents who always prayed for me throughout
the time of my research. And most of all, I am deeply indebted to my loving,
supportive, and patient wife Eunju who raised our daughter Yejin for the last
five years of my absence. I would never have been able to complete this thesis
without her support. Thank you very much.
v
Contents
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
1 Introduction 1
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 An exposition of the forward rate volatility puzzle 8
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Shiller test with recent data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 Exposition of the Puzzle with DSGE model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.1 Stylized facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.2 Baseline DSGE model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4.3 DSGE model with Recursive Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4.4 DSGE model with Bond Market Segmentation . . . . . . . . . 56
2.5 Conclusion and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3 Nominal GDP growth-indexed bonds: prices and benefits within
the framework of New Keynesian DSGE model 73
vi
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2 Summary of the DSGE model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2.2 Labour market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.3 Goods market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.2.4 Monetary policy and government sector . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.2.5 Bond prices and premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.3 Parametrisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.4 Simulated premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.4.1 Baseline model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.4.2 Alternative parametrisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.5 Potential Benefits to the government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.6 Conclusion and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.A List of equilibrium equations (detrended) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.B List of steady states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.C Source of data for the estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4 Welfare effects of nominal GDP growth-indexed bonds 127
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.2 The DSGE model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.2.2 Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.2.3 Labour market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.2.4 Monetary and fiscal policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.2.5 Aggregation and Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.3 Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
vii
4.4.1 Baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.4.2 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4.5 Conclusion and Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.A List of detrended non-linear equilibrium conditions . . . . . . . . . 167
4.B Steady states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.C Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
viii
List of Tables
2.1 Shiller’s test with recent data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.2 Stylized facts of the US term structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3 Stylized facts of the UK term structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Data sources for stylized facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Baseline calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6 Too stable long-term rates from the baseline model . . . . . . 41
2.7 Sensitivity analysis with different shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.8 Sensitivity analysis with different parameters . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.9 Sensitivity analysis with EZ preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.10Parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.11Effect of bond market frictions on relative volatility . . . . . . 61
3.1 Estimates of growth risk premiums from the literature . . . . 79
3.2 List of parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3 Fit of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.4 IRP and GRP, by different shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.5 IRP and GRP, by different parameterisation (preference) . . . 102
3.6 IRP and GRP, by different parameterisation (price/wage stick-
iness, monetary policy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.7 Correlation between output and government transfer . . . . . 110
3.8 Correlation between output and government transfer . . . . . 112
ix
4.1 List of parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.2 List of shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.3 Key moments of the benchmark model (ω = 0) . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.4 Baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.5 Sensitive analysis (share of H2M households) . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.6 Sensitive analysis (debt-to-GDP ratio) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.7 More flexible debt rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
x
List of Figures
2.1 Average yield curve in the CIR model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Responses of expected short-term rates to unexpected shocks 43
2.3 Impulse response functions (Baseline model) . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4 Responses of short-term rate (alternative parameters) . . . . 49
2.5 Responses of short-term rate (alternative parameters) . . . . 50
2.6 Responses of short-term rate (alternative parameters) . . . . 51
2.7 Responses of short-term rate (time-varying inflation target) . 52
2.8 The IRFs from segmented market model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.1 Impulse responses function for key variables . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.2 Impulse respones and role of nominal rigidity . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.1 IRFs for benchmark model (I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.2 IRFs for baseline model (I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
4.3 Destabilising effect from the presence of hand-to-mouth house-




The idea of growth-indexed bonds goes back, at least, to the debt crises of
emerging market countries in 1980s. After the crisis, several economists have
argued that linking the payoffs of the government bonds to the economic per-
formance of the issuing country would help prevent the surge of debt-to-GDP
ratio in case of crisis (Bailey, 1983; Krugman, 1988). This idea has been regain-
ing interest recently as many advanced countries are suffering from very high
levels of government debt after the financial crisis of 2007.1 Contrary to the
discussions in the 1980s which focused mostly on emerging market countries,
recent papers point out that the advanced countries may benefit from the GDP
growth-indexed bonds as well. Furthermore, since the advanced countries are
less likely to suffer from challenges in issuing GDP-indexed bonds such as data
1For example, over the last few years, both academics and central banks around worlds
have actively published papers supporting the idea of GDP-linked bonds (see Barr et al., 2014;
Blanchard et al., 2016; Bowman et al., 2016; Benford et al., 2016; Cabrillac et al., 2016; Bonfim
and Pereira, 2018). Also, in the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting
of 2016 and 2017, G20 members called for further analysis for the state-contingent sovereign
debt including GDP-linked bonds.
1
manipulation or adverse selection2 problems, they may be able to issue them
with lower novelty premium than the emerging market countries.
Previous works on the GDP growth-indexed bonds focused on two main
benefits from the perspective of the government debt management. First of all,
the use of GDP growth-indexed bonds may help stabilise debt-to-GDP dynamics,
and thus reduce its tail-risk. When there exists upward pressure on debt-to-
GDP ratio due to a slowdown in growth, a government should cope with the
pressure by increasing its primary surplus. When the primary surplus cannot
be increased sufficiently for various (usually political) reasons, the government
is forced to face a sharp rise in its debt-to-GDP ratio. If the bond payoffs are
linked to the GDP growth, however, the slower growth also leads to a smaller
debt repayment, and thus the rise in debt-to-GDP ratio can be mitigated.
The second benefit is related with conducting fiscal policy. When a country’s
debt-to-GDP ratio reaches (or closely approaches to) its debt limit3, the govern-
ment faces pressures to conduct pro-cyclical fiscal policy. In other words, the
government is forced to increase its primary surplus even when the economy is
in a recession. In such cases, the use of growth-indexed bonds may play a role
of mitigating the pressure of conducting pro-cyclical fiscal policy.
One thing the previous papers commonly pointed out is that these benefits
may disappear if the premium on the GDP growth-indexed bonds (over the
conventional government bonds) becomes excessively large. Therefore, pricing
them accurately can also be an important topic. However, there are only a small
2When the market participants believe the government has private information that is not
known to the public, they may see the issuance of GDP-indexed bonds as a signal of slowdown
in growth and would demand more premium. The advanced countries in general are believed
to be less subject to this problem.
3The debt limit can be defined in several ways. On one hand, Ostry et al. (2010) developed
the concept of debt limit as follows. If a government cannot issue more debt when its debt-to-
GDP ratio exceeds a certain level, mostly because its fiscal solvency is in doubt, that level of
debt-to-GDP ratio is defined as the government’s debt limit. On the other hand, the limits can
be set politically such as the debt ceiling of the U.S. or the debt limit of 60% set by the Stability
and Growth Pact among the EU countries.
2
number of academic studies conducted on this topic mainly because the GDP
growth-indexed bonds have never been traded, and thus there is no historical
data available for empirical analyses.
Most of the existing researches on the benefits and/or the price of GDP
growth-indexed bonds depend on partial equilibrium models. More specifically,
the benefits were analysed by simulating the well-known debt-to-GDP ratio
identity using exogenously assumed joint processes of output growth, interest
rates and primary balances. In the case of prices, the analyses mostly depend
on CAPM model (Borensztein and Mauro, 2004; Kamstra and Shiller, 2009;
Benford et al., 2016; Bowman et al., 2016), where the required expected return
of the GDP growth-indexed bond is solely determined by its β with an arbitrarily
chosen market portfolio. For this reason, the estimates from CAPMmodels vary
widely across the selection of market portfolio.
The main focuses of the chapters in this thesis are pricing the nominal
GDP-growth indexed bonds (NGDP-indexed bond) and investigating its benefits
within the framework of New Keynesian DSGE model. Even though the bond
prices and benefits from DSGE models also rely on the joint processes of the key
variables, the joint processes are obtained by the optimal choices of rational
agents, not by arbitrary assumptions. The fact that the DSGE models have
become a dominant modelling framework both among academic researchers
and practitioners in analysing the inextricably linked relationship among the
key macro variables also justifies the use of DSGE models. Furthermore, from
a more practical point of view, by using a DSGE model, we can find the answers
to the questions particularly important to policy makers, such as on which deep
parameters the growth risk premium depends, or under which conditions the
government benefits more from the use of growth-indexed bonds.
3
In Chapter 2, before jumping into pricing GDP growth-indexed bonds, we
surveyed various bond pricing and term structure models. First, we began
looking at the models from finance literature that can replicate the bond pricing
facts quite well, but lack of explanations for the fundamental macroeconomic
forces, and we moved on to the macro-finance models which have been de-
veloped in efforts to overcome the shortcomings of the finance models, mainly
by augmenting macroeconomic theories or variables to the finance models in
several ways. Then we illustrated how poor the standard New Keynesian DSGE
model is in terms of replicating bond prices, and explored various modifications
suggested as an attempt to improve the DSGE model’s ability of asset pricing.
In Chapter 3, we built a DSGE model estimated with the U.S. data to cal-
culate the theoretical price of 10-year NGDP-indexed bonds and showed that
the government may benefit from lower borrowing cost when replacing con-
ventional nominal bonds with the NGDP-indexed bonds. As the investors pur-
chasing NGDP-indexed bonds are immune to the inflation risk but are exposed
to the risk in real GDP growth, the government should pay additional growth
risk premium (GRP) but can save inflation risk premium (IRP) when issuing the
NGDP-indexed bonds. We showed that both premiums are positive due to the
fact that the business cycle in this model is driven mainly by supply shocks;
and that the IRP is much larger than the GRP since the inflation is much more
persistent than the output growth. As a by-product of the analysis, we also
showed that the government may benefit from issuing NGDP-indexed bonds
as it gives more room for counter-cyclical fiscal policy, particularly when the
government cannot flexibly adjust its debt-to-GDP ratio.
In Chapter 4, we examined the welfare effect of NGDP-indexed bonds also
within the New Keynesian framework. In Chapter 3, we briefly showed how the
use of NGDP-indexed bonds affects the cyclicality of fiscal policy. However, as
4
Ricardian equivalence holds in the model, we were not able to see how it affects
the business cycle or the welfare of the economy. By adding some households
who cannot access financial and capital markets (hand-to-mouth households)
to the standard DSGE model, we broke Ricardian equivalence, and showed
that the government can use the NGDP-indexed bonds as an alternative fiscal
policy tool to stabilise the business cycle and improve the welfare of the hand-
to-mouth households.
There are many areas where we may extend our models in Chapter 3 and
4. One of them is from the fact that the models in this thesis ignore the pos-
sibility of default and the related costs. Our DSGE models are closed economy
models, and they are estimated (or calibrated) with macroeconomic data from
the U.S, which is taken to be a benchmark country with little likelihood of
government default. Therefore, the conclusion from the model is valid only for
the government with little possibility of default; for a small number of advanced
economies. To make the conclusion more general, we may extend the model to
a small open economy model. Once we explicitly incorporate foreign currency
denominated debts and probability of default as Chamon and Mauro (2006) or
Barr et al. (2014) did, then we will be able to discuss the cases of emerging
market countries as well. If the use of GDP-indexed bonds lowers the overall
borrowing cost of the government as Ostry et al. (2010) and Kim and Ostry
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Chapter 2
An exposition of the forward rate
volatility puzzle
2.1 Introduction
Understanding what moves the term structure of interest rates is important in
many aspects. For example, long-term interest rates reflect how bond market
participants forecast the future path of the economy. It is especially true under
the expectations hypothesis under which the interest rate on a long-maturity
bond is represented as an average of expected future short-term interest rates.
This topic is also important in the area of finance. The term structure of interest
rate is closely related to pricing interest rate derivatives as their theoretical
prices are calculated using current and future yields for risk-free bonds (Camp-
bell et al., 1997; Piazzesi, 2010). The relation between the short and long end of
yield curves has long been a special topic of interest for both macroeconomists
and monetary authorities. It is because, even though central banks, in general,
are believed to be able to set the overnight interbank interest rate at whatever
level they want (unless it is constrained by the zero lower bound), what central
8
banks really want to affect is the long-term real interest rate to which aggregate
demand responds (Blinder, 1997).
Despite of the importance of and the active research on this topic, there
still exist several unsolved puzzles about the behaviour of term structure. The
bond premium puzzle and the excess volatility puzzle are well known among
them. The bond premium puzzle refers to the phenomenon where standard
macroeconomic models cannot generate the size and volatility of risk premium
on nominal bonds prices. Backus et al. (1989) is one of the early papers that
drew attention to this puzzle using a consumption-based asset pricing model
of an endowment economy. They showed that the artificial data from their
theoretical model cannot reproduce the size and sign of the risk premium estim-
ated from the US Treasury data under reasonable assumptions on consumption
growth and risk aversion. They found that, to match the sign and size of term
premium, a negative autocorrelation of consumption growth and a coefficient
of relative risk aversion (CRRA) larger than 8 are needed, which are not sup-
ported by empirical data. Even more recent and sophisticated macroeconomic
models have not been able to generate sizeable term premium without relying
on implausible assumptions.
The excess volatility puzzle, which is the main interest of this chapter, refers
to the excess volatility of the long-term interest rates under the expectations
hypothesis. The standard macroeconomic models share several assumptions:
In the long run, the level of certain variables such as inflation rate or real
interest rate to be constant at their steady state level, the exogenous shocks
are stationary and transitory, and all the agents are homogeneously forward-
looking and fully informed. Under these assumptions, temporary shocks cannot
be transmitted into the far-future expectations of the short-term interest rate,
and that is why the long-term bond yield, which is represented as the (weighted)
9
average of those expectations, should be very stable. Shiller (1979), however,
originally showed that the long-term rates display a much larger volatility above
the upper limit implied by the expectations hypothesis of a rational expectations
model. In the paper, he calculated the theoretical upper limits of variances of
the six different long-term interest rates covering from 1824 to 1977 under
the expectations hypothesis. His results showed that the volatilities of the six
long-term interest rates were around 1.2 to 4.4 time as large as their theoretical
upper limits given by the expectations hypothesis1.
This chapter examines the excess volatility puzzle specifically within the
framework of New Keynesian DSGE model. Despite the success of models in
finance literature in matching the stylized facts of bond prices, such models
are not fully satisfactory from the viewpoint of macroeconomists. It is mainly
because those models do not explain what the latent factors they rely on are,
and what fundamental economic forces are behind those factors. Given the fact
that many central banks around the world are actively using DSGE models to
analyse the macroeconomic phenomena and to formulate monetary policies (To-
var, 2009; Dotsey et al., 2013), and the fact that the effectiveness of monetary
policy relies highly on the relation between the short-term nominal policy rates
and long-term real rates, there is a strong demand for a term structure model
which is based on macroeconomic theory and, at the same time, able to match
the bond pricing fact well.2 However, as shown in Section 2.4, the medium
scale DSGE model estimated with the recent data for macro variables and
short-term interest rate does not generate volatile enough long-term interest
1More details about his methodology will be provided in Section 2.3.
2How central banks interpret the spread between short- and long-term interest rates is
critical for their monetary policy responses, and the interpretation is closely related with the
macroeconomic models they rely on. For example, under the expectations hypothesis, central
banks may rely more on forward looking guidances to influence the expectations of market
participants. On the contrary, if central banks see the spread reflects relative supply between
short- and long-term bonds, they may rely more on asset purchase policies.
10
rate under the expectations hypothesis.3 This may tell us that such DSGE
models cannot transmit the effects of current shocks sufficiently into the future
(if the expectations hypothesis holds), or we should modify the standard DSGE
models such that they can generate sufficiently volatile term premiums (if the
expectations hypothesis is abandoned).
This chapter also illustrates that, under the expectations hypothesis, incor-
porating time-varying inflation target to the DSGE model can be an effective
way in generating volatile long-term interest rate. It is because that makes the
response of short-term interest rate to current shocks significantly more per-
sistent. This approach is also consistent with the empirical evidence provided
by Gürkaynak et al. (2005) which shows that even far away forward rates
respond to the unexpected shocks to various macroeconomic and monetary
variables. However, under the expectations hypothesis, sensitivity analysis
with other modifications, such as different composition of shocks or different
value of key structural parameters, only slightly changed the relative volatility
of long-term interest rates.
This chapter also examines the DSGE models which accommodate the ex-
istence of term premiums. Even though the standard DSGE models cannot
generate sizeable term premium even when they are solved with second- or
higher-order approximations, the models with Epstein and Zin (1989) type re-
cursive preference successfully generated sizeable term premiums (Rudebusch
and Swanson, 2012; Darracq Paries and Loublier, 2010). However, even this
approach was not very effective in matching the relative volatility of long-term
interest rates. As another approach, we also examined the DSGE models with
asset market frictions so that the short- and long-term bonds are not perfect
3Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) also illustrated that the medium scale DSGE model with
nominal rigidities, labour market frictions, and habit in consumption is poor at matching
stylized facts on term structure of interest rates.
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substitutes (Harrison, 2011, 2012; Carlstrom et al., 2017; Fuerst, 2015). If this
is the case, the relative supply of these bonds affects the size and sign of term
premiums. Among them, we examine the model of Harrison (2011, 2012) more
in detail.
This chapter consists of 5 sections. Section 2.2 provides a detailed survey of
literature on term structure and asset pricing models, and how they replicate
key bond pricing facts such as upward sloping yield curves or volatile long-
term interest rates. In Section 2.3, we reconfirm the existence of the excess
volatility puzzle by conducting the same test as Shiller (1979) with newer data
set. In section 2.4, the key stylized facts are provided and we examine how
well the medium sized DSGE model can replicate those stylized facts. Also,
various recent modifications to DSGE models are investigated both under the
expectations hypothesis and when the hypothesis is abandoned. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Early literature on term structure models were stemmed from the seminal
papers of Vasicek (1977) and Cox et al. (1981, 1985). These models begin
by specifying stochastic processes of the risk-free short-term rate, rt, and the
stochastic discount factor (SDF), mt+1 given by Equation (2.1) and (2.2)
4 re-
spectively:
rt+1 = ϕrt + (1− ϕ) θ + Σ (rt, σ) εt+1 (2.1)
− logmt+1 = δ + rt + λεt+1, (2.2)
4Most of the equations describing the (discrete time) affine term structure models in this
chapter are borrowed from Backus et al. (1998) who translated the original continuous time
version of models into the discrete time version.
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where εt+1 is distributed normally and independently with mean zero and vari-
ance one. The parameters ϕ, θ, σ2 are the autocorrelation coefficient, the mean,
and the conditional variance of rt, respectively. λ is the so-called market price
of risk assumed to be constant in these models. The last term in Equation (2.1)
is assumed as
Σ (rt, σ) =


σ in Vasicek model
σ
√
rt in CIR model.
They then derive the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates with an
additional assumption of no arbitrage. Under the arbitrage-free assumption,
there always exists mt+1 that satisfies the following general asset pricing con-
dition,
pt = Et (mt+1pt+1) , (2.3)
where pt denotes the price of any asset at time t. They then assume an affine
functional form of the n-period zero coupon bond price, p
(n)
t as
− log p(n)t = An +Bnrt. (2.4)
Combining Equation (2.3) and (2.4), and applying the method of undetermined
coefficients, the closed form expressions for An+1 and Bn+1 are explicitly given
in terms of An and Bn. Since A0 = B0 = 0, and A1 = 0, B1 = 1, the price
of any n-period zero coupon bond (and its yield to maturity) can be explicitly
calculated given rt. Since these models rely on only a single factor, rt, these
“single-factor” affine term structure models (ATSM) give closed form solutions
and are easy for variety of applications.
13
However, as Backus et al. (1998) already showed, these models generate
yield curves with much smaller curvature than is observed in the actual data5.
Moreover, having a single factor also requires the correlations between bond
prices for all the maturities close to one6, which is not observed from the data
either. Considering these shortcomings, models with multiple factors are more
widely used in practice. Multi-factor ATSMs assume that long-term bond prices
and SDFs are affine functions of several unobserved latent factors; and they
require the dynamic evolution of yield curve consistent with cross sectional
relation by adding no arbitrage condition. Two-factor CIR models (Chen and
Scott, 1993; Longstaff and Schwartz, 1992) can be included in this category,
and more general conditions for multi-factor ATSMs can be found from Duffie
and Kan (1996) and Dai and Singleton (2000).7
Meanwhile, a demand for a more parsimonious model of term structure,
especially from the financial market participants, leads to the development of
so-called pure statistical models. Nelson and Siegel (1987) and Litterman and
Scheinkman (1991) are the two most influential models of this group. These
models are able to describe various shapes - monotonic, humped and, S-shaped
- of yield curves with only a very small number of latent factors. Litterman and
Scheinkman (1991) showed that only three orthogonal factors obtained from
the principal component analysis are enough to explain most of the variabilities
5See Figure 2.1 which compares the average yield curve estimated from the US data
(Gürkaynak et al., 2007) with those constructed using CIR model.
















Therefore, the correlations between rt and f
(n)
t , or between forward rates of any horizons
should all be equal to 1 (Backus et al., 1998). But as seen from Table 2.2 and 2.3, the
correlations between the short-term rate and the forward rates from the historical data are
smaller than 1.
7Duffie and Kan (1996) provided the necessary and sufficient conditions to represent the
bond price as an affine function of state variables under a risk neutral measure, and Dai and
Singleton (2000) extended these conditions under an actual physical measure.
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Figure 2.1: Average yield curve in the CIR model

























Note: CIR model implied yield curve (thick black line) used sample
autocorrelation coefficient from the data (ϕ = 0.9922), and the other
two curves used smaller ϕ. The asterisk shows the zero coupon
yield curve estimated by Gürkaynak et al. (2007).
of the yield curve, and they named those three factors as "level," "slope," and
"curvature" factors for they seem to affect the level, slope, and curvature of the
yield curve, respectively. Nelson and Siegel (1987) developed a similar model
where m−period ahead instantaneous forward rate, f (m), is given by
f (m) = β0 + β1 exp (−m/τ) + β2 [(m/τ) exp (−m/τ)] . (2.5)
In this model, β0 determines the long-term components of the forward rate as
f (m) approaches to β0 when m → ∞. Similarly, β1 determines the short-end of
the yield curve as it approaches to β0 + β1 when m → 0. Lastly, the shape of
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“hump” - or medium term component - is determined by β2.
8 The yield for the
m-period zero coupon bond, R(m), is calculated by integrating f (m) from zero to
m, and dividing it by m:
R(m) = β0 + (β1 + β2)
[1− exp (−m/τ)]
(m/τ)
− β2 exp (−m/τ) . (2.6)
Svensson (1994) further improved the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model by
augmenting one more term (with two more parameters, β3 and τ2):
f (m) = β0 + β1 exp (−m/τ1) + β2 [(m/τ1) exp (−m/τ1)] + β3 [(m/τ2) exp (−m/τ2)] .
(2.7)
This model is called Nelson-Siegel-Svensson (or NSS) model. By adding the
fourth term, this model allows two humps in the yield curve. As the yield
curves often show two humps, the new term significantly improved the fit of
the model.9
The biggest advantage of these group of models are that they give better fit
than the theory-based models without resorting to the complicated models with
many variables. However, the fact that the earlier versions of these models give
no information about the dynamics of yield curve was a drawback for macroe-
conomists. It is because that means such models cannot be used for forecasting
purpose. This limitation motivated the development of the dynamic version of
Nelson and Siegel (1987) by Diebold and Li (2006). They incorporated a vector
autoregressive (VAR) process of the three latent factors to the model of Nelson
8Nelson and Siegel (1987) used 37 cross-sectional daily term structure samples, and each
sample contains 30 or 31 pairs of yields and maturities for the date. For a given parameter τ ,
the best-fitting values of three factors are estimated using linear regression. By trying a grid
of values for τ , they found the overall best-fitting values of the factors and τ .
9One of the widely used term structure data given by Gürkaynak et al. (2007) is also
constructed using NSS model.
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and Siegel (1987), and described the m-period interest rate at t as follows:
R
(m)
t = y (m) θt + εt (m) , (2.8)
where θt is a vector of latent factors at t, and y (m) is a vector of factor loadings
for a maturity m. In this sense, Equation (2.8) is just a vector representation
of Equation (2.6). As the factor loadings, y (m), can be simply calculated with
given m and τ , they obtained the estimates of the factors, θˆt, for each time-t by
conducting an ordinary linear regression of yield curve data, R
(m)
t , on factor
loadings, y (m). Once the factors at each point in time are obtained, they
constructed the VAR model for the factors.
Lengwiler and Lenz (2010) improved this model one step further. They
named their model as an intelligible factor model for it resolved one of the
main drawbacks of the previous model: the lack of orthogonality among the
innovations to the three factors. Since Diebold and Li (2006) model does not
guarantee that the innovations in θt are mutually orthogonal, it is hard to
conduct an impulse response analysis with the model. Lengwiler and Lenz
(2010) transform the model such that
R
(m)
t = k (m)φt + εt (m) , (2.9)
where φt = Bθt and k (m) = y (m)B
−1, and impose restrictions on the matrix
B in the way that guarantees the innovations to the factors are mutually ortho-
gonal.
Despite the fact that these factor models from the finance literature are
able to replicate the yield curve behaviour quite well (Dewachter and Iania,
2011), one of the weakest points of such models is that they cannot clearly
explain how and which macroeconomic forces are behind the latent factors,
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and thus, the term structure behaviours. Moreover, for the same reason, the
usage of these models for the purpose of policy analyses is very limited. For
example, if a central bank tries to analyse the effect of a tighter monetary policy,
it can be done by simply changing a relevant structural parameter in monetary
policy equation if they use a structural macroeconomic model such as DSGE
models. However, with the reduced-form models, one cannot simply change
some coefficients since the reduced-form model coefficients are not structural,
and the theoretical relation between the reduced-form model coefficients and
the structural parameters are not clearly given by the model. Therefore, at
least for the purpose of policy analysis, structural macroeconomic models are
more widely used by the policy makers or central bankers.
To bridge the gap between the finance and the macroeconomics literatures,
so-called macro-finance models have emerged. The first stage of the macro-
finance models simply replaced the latent factors with macroeconomic vari-
ables (Bernanke et al., 2004), or added macroeconomic variables as additional
factors for the Nelson-Siegel type dynamic models (Diebold et al., 2006) or for
the multi-factor ATSMs (Ang and Piazzesi, 2003). For example, Diebold et al.
(2006) extended Diebold and Li (2006) by simply adding a VAR representa-
tion of macroeconomic variables. Contrary to Nelson and Siegel (1987) type
dynamic models on which arbitrage-free condition is not explicitly imposed,
Ang and Piazzesi (2003) built a macro-finance model by adding macroeconomic
variables into a multi-factor ATSM such that both the macro factors10 and the
latent factors simultaneously determine the short rate process, the SDF, and
10Ang and Piazzesi (2003) constructed the inflation factor by extracting the first principal
component from three inflation measures (CPI, PPI and commodity price indices), and the real-
activity factor from four variables capturing the real activity of the economy (help wanted
advertising in newspapers, unemployment, employment growth, and the industrial production
growth).
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the market price of risk. Their model consists of the following four equations:
Xt = µ+ ΦXt−1 + Σεt (2.10)
rt = δ0 + δ
′
1Xt (2.11)
− logmt+1 = 1
2
λ′tλt + δ0 + δ1Xt + λ
′
tεt+1 (2.12)
λt = λ0 + λ1Xt. (2.13)
Equation (2.10) is a Gaussian VAR process of the vector of state factors, Xt,
containing both macro and latent factors. Equation (2.11) shows the assump-
tion that the short-term interest rate is an affine function of state factors. The
assumption of no-arbitrage guarantees the existence of SDF, and its functional
form is assumed to be Equation (2.12). The last equation assumes that the
time-varying market price of risk, λt, is also an affine function of the state
factors. As can be seen, it is almost same as the original multi-factor ATSMs
except that its state vector contains the observable macro variables as well11.
More recently, Dewachter and Iania (2011) introduced an extended version of
Ang and Piazzesi (2003)’s model in that financial factors are augmented to Ang
and Piazzesi (2003), and showed that adding the financial factors could improve
the cross sectional fit of yield curves.
The macro-finance models introduced above have only one feedback chan-
nel, from macro variables to financial variables, but not the other way around.
However, there also exist macro-finance models which are equipped with two-
way feedback channel by incorporating macroeconomic structures into finance
models. Hördahl et al. (2006) and Rudebusch and Wu (2007, 2008) are ex-
amples of this group of models. Here we look more closely at Rudebusch
and Wu (2008). More specifically, Rudebusch and Wu (2008) used the linear-
11Dewachter and Lyrio (2006) also follows this approach.
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ised equilibrium conditions from the standard New Keynesian macroeconomic
model to specify the dynamics of the latent factors in their model (see Equation
2.18 and 2.19). Nonetheless, from the fact that the process of the price of risk
is not derived from the optimal choices of consumers, this model is still just a
partial equilibrium model. In this model, the functional form of a short-term
interest rate, rt, is assumed as an affine function of latent factors:
rt = δ0 + Lt + St, (2.14)
where Lt and St is the two latent factors corresponding to level and slope of an
yield curve. The dynamics of these latent factors are specified such that they
are affected by macroeconomic variables :
Lt = ρLLt−1 + (1− ρL) πt + εL,t (2.15)
St = ρSSt−1 + (1− ρS) [gyyt + gpi (πt − Lt)] + uS,t (2.16)
uS,t = ρuuS,t−1 + εS,t, (2.17)
where πt is inflation rate and yt is output gap. Given the specification, Lt is
interpreted as the time-varying inflation target of the central bank, and St is
interpreted as the central bank’s monetary policy stance. Most distinct feature
of this model comes from Equation (2.18) and (2.19), which are similar to the
dynamic IS equation and the Phillips curve, respectively:
yt = µyEtyt+1 + (1− µy) (βy1yt−1 + βy2yt−2)− βr (rt−1 − Lt−1) + εy,t (2.18)
πt = µpiLt + (1− µpi) (αpi1πt−1 + αpi2πt−2) + αyyt + εpi,t. (2.19)
These two equations mean that the macroeconomic variables yt and πt are also
affected by the latent factors. Given the processes of the latent factors and the
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short-term interest rate assumed above, together with the assumption that the
price of risk and the long-term bond prices are affine functions of the latent
factors, one can derive the closed form relation between a short- and long-term
bond prices, following the same way as the standard no-arbitrage ATSMs.
Another stream of macro-finance models derive SDF from the optimal choice
of a rational consumer, while assuming exogenous processes of macro vari-
ables. To generate upward sloping yield curves and more volatile long-term in-
terest rates, these models make modifications to the preference of consumers.
Wachter (2006) proposed a consumption-based asset pricing model of an en-
dowment economy augmented with an external habit formation. The idea of the
external habit in asset pricing model is originally from Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) who successfully matched various properties of equity prices. Intuitively,
including an external habit, which is the weighted average of past consump-
tions, in a preference makes consumers prefer a smoother consumption stream,
or dislike consumption volatility more. Therefore, consumers demand a higher
risk premium when purchasing risky assets12. In Wachter (2006), consumers





(Ct −Xt)1−γ − 1
1− γ , (2.20)
where the external habit, Xt, is indirectly defined through the surplus consump-
tion defined as
St ≡ Ct −Xt
Ct
.










12See De Paoli et al. (2010) for an example.
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She then assumed the process of the log surplus consumption, st, as
st+1 = (1− φ) s¯+ φst + λ(st) (∆ct+1 − E(∆ct+1)) , (2.22)
where s¯ is the long-run average of surplus consumption, and the sensitivity
function, λ(st), determines the volatility of surplus consumption. Once the
processes of the consumption growth and inflation are added13, the nominal
stochastic discount factor can be calculated. Then, the price of nominal bonds
can be given from the fundamental asset pricing relation.14
Instead of the external habit in the preference, Piazzesi and Schneider (2007)
used Epstein and Zin (1989) type recursive preference, EZ preference here-
after, for their consumption-based asset pricing model of an endowment eco-
nomy. In Epstein and Zin (1989), a consumer maximises the following recurs-
















where θ ≡ (1− γ) / (1− 1/ψ). γ ≥ 0 is the parameter which controls the
preference for consumption smoothing over the state of nature (or CRRA), and
ψ ≥ 0 is the parameter governing the preference for consumption smoothing
over time (or IES). By assuming a unitary IES, Piazzesi and Schneider (2007)






13She simply assumed that the consumption growth follows a random walk with a drift, and
the inflation follows an ARMA(1,1) process.
14Detailed solution method used in Wachter (2006) can be found from Wachter (2005).
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and once log-normality is assumed, the log of SDF can be derived as follows15:
















Equation (2.26) clearly shows the difference between the time-separable
expected utility, EU preference hereafter, and EZ preference. The first two
terms in Equation (2.26) commonly exist under both preferences, but the re-
maining two terms appear only when EZ preference is used. In general, an
asset should pay a positive risk premium if it gives a smaller payoff when a bad
event happens. With EU preference, a bad event means a lower consumption
growth for one period, and the first two terms in Equation (2.26) imply this.
On the contrary, a consumer with EZ preference considers the entire path
of future consumption growth. That is, lower consumption growth of further
future periods are also considered as bad events, which is captured in the last
two terms of Equation (2.26). In Piazzesi and Schneider (2007), high inflation
is regarded as a bad event as it is (exogenously) related with several periods
of lower consumption growth in the future. Therefore, if an asset’s payoff
is negatively correlated with inflation, the asset should provide an additional
15This equation is a simplified version of Equation (6) of Piazzesi and Schneider (2007). We
used a constant parameter β for the weight in Equation (2.24), while Piazzesi and Schneider
(2007) assumed the weight is time-varying.
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positive premium on top of the premium required when standard EU preference
is assumed. This well explains the upward slope nominal yield curve because
the payoffs of longer-term nominal bonds are more negatively correlated with
inflation.
Moreover, by changing the value of γ, one can freely choose the size of the
additional premium. Note that the EZ preference collapses to the standard
EU preference when γ = 1. Here comes another advantage of EZ preference.
EU preference assumes the two risk parameters, γ and ψ, are tightly related,
γ = 1/ψ, with no clear evidence. Therefore, a very high level of CRRA means an
unrealistically low level of IES in models with EU preference, and this ends up
distorting the fit of macroeconomic variables. However, as the EZ preference
breaks the linkage between the two parameters, one can choose any level of
CRRA to match the term premium while holding the level of IES, or without
comprising the fit of macroeconomic variables.
Even though all these macro-finance models (Rudebusch and Wu, 2008;
Wachter, 2006; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2007) are quite successful in matching
the bond pricing facts, there is still room for criticism in that they are all partial
equilibrium models. More specifically, the process of price of risk in Rudebusch
and Wu (2008) is not derived from the optimal choice of rational consumers,
but arbitrarily assumed. Therefore, the price of risk does not reflect the con-
sumer’s expectations on consumption and inflation. On the contrary, Wachter
(2006) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) derive the stochastic discount factor
from consumer’s utility maximisation, and thus the relations between SDF,
consumption, and inflation are based on the macroeconomic theory. Neverthe-
less, they are imperfect since the processes for consumption and inflation are
exogenous in these models. In other words, these models can generate sizeable
and volatile term premium mostly because of their assumptions of negative
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correlation between consumption and inflation (both Wachter 2006; Piazzesi
and Schneider 2007) or of inflation as the predictor for the future consumption
growth path (Piazzesi and Schneider, 2007). The fact that the key ingredients
of their successes are not based on the consumer’s optimal choices, but just
on the exogenous assumptions, can be an important drawback of these partial
equilibrium models16.
In order to overcome the drawbacks of these partial equilibrium macro-
finance models, efforts to explain the anomalies of bond price behaviour within
the framework of DSGEmodels have been being made. In contrast with Wachter
(2006) who successfully generated sizeable term premium with the help of an
external habit, the production economy model with habit formation was not
very impressive in terms of replicating the bond pricing facts. The reason
is already pointed out by many authors (Jermann, 1998; Boldrin et al., 2001;
Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008; De Paoli et al., 2010). By incorporating habit
formation, Wachter (2006) was able to amplify the curvature of the utility func-
tion and increase the consumer’s distaste for volatile consumption. This con-
sequently induced consumers to ask for a higher risk premium for a risky
asset. However, contrary to the endowment economy model, consumers have
an additional margin to smooth consumption in response to shocks by adjusting
labour supply in production economy models. For this reason, the consumers in
production economy models require less premium than in endowment models.17
More recently, Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) showed that the DSGE model
with EZ preference and very high level of CRRA can generate sizeable and
16Rudebusch and Wu (2008) also mentioned that their partial equilibrium model is “just an
intermediate step between the purely empirical models and deep theoretical models”.
17Despite Hördahl et al. (2008) argued that their DSGE model with habit formation success-
fully generated sizeable term premiums, their seemingly successful results are mainly from
a very large and persistent technology shocks. In order to stabilise the volatile processes of
macro variables resulted from the large and persistent technology shocks, they had to rely on
extremely high level of monetary policy smoothing parameter and zero output gap coefficient.
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volatile term premium without distorting the fit of macroeconomic variables.
More details on this model will be discussed in Section 2.4.
2.3 Shiller test with recent data
Before jumping into the DSGE models, let us briefly sketch and apply Shiller
(1979)’s method to document the existence of excess volatility. Under the
expectations hypothesis, n−period interest rate, R(n)t , should be equal to the








γKEt (rt+K) , (2.27)
where γ ≡ 1/ (1 +R), and R is a discount rate for the future. Also, 1-period













t denotes the price of n−period bond at time t, and C denotes the
coupon. Substituting the price of the bond (assuming principal at maturity
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1− 1/ (1 +R)n−1]−1}−1 = γ (1−γn−1
1−γn
)
. When the maturity
becomes infinity, Equation (2.31) becomes
H˜t = (Rt − γRt+1) / (1− γ) , (2.32)
where superscript (∞) is abstracted. In a similar way, when the maturity
becomes infinity, Equation (2.27) becomes
Rt = (1− γ)
∞∑
K=0
γKEt (rt+K) . (2.33)
From Equation (2.33), Shiller defined "ex post rational long-term rate", R∗t , as
follows:




Then from Equation (2.33) and (2.34), he defined forecast error for the ex post
long-term rate, R∗t − EtR∗t = R∗t − Rt. As the forecast error is uncorrelated with
time t information set, the following conditions hold:
E [(R∗t −Rt)Rt−τ ] = 0 ∀τ ≥ 0 and
E [(R∗t −Rt) rt−τ ] = 0 ∀τ ≥ 0. (2.35)
Now we are ready to derive the variance of (linearised) holding period return,






[(−1 + γ2)V ar(Rt) + 2 (1− γ)Cov (rt, Rt)] . (2.36)
By differentiating Equation (2.36) with respect to V ar(Rt), we are given the
upper bound for V ar(H˜) as follows:




1− γ2) , (2.37)
where ρrR is correlation coefficient between rt and Rt; and from here, we get
the condition, σ(H˜) < ρrRσ (r)
√
1− γ2, or
σ(H˜) < aσ (rˆ) , (2.38)
where a ≡
√
(1− γ2) and rˆ is the fitted value of a regression of rt on Rt.19
In this section, the same test was conducted with two recent long-term
interest rate series from the US and the UK. For the US, 30-year zero coupon
bond yields from 1986Q1 to 2016Q4 were used; and consol yields from 1960Q1
to 2016Q4 were used for the UK. For the short-term interest rates, 3 month
T-bill rates were used for both countries. The results are summarised in Table
2.1. For the US, the standard deviation of the linearised holding period return,
σ(H˜), is 1.8 times as large as the theoretical maximum level calculated under
the expectations hypothesis. Similar results were obtained with the UK data
where the volatility of long-term rates are 1.5 to 2.8 times as large as their
theoretical upper limits depending on the time periods concerned. Such results
are not quite different from the Shiller’s original results where the volatility







from Equation (2.33) and
(2.34), then use the condition that Rt −R∗t is uncorrelated with Rt−τ for all τ ≥ 0. See footnote
13 from Shiller (1979) for more details.
19ρ2rRV ar (r) = V ar (rˆ) is used.
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maturity(n) ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 120
γn 0.9776 0.9775 0.9894 0.9810 0.9826
a 4.75 4.74 6.88 5.16 5.38
σ(rˆ) 2.28 2.54 1.24 2.28 2.08
aσ (rˆ) 10.80 12.06 8.54 16.92 11.20
σ(H˜) 27.50 21.19 23.57 25.51 20.32
σ(H˜)/aσ (rˆ) 2.55 1.75 2.76 1.51 1.81
Note: For the UK, quarterly averages of consol yields provided by the Bank of England
are used. For the US, quarterly average of 30-year zero coupon yields constructed by
Gürkaynak et al. (2007) are used. H˜t and γn are calculated from Equation (2.31) with n
indicated. Sample average of long-term interest rates were used for R.
of six different long-term rates were around 1.2 to 4.4 times as large as their
theoretical upper limits.
2.4 Exposition of the Puzzle with DSGE model
In Section 2.3, we saw that there still exists the excess volatility puzzle using
Shiller’s methodology. In other words, the long-term interest rate were more
volatile than their theoretical upper limit calculated under the expectations
hypothesis. In this section, we examine whether the artificial data generated
by a medium scale New Keynesian DSGE model gives the same results. We
provide the stylized facts on bond prices in the US and the UK in subsection
2.4.1, and examine how well various New Keynesian DSGE models replicate
the stylized facts in subsection 2.4.2, 2.4.3 and 2.4.4.
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2.4.1 Stylized facts
Now let us look at the key stylized facts for the term structure of interest rates
in the US and the UK. Table 2.2 and 2.3 provide the descriptive statistics for key
indicators: per capita real GDP, Yt, inflation rate, πt, 3-month treasury bill rate,




t , and 2- and 10-




t . The inflation denotes an
annualized quarterly percentage change in personal consumption expenditure
price index. The quarterly averages of daily (annualized) rates were used for
the interest rates and the forward rates. The standard deviation of Yt was
calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filtered data, but all the other statistics in
Table 2.2 and 2.3 were computed with raw data. The detailed sources of the
data can be found in Table 2.4.
In Table 2.2 and 2.3, the full sample covers the period from 1971Q3 to
2016Q4 for the US, and from 1971Q2 to 2016Q4 for the UK. The full sample
is divided into three sub-sample periods. The first subperiod, before 1986, can
be characterized as the period of high inflation hand in hand with high interest
rates in both countries. The second subperiod, from 1986 to 2007, is the period
of so-called Great Moderation, where both economies experienced a long period
of low volatility in business cycles and persistent growth in output, but more
particularly in the US. The last subperiod, after 2008, covers the period of and
after the Great recession when unconventional monetary policies have been
actively conducted by the central banks of both countries20. The sub-periods
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Table 2.2: Stylized facts of the US term structure








Y t 2.17 0.74 0.13 1.05 0.56 0.50
pit 2.45 0.84 0.32 0.90 0.48 0.34
rt 2.92 1.00 1.00 1.87 1.00 1.00
R
(2)
t 2.62 0.90 0.95 1.87 1.00 0.96
R
(10)
t 2.39 0.82 0.84 1.52 0.82 0.75
f
(2)
t 2.46 0.84 0.85 1.74 0.93 0.87
f
(10)
t 2.38 0.82 0.79 1.39 0.74 0.51








Y t 1.06 2.29 0.42 1.50 0.44 0.17
pit 0.82 1.76 0.26 2.44 0.71 0.67
rt 0.47 1.00 1.00 3.44 1.00 1.00
R
(2)
t 0.53 1.13 0.89 3.47 1.01 0.98
R
(10)
t 0.83 1.79 0.46 2.85 0.83 0.92
f
(2)
t 0.63 1.35 0.65 3.31 0.96 0.95
f
(10)
t 1.16 2.50 0.31 2.46 0.72 0.85
Note: σx denotes the standard deviation of variable x, σx/σr is the
standard deviation of variable x over that of short-term interest rate, and
ρrx is the correlation between variable x and short-term interest rate. Yt is
the per capita GDP (HP-filtered), pit is the annualized percentage change
in personal consumption expenditure price index from the previous




t are 2- and 10-year




t are 2- and 10-year ahead instantaneous
forward rate. All the interest rates and forward rates are quarterly
averages of daily numbers.
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Table 2.3: Stylized facts of the UK term structure
1971Q2 - 1986Q4 1986:Q1 - 2007:Q4




Y t 1.99 0.69 0.12 1.18 0.39 0.19
pit 6.18 2.13 0.36 2.58 0.85 0.67
rt 2.90 1.00 1.00 3.04 1.00 1.00
R
(2)
t 2.23 0.77 0.95 2.47 0.81 0.96
R
(10)
t 1.87 0.65 0.78 2.28 0.75 0.85
f
(2)
t 2.00 0.69 0.86 2.24 0.74 0.88
f
(10)
t 2.47 0.85 0.40 2.22 0.73 0.73
2008Q1 - 2016:Q4 Full sample




Y t 1.48 1.08 0.58 1.55 0.37 0.16
pit 1.95 1.42 0.50 5.62 1.34 0.61
rt 1.37 1.00 1.00 4.20 1.00 1.00
R
(2)
t 1.17 0.85 0.96 3.87 0.92 0.98
R
(10)
t 0.97 0.71 0.64 3.67 0.87 0.90
f
(2)
t 1.17 0.85 0.77 3.80 0.90 0.93
f
(10)
t 0.95 0.69 0.29 3.82 0.91 0.77
Note: Refer to the note from Table 2.2.
selected in this chapter also roughly coincide with the personnel changes of
the Fed21.
The first columns in each panel in Table 2.2 and 2.3 give the standard
deviations, σx, of the key variables for the full sample and the three sub-sample
periods. Comparing the subperiods reveals a clear declining trend in volatility
20 The first quantitative easing, QE hereafter, was initiated in November 2008 in the US, and
March 2009 in the UK.
21The first subperiod can be named as the pre-Greenspan period, and the Fed was chaired
by Alan Greenspan (from November 1987 to January 2006) in most of the second subperiod.
During the last period, the Fed was under Ben Bernanke’s presidency (from February 2006 to
February 2014) for most of the time.
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Table 2.4: Data sources for stylized facts
Series Source Details
US real GDP BEA NIPA table 1.1.6
real consumption BEA NIPA table 2.2.3
population (+16) BLS CNP16OV
GDP deflator BEA NIPA table 1.1.9
3 month T-bill rate FRED TB3MS
zero coupon yields and
forward rates
see note -
UK real GDP ONS ABMM
real consumption ONS ABJR+HAYO
population (+16) ONS MGSL
GDP deflator ONS (ABJQ+HAYE)/(ABJR+HAYO)
3 month T-bill rate FRED INTGSTGBM193N
zero coupon yields and
forward rates
BOE BOE yield curve archive
Note: Gürkaynak et al. (2010b).
of the interest rates. The second column provides the relative volatilities, σx/σr,
of the key variables defined as the standard deviation of each variable over that
of the short-term interest rate. In general, the relative volatility decreased as
the maturity increases, but even the 10-year ahead forward rates are around
80% as volatile as the short-term rates in the full sample in both countries.
In contrast to the other two subperiods, the third subperiod shows clearly
different pattern from the full sample. During the third subperiod, especially
in the US, 10-year spot rate, R
(10)
t , and 10-year ahead forward rate, f
(10)
t , were
much more volatile than the short-term interest rates, rt. This seems mainly
because the short-term rate was almost tied to zero since the beginning of
QE, while the long-term rates were allowed to fluctuate22. The correlation
22It does not seem that the UK data shows the similar behaviour as the US data in this period.
It may be attributable to the fact that the Bank of England began its QE several quarters later
than the Fed. If we use the data from 2009Q1 to 2016Q4, the relative volatilities of f (10) become
very large in both countries (1,156% in the US and 967% in the UK).
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of each variable with the short-term interest rate, which is presented in the
third column, shows the similar pattern as the relative volatility: The longer
the maturity, the smaller the correlation with the short-term rates. Also note
that the correlations in the third subsample periods were much lower than the
other two subsample periods in both countries.
The two interesting findings from the stylized facts in Table 2.2 and 2.3
are the sizeable volatility in the long-term bond yields and their close positive
correlation with the short-term interest rates. One of the possible explanation
can be found from Gürkaynak et al. (2005) which shows that far-away (even up
to 15 years ahead) forward rates respond to the unexpected shocks to various
current macroeconomic variables such as consumer price index, GDP, unem-
ployment, etc. Under the expectations hypothesis where no premium exists,
forward rate should be equal to the expectation of short-term interest rate
over the same horizon. If that is the case, the volatile long-term interest rates
can only be explained by the expected future short-term rates being around
80% as volatile as current short-term rates. Put differently, in order to be
able to generate volatile enough long-term interest rate under the expectations
hypothesis, either the shocks in the model are very persistent (as in Hördahl
et al., 2008) or the model is equipped with an appropriate mechanism which
transfers the impacts on the short-term rate into its far-future expectations.
These will be discussed in the following sections.
2.4.2 Baseline DSGE model
In this subsection, we use a slightly modified version of Smets and Wouters
(2007) as our baseline model for the analysis under the expectations hypothesis.
The baseline model of Smets and Wouters (2007) is most commonly used as
the workhorse for the macroeconomic analysis. We also conduct sensitivity
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analyses using alternative parameter calibrations to see how they affect the
relative volatility of long-term interest rates.
2.4.2.1 Model Summary
Our baseline model is mainly based on Smets and Wouters (2007), and assumes
the similar frictions and shocks as they did. However, as we are going to use
up to third-order approximation of the model in Section 2.4.3 to examine the
role of time-varying term premium, we slightly simplify the model of Smets and
Wouters (2007) such that we can explicitly and compactly write the non-linear
equilibrium conditions recursively. As the two models are not very different,
the description of the model will focus only on the differences between the two
models.
(Households) The optimization problem of the representative household is




















Here we assume the preference shock, εbt , following an AR(1) process, instead
of the premium shock used in Smets and Wouters (2007). Each households
faces the following budget constraint:
Ct,j + It,j +
Bt,j
RtPt









−a (zt,j)Kt−1,j +Divt,j, (2.40)
where all the households are given same wage, W ht , for they supply homogen-
eous labours to the union, andDivt,j denotes the profits from intermediate good
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producers and unions. The low of motion of capital is given as follows:
Kt,j = (1− δ)Kt−1,j + εIt [1− S (It,j, It−1,j)] It,j. (2.41)
In addition, we explicitly specified the functional form of the capital utilization
cost:
a (zt,j) = δ1 (zt,j − 1) + δ2
2
(zt,j − 1)2 , (2.42)
and the investment adjustment cost:









and the investment shock, εIt , is assumed to follow an AR(1) process.
(Price and wage setting) The assumptions on labour and goods market
structure are similar to Smets and Wouters (2003) with a minor modification
on markup shocks. There is a competitive final good firm who aggregates inter-
mediate goods produced by monotonically competitive intermediate good pro-










instead of using Kimball (1995) aggregator used in Smets and Wouters (2007).
We also replaced the time-varying price markup, λp,t, in Smets and Wouters
(2007) with constant price markup, λP , and added wedge type markup shock,















where Pˆt,i denotes the optimal price of ith intermediate good and X
p
t,s is the














if s ≥ 1.
The same changes are made in the wage setting procedure too. We assume
that the competitive labour packer uses the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
and the time-varying price markup, λw,t, is replaced with λw and ε
w
t . We also
assume AR(1) processes for these two shocks in the same manner as the other
shocks. These modifications are made just because it is tricky to write the
non-linear price and wage setting equations recursively when there is a time-
varying markup in the exponents. The productivity shock, εat , follows the same
process as in Smets and Wouters (2007).
(Government and Monetary policy) The ratio of government spending to
trend output, εgt = Gt/(y∗γ










+ ηgt + ρgaη
a, (2.46)
where Gt is real government spending, y∗ is the steady state level of detrended
real output, and εg
∗
is the steady state ratio of government spending over output.
ηgt and η
a
t are i.i.d. shocks on government spending and productivity, respect-


















where εrt follows AR(1) process. Here, we use the steady state level of real
output Y∗ instead of the flexible price/wage economy output level of Y
f
t used
by Smets and Wouters (2007). More importantly, the inflation target is allowed
to be time-varying. For this purpose, we added two more equations borrowed
from Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) as below:
π∗t = ρpi∗π
∗
t−1 + ϑpi∗(π¯t − π∗t ), (2.48)
and
log π¯t = θpi log π¯t−1 + (1− θpi) log πt. (2.49)
Except for these differences, the model maintains most of the key features of
Smets and Wouters (2007).
2.4.2.2 Baseline results
The baseline parameter values are reported in Table 2.5. Most of the structural
parameters and size of shocks are equal to the estimates of Smets and Wouters
(2007) except for (inverse of) elasticity of intertemporal substitution in con-
sumption σc, steady state level of price and wage markup, λp and λw, and the
standard deviation of price and wage markup shocks, σp and σw. We set σc = 2.0
following Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) which is somewhat larger than the
estimate of Smets and Wouters (2007), 1.39. This is just to avoid σEZ being to
large when matching the term premium of 100 basis points in subsection 2.4.3.
The steady state level of markups are set as λp = 0.2 and λw = 0.5 following
Levin et al. (2006) and Smets and Wouters (2003), respectively. As we use a
different specification for the markup shocks from those of Smets and Wouters
(2007), we calibrated the size of these two shocks so that the model matches
the volatility of output growth, consumption growth, inflation and short-term
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interest rates of the US data which are used to construct Table 2.2 (full sample,
1971Q3 - 2016Q4). As we use the first order approximation of the model and
do not assume time-varying inflation target in this subsection, we let σEZ = 0,
ρpi∗ = 1 and ϑpi∗ = 0 for our baseline model.
Given that all the discussions in this subsection are made under the expecta-
tions hypothesis, we solved the first-order approximation of our baseline model,
and then generated 10,000 periods of simulated data, including 39 forecasts
for the future short-term rates in each period. Using the simulated data, we











t denotes n−period interest rate, and Etrt+k denotes time t expecta-
tion of k−period ahead short-term interest rate from the model.
Table 2.6 provides the summary of the baseline results. The first two columns
show the standard deviation and relative volatility of the key macro and bond
price variables from the actual data, and the last two columns show those
from the simulated data. Even though the baseline model well replicates the
volatility of actual output growth, consumption growth, inflation and short-term
interest rate, the model implied long-term interest rates (computed under the
expectations hypothesis) seem to be too stable compared to the actual data. For
example, the actual 10-year zero coupon bond yields were 83% as volatile as
the short-term rates, but the standard deviation of the (baseline) model implied
10-year yield is only 21% of that of short-term rate. Similarly, the expectation
for the 10-year ahead short-term rate given by the model (Etrt+39) is only 15%
as volatile as the current short-term rates, but it was 72% in the actual data. In
short, despite of the model’s good fit to the macro variables, the expectations
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Table 2.5: Baseline calibration
(Structural parameters)
Parameter Description Parameter Description
σc 2.00 IES in consumption ρ 0.81 policy rate smoothing
σl 1.90 labour supply elasticity ψ1 2.03 inflation gap coefficient
λ 0.71 degree of habit ψ2 0.08 output gap coefficient
ξp 0.65 price stickiness ψ3 0.22 growth rate coefficient
ξw 0.73 wage stickiness ρpi∗ 0.99 AR(1) coefficient for pi
∗
t
ιp 0.22 price indexation ϑpi∗ 0.01 response of pi
∗ to pit
ιw 0.69 wage indexation θpi 0.7 controlling duration of pit
λp 0.20 steady state price markup α 0.19 capital share in income
λw 0.50 steady state wage markup pi∗ 0.81 steady state inflation
Φ 1.61 fixed cost β 0.16 discount factor
φ 5.48 investment adj. cost γ 0.43 balanced growth rate
δ1 0.035 first derivative of util. cost ε
g
∗ 0.18 gov. spending over output
δ2 0.019 second derivative of utili. cost σEZ - EZ parameter
Note: β ≡ 100 (β−1 − 1) and γ ≡ 100× log γ. Note also that, for the baseline model,
time-varying inflation target is not assumed, that is, ρpi∗ = 1 and ϑpi∗ = 0. In subsection
2.4.2.2 and 2.4.2.3, σEZ = 0 is used as we assume expected utility preference, and in




σa 0.45 ρa 0.95 productivity shock
σb 0.24 ρb 0.18 preference shock
σg 0.52 ρg 0.97 spending shock
σi 0.45 ρi 0.71 investment shock
σr 0.24 ρr 0.12 monetary shock
σp 0.40 ρp 0.90 price markup shock
σw 0.40 ρw 0.97 wage markup shock
ρga 0.52 correlation between a, g shocks
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Table 2.6: Too stable long-term rates from the baseline model
Actual (US) Model implied
σx σx/σr σx σx/σr
dyt 3.19 0.93 3.28 0.93
dct 2.62 0.76 2.34 0.78
pit 2.44 0.71 2.95 0.79
rt 3.44 1.00 3.43 1.00
R
(2)
t 3.47 1.01 2.17 0.63
R
(10)
t 2.85 0.83 0.73 0.21
f
(2)
t (or Etrt+7) 3.31 0.96 0.94 0.28
f
(10)
t (or Etrt+39) 2.46 0.72 0.51 0.15
Note : Moments for the actual data are calculated from the same data as
in Table 2.2 for the period from 1971Q3 - 2016Q4. dyt and dct denote
quarterly output and consumption growth rates expressed in percent. The
model moments are obtained by simulating the baseline model for 10,000
periods.
given by the model were too stable to replicate the behaviour of the actual
long-term interest rates under the expectations hypothesis.
We also examined how well the current unexpected shocks are transmitted
into the future using the baseline model simulated data. For this, we examined
the relation between the response of current short-term rate to unexpected
shocks and the responses of various (1 to 40 quarter ahead) expected short-
term rates to the same unexpected shocks. This can be done by simply re-
gressing the unexpected change in the expectation of k-period ahead short-term
rate (Etrt+k − Et−1rt+k) on the unexpected change in the current short-term rate
(rt − Et−1rt):
Etrt+k − Et−1rt+k = αk + βk (rt − Et−1rt) + ǫt. (2.51)
When there is no unexpected shock at time t, rt and Etrt+k should be equal to
those are expected at time t−1; i.e., rt = Et−1rt and Etrt+k = Et−1rt+k. Therefore,
(rt − Et−1rt) and (Etrt+k − Et−1rt+k) are the unexpected changes in current and
expected short-term rates due to the unexpected shocks revealed at time t.
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Figure 2.2 shows the βk coefficients from all 40 regressions. The unexpected
shocks at time-t that increases rt by 1 percent point raises Etrt+1 by more
than 100 basis points in the baseline model (solid black line), but βk rapidly
decreases as the expectation horizon extends, and it becomes less than 2 basis
points when the expectation horizon is longer than 15 quarters. This result
is quite different from the empirical evidence observed by other authors. As
already mentioned, Gürkaynak et al. (2005) showed that even far-ahead for-
ward rates strongly respond to current shocks on macro and monetary vari-
ables. They showed that, for example, 1 percent point surprise of monetary
policy announcement changes 10 year ahead forward rates by 16 basis points.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) also showed that a shock that increases 2-year
nominal interest rate by around 1 percent point also raises the 5- and 10-year
ahead real forward rates by 47 basis points and 12 basis points, respectively.23
Gilchrist et al. (2014) and Hanson and Stein (2015) reported similar results. We
show, however, that our baseline DSGE model cannot replicate such empirical
findings. In order to match these empirical findings, a lot stronger responses of
Etrt+39 are required to the current shocks. For comparison, we also presented
the results when time-varying inflation target is incorporated to the baseline
model (setting ρpi∗ = 0.99 and ϑpi∗ = 0.01) in Figure 2.2, and the result suggests
that allowing time varying inflation target may help increase the responses of
far future expectations.
23Note that Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) are different in
interpreting their results. The former argue that the current shocks affect far-ahead nominal
forward rates through inflation expectations. However, Nakamura and Steinsson (2013) argue
that most of the responses of the far-ahead nominal forward rates are from the responses of
the real forward rates, not the inflation expectations.
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Figure 2.2: Responses of expected short-term rates to unexpected shocks









Estimates from the OLS regressions




2.4.2.3 Sensitivity analysis with alternative parameters
In this subsection, we conducted a sensitive analysis using alternative sets of
parameters to see how different parameters affect the relative volatility of long-
term interest rates, i.e., whether they may be able to increase the volatility of
far future expectations large enough to match the actual data. Specifically, we
first examined how different composition of shocks affect the relative volatility
of the long-term interest rates. We simulated the model for 10,000 periods
with different set of shocks and compared the relative volatilities calculated
in each case. We also tried different values of parameters controlling degree
of monetary policy smoothing (ρ), intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σc),
price and wage rigidities (ζp, ζw), degree of external habit (λ), and time-varying
inflation target (ρpi∗). Note again that all these analysis are made under the
expectations hypothesis.
(Composition of shocks) Table 2.7 shows how different shocks affect the
relative volatility of long-term interest rates. The panel (I) and (II) provide
the statistics from the actual data and the baseline model. Panel (III) shows the
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Table 2.7: Sensitivity analysis with different shocks
dy dc pi r R(2) R(10) Etrt+7 Etrt+39
(I) Actual σx 3.19 2.62 2.44 3.44 3.47 2.85 3.31 2.46
σx/σr 0.93 0.76 0.71 1.00 1.01 0.83 0.96 0.72
(II) Baseline σx 3.28 2.34 2.95 3.43 2.17 0.73 0.95 0.51
σx/σr 0.96 0.68 0.86 1.00 0.63 0.21 0.28 0.15
(III) Demand σx 2.97 2.13 1.93 3.00 1.91 0.56 0.82 0.40
σx/σr 0.99 0.71 0.64 1.00 0.64 0.19 0.27 0.13
Supply σx 1.30 0.96 2.27 1.73 1.07 0.43 0.44 0.27
σx/σr 0.75 0.56 1.31 1.00 0.62 0.25 0.25 0.16
(IV) shock a σx 1.23 0.89 2.16 1.65 1.03 0.40 0.38 0.25
σx/σr 0.74 0.54 1.31 1.00 0.62 0.25 0.23 0.15
shock b σx 1.32 1.98 0.57 0.85 0.36 0.07 0.08 0.02
σx/σr 1.55 2.34 0.67 1.00 0.42 0.08 0.10 0.03
shock g σx 2.14 0.33 0.52 1.20 0.69 0.44 0.44 0.38
σx/σr 1.79 0.28 0.44 1.00 0.58 0.37 0.37 0.31
shock i σx 1.47 0.20 1.45 2.56 1.79 0.40 0.74 0.23
σx/σr 0.57 0.08 0.57 1.00 0.70 0.16 0.29 0.09
shock r σx 0.68 0.72 1.06 0.83 0.19 0.03 0.10 0.00
σx/σr 0.82 0.86 1.27 1.00 0.23 0.04 0.12 0.00
shock p σx 0.40 0.31 0.62 0.36 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.01
σx/σr 1.13 0.88 1.75 1.00 0.43 0.09 0.38 0.03
shock w σx 0.20 0.24 0.34 0.26 0.16 0.06 0.06 0.03
σx/σr 0.78 0.92 1.29 1.00 0.63 0.24 0.23 0.13
Note: Demand shocks include b, g, i, r shocks and supply shocks consists of a, p, w
shocks. Model implied volatilities are calculated using 10,000 simulated data with
different set of shocks.
simulated results when only demand shocks (preference, government spending,
investment, and monetary policy shocks) or supply shocks (productivity, price
markup, and wage markup shocks) are used. When there exist only demand
shocks in the model, the volatilities of macro variables are not very different
from the baseline model, and the relative volatility of Etrt+39 becomes a little
bit smaller than the baseline result (15%→13%). On the contrary, when there
are only supply shocks in the model, the relative volatility of Etrt+39 becomes
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a bit larger the baseline model (16%), but still far lower than the actual data
(72%).
We also examined the seven cases where only one shock exists in the model
(see panel IV). Among the seven cases, only government-shock-only case gen-
erates the relativity volatility of Etrt+39 larger than the baseline model. Even
the results from the government-shock-only case is, however, still far lower
than the actual level of 72%. Figure 2.3 which provides the impulse response
of short-term interest rate to each of the seven shocks up to 40 periods tells
the same story. The results in table 2.7 and Figure 2.3 suggest that some
combinations of the shocks may increase the relative volatility of Etrt+39, but
it seems hard to reach the level from the actual data.
(Different value of structural parameters) Table 2.8 shows how the changes
in some parameter values affect the relative volatility of long-term interest
rates. Same as the Table 2.7, the top two panels show the statistics from
the actual data and the baseline model. The rest of the panels, from (III)
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Table 2.8: Sensitivity analysis with different parameters
dy dc pi r R(2) R(10) Etrt+7 Etrt+39
(I) Actual σx 3.19 2.62 2.44 3.44 3.47 2.85 3.31 2.46
σx/σr 0.93 0.76 0.71 1.00 1.01 0.83 0.96 0.72
(II) Baseline σx 3.28 2.34 2.95 3.43 2.17 0.73 0.95 0.51
σx/σr 0.96 0.68 0.86 1.00 0.63 0.21 0.28 0.15
(III) ρ = 0.20 σx 3.09 2.02 2.81 5.34 3.04 0.98 1.29 0.57
σx/σr 0.58 0.38 0.53 1.00 0.57 0.18 0.24 0.11
ρ = 0.99 σx 11.79 11.84 25.47 7.10 4.64 1.21 2.09 0.38
σx/σr 1.66 1.67 3.59 1.00 0.65 0.17 0.29 0.05
(IV) ζp = 0.01 σx 3.38 2.28 4.57 3.82 2.11 0.72 0.85 0.51
σx/σr 0.88 0.60 1.20 1.00 0.55 0.19 0.22 0.13
ζp = 0.99 σx 3.50 2.43 0.13 2.32 1.51 0.55 0.90 0.33
σx/σr 1.51 1.05 0.05 1.00 0.65 0.24 0.39 0.14
(V) ζw = 0.01 σx 3.82 1.91 3.79 3.74 2.12 0.73 0.86 0.51
σx/σr 1.02 0.51 1.01 1.00 0.57 0.19 0.23 0.14
ζw = 0.99 σx 3.45 2.77 1.78 2.51 1.57 0.50 0.82 0.32
σx/σr 1.37 1.10 0.71 1.00 0.62 0.20 0.33 0.13
(VI) σc = 0.7 σx 3.17 2.99 1.88 1.46 0.92 0.36 0.61 0.14
σx/σr 2.18 2.05 1.29 1.00 0.63 0.25 0.42 0.10
σc = 5.0 σx 3.51 3.09 4.45 5.66 3.71 1.77 2.02 1.53
σx/σr 0.62 0.55 0.79 1.00 0.66 0.31 0.36 0.27
(VII) λ = 0.01 σx 3.00 3.22 2.23 2.30 1.63 0.61 0.90 0.42
σx/σr 1.31 1.40 0.97 1.00 0.71 0.26 0.39 0.18
λ = 0.98 σx 3.26 2.40 4.61 5.39 3.51 1.77 1.88 1.47
σx/σr 0.60 0.44 0.86 1.00 0.65 0.33 0.35 0.27
(VIII) time-varying σx 3.29 2.36 5.16 5.50 4.73 4.19 4.32 4.20
inf. target σx/σr 0.60 0.43 0.94 1.00 0.86 0.76 0.78 0.76
Note: For the case of time-varying inflation target, we assumed that ρpi∗ = 0.99,
ϑpi∗ = 0.01 and θpi = 0.7 as in Table 2.5.
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to (VII), display the relative volatilities for the cases where some structural
parameters have extreme values while leaving other parameters unchanged.
For example, from the panel (III), we see that the relative volatility of Etrt+39
does not increase significantly even when we use a very small (ρ = 0.2) or a very
large (ρ = 0.9) values for the monetary policy smoothing parameter. The other
parameters tell the similar stories. We also examined the two parameters which
control the rigidities of price and wage, ζp and ζw. We chose to examine these
two parameters because the rigidities in price and wage are directly related
with the volatility in inflation, and thus in short-term interest rate as well.
However, as the result shows (panel IV and V), they did not significantly affect
the relative volatility of the long-term interest rate or far future expectations
for the short-term interest rate.
The parameters related with the consumer’s preference, σc and λ, also affect
the volatility of current short-term interest rate. Higher level of σc means smal-
ler intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and this implies a smaller change in
consumption for a given change in real interest rate. In other words, the larger
σc becomes, the more volatile the short-term interest rate becomes. When we
increase σc from 2.0 (baseline value) to 5.0, the relative volatility also rises
from 0.15 to 0.27 as seen from the panel (VI). However, it is still far lower
than the actual level of 0.72. Higher degree of external habit, λ, gives the
similar result. When λ increases, consumers respond to current shocks less
sensitively, and thus other variables, including short-term interest rate, become
more volatile. This change also increased the relative volatility, but not enough
to match the actual data. As we can see from Figure 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, the
extreme values in these parameters affect mostly the instant (and near future)
responses of short-term interest, but none of them seems to significantly change
far-future expectations. In short, under the expectations hypothesis, it seems
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hard to replicate the relative volatility of actual data by simply changing the
composition of shocks or with different set of parameter values.
(Allowing time-varying inflation target) The bottom panel (VIII) in Table
2.8 shows the results when we allowed time-varying inflation target using Equa-
tion (2.48) and (2.49), which were assumed to be constant in the previous
cases. The idea of time-varying inflation target is first introduced by Kozicki
and Tinsley (2001), and many authors accepted this idea for explaining their
empirical findings (Gürkaynak et al., 2005), interpreting the latent factors in
their macro-finance models (Dewachter and Lyrio, 2006; Rudebusch and Wu,
2008), or matching sizeable term premium in a DSGE based asset pricing
models (Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012; Hördahl et al., 2008).24 In our model,
we set ρpi∗ = 0.99 and ϑpi∗ = 0.01 following Rudebusch and Swanson (2012). In
contrast to the previous cases where even extreme values can hardly increase
the relative volatility of far-future expectations, the result in panel (VIII) shows
that allowing time-varying inflation target increases the relative volatility of
Etrt+39 to a significantly higher level.
The impulse response functions in Figure 2.7 help explain this result. As-
suming time-varying inflation target hardly affects the instant or near future
responses of short-term rates, but it significantly amplifies the responses of
far-future expectations. The mechanism behind this is as follows. When a
certain shock - e.g., a negative productivity shock - increases both current
short-term interest rate and inflation at the same time; and it also increases
the central bank’s inflation target through Equation (2.48) and (2.49). Then,
24Gürkaynak et al. (2005) explained why current unexpected shocks affect far-ahead forward
rates by assuming time-varying inflation target. In their model, the unexpected shocks that
raise current short-term rate also increase long-run inflation target, which in turn affect the
expectation for far-ahead nominal interest rate. In Dewachter and Lyrio (2006) and Rudebusch
and Wu (2008), the level factors of their macro-finance models are interpreted as time-varying
long-run inflation expectations. Hördahl et al. (2008) relied on the assumption of very persistent
(ρpi∗ = 0.999) time-varying inflation target to generate sizeable term premium.
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the increased inflation target raises the far-future expectations for nominal
interest rates. This explains why incorporating time-varying inflation target
enlarges the volatility of long-term interest rates disproportionately than that
of the short-term interest rate.
Note, however, that there are criticisms on the assumption of time-varying
inflation target. One of them is the lack of micro-foundation. In other words,
even though our results rely heavily on Equation (2.48) and (2.49), there is no
clear theory or empirical evidence that supports the assumption that central
banks revise their inflation target following the two equations.
2.4.3 DSGE model with Recursive Preference
When the expectations hypothesis is assumed as in the previous sections, volat-
ility of long-term interest rate is purely determined by the average expectations
of future short-term rates. Therefore, the DSGEmodel implied relative volatility
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of long-term interest rate is able to be enlarged only when the responses of
short-term rates to current shocks became significantly more persistent, and
this was well achieved when time-varying inflation target was incorporated
to the model. When the expectations hypothesis does not hold, however, the
volatility of long-term rate can be affected by term premiums as well.
To examine the role of term premium, we made two modifications to our
baseline model in subsection 2.4.2. First, we assumed that the representative
households optimise the welfare as follows:







where the period utility u (ct, ht) and the budget constraint are same as those
of the baseline model. This form of recursive preference is used by Rudebusch
and Swanson (2012) who rewrote the recursive preference of Epstein and Zin
(1989) for notational clarification. Under this assumption, the real stochastic
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where Ξt is the marginal utility of consumption. When EZ preference is as-





)1−σEZ] 11−σEZ)−σEZ , is added on top
of the SDF used in the baseline model with EU preference; and this term
determines how much consumers dislike consumption volatility across different
states. In other words, the larger σEZ (in absolute terms) makes consumers
become more reluctant to substitute consumption across different states (i.e.,
more risk-averse), and thus makes them ask more premium when investing in
risky assets.
When the expectations hypothesis is abandoned, long-term interest rate
cannot be represented as an average of future short-term rates. Instead, the
price of n-period zero coupon bond, P
(n)
t , is calculated as the expected value of














where Πt,t+n ≡ Pt+nPt denotes cumulative gross inflation from t to t + n. Also,













As there exist autocorrelation among real SDFs (real term premium) and cov-
ariance between SDF and inflation (inflation risk premium), R
(n)
t is, in general,
different from that is calculated under the expectations hypothesis. If the model
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is approximated higher than third order, these premiums (covariance terms)
can be time-varying and become the source of volatility in long-term interest
rate.
For the calculation of 10-year bond price and its term premium, we followed
the method used by Rudebusch and Swanson (2012). In order to save calcula-
tion time25, they used an infinitely lived consol-type bond where a unit of consol
issued at time-t pays δkc units of money as a coupon at t + k for all k ≥ 0. The
price of the decaying consol, P ct , satisfies












P ct − 1
)
. (2.57)
By setting δc = 0.9848, we set the duration of the decaying consol to 10 years
following Rudebusch and Swanson (2012). One can also calculate risk neutral
price (and yield to maturity) of the consol by replacing the stochastic discount
factor with nominal short-term interest rate26, and the difference between the
two YTMs gives the term premium by definition.
We solved and simulated the third-order approximation of the model to
generate time-varying term premium. The value of newly added parameter,
σEZ = −106, is calibrated such that the average term premium of 10-year
25When we use the typical zero-coupon bonds, we need 40 variables to calculate 10-year bond
price. However, when using the decaying consol following Rudebusch and Swanson (2012),
one can calculate the 10-year bond price by just setting δc such that the Macaulay duration (or
maturity) of the bond becomes 10-year, and thus one can save 39 variables.
26Under the expectations hypothesis, Equation (2.56) becomes P c,rnt = 1 + δce
−rtP c,rnt+1 where
the (nominal) stochastic discount factor is replaced with gross short-term rate, e−rt . Similarly,







. Then we can calculate the term




Table 2.9: Sensitivity analysis with EZ preference
dy dc pi r R(10,EH) R(10,EZ) TP
(I) Actual σx 3.19 2.62 2.44 3.44 2.85 n.a n.a
σx/σr 0.93 0.76 0.71 1.00 0.83 n.a n.a
(II) Baseline σx 3.28 2.34 2.95 3.43 0.75 n.a n.a
(first order) σx/σr 0.96 0.68 0.86 1.00 0.22 n.a n.a
(III) EZ, third σx 3.32 2.33 2.98 3.42 0.55 0.64 0.13
(σEZ = −106) σx/σr 0.97 0.68 0.87 1.00 0.16 0.19
(IV) EZ, third σx 3.45 2.79 3.29 4.04 0.76 0.88 0.16
(σEZ = −22.5) σx/σr 0.85 0.69 0.81 1.00 0.19 0.22
Note: R(10,EH) denotes the risk-neutral long-term interest rate, and R(10,EZ) is the risky
long-term interest rates with term premium. Both of them are calculated with decaying
consol with δc = 0.9848. TP denotes the standard deviation of term premium. In (IV), we
set σEZ = −22.5 and σc = 3 to keep the mean of term premium at 100 basis points.
nominal bonds from the model matches 100 basis points leaving all the other
parameters unchanged. Table 2.9 compares the results from actual data (I), the
baseline results27 with EU preference (II), and the EZ preference models (III,
VI).
The panel (III) shows that the relative volatility of 10-year interest rate from
the model with EZ preference, R(10,EZ), is only 0.19, which is far smaller than
0.83 from the actual data. Even though the model generated sizeable time-
varying term premium with EZ preference and this made the volatility of long-
term interest rate lager than that of risk-neutral rates, the standard deviation
of term premium is only 13 basis points, which does not seem to make much
difference. One more thing to note here is the trade-off between IES and CRRA.
By setting lower IES (higher σc), it is possible to match the same size of term
premium with lower CRRA (smaller σEZ in absolute term). As seen in the bottom
panel of Table 2.9, when we increase σc to 3.0 and decrease the absolute value
27The standard deviation of risk neutral yield to maturity, R(10,EH), in Table 2.9 is slightly
different from those in Table 2.7 and 2.8. It is just because the bond prices in this Table are
calculated using Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)’s decaying consol, instead of the standard
10-year zero coupon bonds.
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of σEZ to 22.5, the model generated more volatile long-term interest rates, keep
matching the mean term premium of 100 basis points. This gives us a hint
on how Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) successfully matched the volatility of
long-term interest rate using EZ preference, which we failed to do here.28
In addition, we should also note that this approach is not immune to criticism
as well. What is most frequently pointed out is the justification of the incredibly
high level of risk aversion. Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) used around -150
for σEZ , and Darracq Paries and Loublier (2010) show that σEZ should be
around -1,000 to generate term premium of 100 basis points if they use the
exactly same model as Smets and Wouters (2007). Moreover, as Darracq Paries
and Loublier (2010) also showed, the level of σEZ needed to match a certain
level of term premium changes dramatically depending on the value of other
parameters such as β, γ, and σc. Fuerst (2015) also pointed out that a simple
change in period utility function significantly changes the size of term premium
with given level of σEZ
29.
2.4.4 DSGE model with Bond Market Segmentation
In the DSGE models used in subsection 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, we assumed perfect
substitutability among the assets. However, there also exist DSGE models
where such assumption is abandoned. When imperfect substitutability among
assets is assumed, the rate of returns of bonds with different maturities can
vary even when investors are risk-neutral. Such models usually incorporate
28Note that Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) relied on very small IES (σc ≈ 9) to match the
volatility of long-term interest rates in their best-fit model. In their baseline model, where they
set σc = 2, the standard deviation of 10-year interest rate was not much different from that
of EU preference model. However, when they decreased the IES down to 0.11 in their best-fit
model, the standard deviation became more than twice as large as that of the EU preference
model and well matched the actual data.
29As an example, he showed that by simply adding a constant term in the utility function, a
lot larger σ is required to obtain the same size of term premium.
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imperfect substitutability by assuming that relative supply affects the sign and
size of term premium30. Andrés et al. (2004), Harrison (2011, 2012), and
Carlstrom et al. (2017) accepted this idea and modified the standard New
Keynesian DSGE model. These papers assume in common that there exist
some frictions in asset markets, and the frictions hinder the arbitrage ability of
households (or financial intermediaries) between long and short-term bonds.31
Different assumptions about the existence of such frictions lead to different
implications of the term premium. In section 2.4.3, we assumed frictionless
bond market, and thus term premium does not have any effect on real activities.
For example, we were able to choose any level of term premium by adjusting
σEZ without distorting the fit of key variables. However, in the DSGE models
with bond market segmentation, aggregate demand is affected not only by
short-term interest rate, but also long-term interest rate. Therefore, the size
of term premium can play an important role in business cycle. This can leads to
the different stance of monetary policy channel as well. While monetary policy
is conducted solely by changing short-term interest rates when no friction is
assumed, the assumption on segmented asset market allows an additional mon-
etary policy channel (Bernanke et al., 2002)32. For example, under the assump-
30This assumption reflects Tobin (1969)’s view that increasing the supply of one asset affects
not only the return of the asset but also the spread between the asset and other assets.
31Harrison (2011, 2012) can be regarded one of the simplest among the models with such
asset market frictions. Andrés et al. (2004), who introduced asset market segmentation in New
Keynesian DSGE model ahead of Harrison, is similar in that the household utility function is
augmented with an "arbitrary" portfolio adjustment cost. More micro-founded models for asset
market segmentation include Carlstrom et al. (2017). This model uses a similar approach to
Gertler and Karadi (2011) in order to limit the arbitrage ability of financial intermediary. More
specifically, the size of deposit issuance by the financial intermediary is linked to its net worth,
and it is costly for them to adjust the size of net worth.
32Keynes also made a similar argument in his book Treatise on money: “My remedy in the
event of the obstinate persistence of the slump would consist, therefore, in the purchase of
securities by the central bank until the long-term market rate of interest has been brought
down to the limiting point, which we shall have to admit a few paragraphs further on. It should
not be beyond the power of a central bank (international complications apart) to bring down the
long-term market-rate of interest to any figure at which it is itself prepared to buy long-term
securities” (Keynes, 1930)
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tion of segmented bond market, central banks may justify their intervention in
the long-term bond market (or quantitative easing) by arguing that a decrease
in relative supply of long-term bonds can leads to a decline in term premium.
This subsection explains how the volatility of long-term interest rate is af-
fected when the market segmentation assumption is incorporated into the stand-
ard New Keynesian DSGE model, using the models of Harrison (2011, 2012).
Since the focus of this subsection is to examine the mechanism by which the
term premium is determined in the DSGE model with the market segmentation
hypothesis, the description of the model focuses only to the part that differs
from the standard New Keynesian DSGE model by incorporating segmented
bond markets.33 The most distinctive difference of his models from the standard
DSGEmodel is the existence of portfolio adjustment cost in the household utility
function34, which creates imperfect substitution between short- and long-term































subject to the budget constraint
BL,t +Bt +Mt = RL,tBL,t−1 +RtBt−1 +Mt−1 +Wtnt + Tt +Dt − Ptct,
where RL,t denotes 1-period holding period return of the long-term bond (con-
sol) from t− 1 to t, and BL,t is its nominal amount. The household in this model
33Originally, Harrison (2011, 2012) developed his models to analyse the effect of asset
purchase policy of a central bank. However, we are only interested in the effect of market
segmentation on relative volatility of long-term interest rate, so we set the size of long-term
bond purchase, qt = 0, in our model.
34In Harrison (2011), which is a bit more complicated than Harrison (2012), the portfolio
adjustment cost exists in financial intermediary’s profit function. However, the two models give
very similar results.
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can save via both short- and long-term bonds35. The portfolio adjustment cost,
however, implies that the households have tendency to keep their portfolio mix
to a certain level, δ−1. This forces the household to tolerate the difference in
returns between the two assets. The parameter ν˜ determines the size of fric-
tion (or degree of market segmendation). The household optimization problem
gives the following (log-linearised) dynamic IS relation (Equation 2.58), term
premium (Equation 2.59), and a money demand relation (Equation 2.60):







EtRˆL,t+1 − Etπˆt+1 − r∗t
]
(2.58)























where lower-case letters denote real variables, variables with an asterisk are
steady states, and the hat is used to denote a log-deviation from their steady







Equation (2.58) and (2.59) most distinctly show the difference between this
model and the standard New Keynesian DSGE model. Because of the friction,
35In this model, the long-term bond denotes consol, and a unit of consol pays one unit of
currency each period for the infinite future.
36The following three first order conditions and yˆt = cˆt constitute Equation (2.58) and (2.59):
(∂ct) cˆt = Etcˆt+1 − σ
[




















Λˆt+1 − pˆit+1 + RˆL,t+1
]









Λˆt+1 − pˆit+1 + Rˆt
]
where Λˆ is real Lagrange multiplier.
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aggregate demand relies not only on the short-term interest rate, but on the
weighted average of both interest rates. Note that Equation (2.58) collapses to
the standard dynamic IS equation when there is no friction (ν˜ = 0). Equation
(2.59) shows that the term premium - the difference between the expected 1-
period holding period return of long-term bonds, EtRˆL,t+1, and the short-term
interest rate, Rˆt - depends on the relative suppy of the two bonds, bˆt − bˆL,t.
There exist monopolistically competitive intermediate good firms. They hire
only labours to produce their intermediate goods and set their prices under
Calvo (1983) pricing scheme where α = 0.75 of them cannot change the price in
each term. Wage rigidity is not included in this model. This gives the following
Phillips curve:
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 + κyˆt, (2.62)
where κ ≡ (1−α)(1−βα)
α
(ψ − σ−1) . Finally the model is closed with two additional
equations: monetary policy rule,
Rˆt = ρRRˆt−1 + (1− ρR) (φpiπˆt + φyyˆt) + ηRt , (2.63)






















We generated 10,000 simulated data from this model using two i.i.d. exo-
genous shocks - real interest rate shock and monetary policy shock - whose
37To stabilise the total debt stock, the following transfer rule,
τ
b
τˆt = −β−1Rˆt−1 − θbˆt−1,
where τt denotes real government transfer to households, is incorporated into the government
budget constraint.
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Table 2.10: Parameter values
Parameter Description Parameter Description
σ 6 IES θ 0.025 feedback in tax rule
β 0.9925 discount factor ρ∗ 0.85 AR(1) of natural real rate
κ 0.024 slope of Phillips curve σr∗ 0.01 s.d. of natural real rate shock
σm 6 money demand elasticity φpi 1.5 policy response to inflation
m/b 0.001 steady state m/b φy 0.5 policy response to output gap
δ 3 steady state b/bL ρ 0.85 policy rate inertia
pi∗ 0 steady state inflation σR 0.01 s.d. of monetary policy shock
Note: κ = 0.024 is from α = 0.75 and ψ = 0.11.






ν˜ = 0 6.47 1.20 0.19
ν˜ = 0.1 7.87 1.06 0.13
ν˜ = 0.2 8.88 0.99 0.11
Note: ν˜ = 0 means New Keynesian model with no friction. The 40-period
interest rate, R
(10)
t , is calculated using the average of expected 1-period
holding period returns of the consol: 140
∑40
i=1EtRˆL,t+i.
standard deviations are assumed to be 1%. The parameter values are provided
in Table 2.10, and they are same as those in Harrison (2012)38.
The results are summarized in Table 2.11. In the table, we compared the
three cases where ν˜ = 0, 0.1, and 0.2. When ν˜ = 0, there is no friction in
the economy and the two bonds are perfect substitutes, and thus the model
becomes the standard New Keynesian DSGE model. The table shows that, as
the bond market becoms more and more segmented, i.e., ν˜ gets larger, the
standard deviation of short-term interest rate becomes larger, but at the same
time, that of long-term interest rate becomes smaller. This result suggests that
the friction specified in this model actually lowers the relative volatility of long-
term interest rate than that of the standard New Keynesian model.
38Harrison took most of the parameter values from Levin et al. (2010) except for the steady
state ratio of long-term bonds to short-term bonds, δ, which is calibrated from the U.S. data.
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Figure 2.8: The IRFs from segmented market model
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Note: Expressed in annualized percent unit.
These results can be reconfirmed from the IRFs in Figure 2.8. Regardless
of the type of shocks, the larger friction leads to the greater response of the
short-term interest rate, and the smaller response of the long-term interest
rate. This can be explained from the two key equations of the model; Equation
(2.58) and (2.59). These equations tell that the aggregate demand depends
solely on short-term interest rate when there exists no friction (ν˜ = 0), but it
depends on the weighted average of the two interest rates when the friction
exists (ν˜ > 0). For this reason, the short-term interest rates respond less and
less sensitively to shocks as friction gets bigger.
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Let us think more deeply about the results with the example of a positive
monetary policy shock. In this model, a positive monetary policy shock means
an unexpected increase in short-term bond supply, or an unexpected decrease
in relative supply of long-term bonds39. Therefore, the shock has a negative
effect on long-term interest rate when ν˜ > 0. This negative effect on long-term
interest rate mitigates the negative effect of a positive monetary policy shock on
aggregate demand, and such an effect becomes stronger as ν˜ becomes larger.
In general, to equate monetary policy rule (Equation 2.63) again after a positive
monetary policy shock, we need a higher Rˆt and/or lower aggregate demand.
That is to say, as the market segmentation gets stronger, a larger increase in
Rˆt is required to equate Equation (2.63) again given the same size of shocks. A
similar explanation can be made for the case of demand shock as well. In short,
given the same size of shocks, the friction magnifies the required change in
short-term interest rate, but it allows smaller change in long-term interest rate,
and thus, increases (decreases) the volatility of short-term (long-term) interest
rate.
In terms of the relatively volatility, this example illustrates that the volatility
of long-term interest from the New Keynesian DSGE model with asset mar-
ket segmentation can even be smaller than those from the standard models.
Even though this conclusion may not be true to all the models with market
segmentation, at least Harrison (2011, 2012) - the models where a relative
supply affects the size of term premium - are not successful in generating more
volatile long-term interest than the standard DSGE models.
39The real stock of consol is assumed to be held fixed in this model.
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2.5 Conclusion and Summary
This chapter surveyed the key papers in the field of term structure of interest
rate and asset pricing, and examined the characteristics of the models from a
macroeconomic standpoint. Especially from the viewpoint of central bankers,
a general equilibrium model which can explain the behaviour of both macroe-
conomic variables and bond pricing facts is necessary to conduct successful
monetary policies. Nevertheless, even the most widely used models are only
partially useful for either macroeconomic analysis or bond pricing.
This chapter re-confirmed that the most widely praised medium scale DSGE
model of Smets and Wouters (2007) is also very poor at replicating volatile
long-term interest rate observed from the data. From here, we surveyed various
modifications made to the DSGE model and investigated whether and how
each approach may or may not improve the ability of DSGE model in terms
of replicating key bond pricing facts.
Under the expectations hypothesis, one of the effective way seems to be to
incorporate the concept of time-varying inflation target. If a positive shock to
current short-term rate also has a positive effect on inflation target, its effect
on short-term rates becomes more persistent. This can increase the response
of long-term interest rate even under the expectations hypothesis. However,
consensus on such an assumption on central bank behaviour does not seem to
exist yet.
Generating more volatile term premia may help when the expectations hy-
pothesis is abandoned. We examined two ways of incorporating term premium
into DSGE models. When perfect substitution between assets is assumed, one
can rely on EZ preference and very high level of risk aversion to match the
bond pricing facts while keeping the fit of macro variables. However, this modi-
fication was not very successful in matching the relative volatility of long-term
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interest rate from the actual data. Moreover, this approach is receiving criti-
cism as there is not enough justification for the extreme level of risk aversion.
Alternatively, one may explain the existence of term premium with the DSGE
models augmented with asset market frictions. The frictions in these models en-
able asset market segmentation by limiting investor’s arbitrage ability between
assets with different maturities. However, the results from Harrison (2012)
show that models with such frictions may generate even more stable long-term
interest rate than those from the standard New Keynesian DSGE model.
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bonds: prices and benefits within
the framework of New Keynesian
DSGE model
3.1 Introduction
The idea of issuing GDP-indexed government bonds goes back at least to the
1980s. After the debt crises of emerging market countries in 1980s, Bailey
(1983) suggested to link a government’s debt payments to the export of issuing
country, and Krugman (1988) also suggested the idea of indexing government
debt cash flows to some indices such as oil prices or world interest rates which
is hard to be manipulated by the government. This idea was further developed
by Shiller (1993, 2003) who proposed to issue consol type state-contingent debt
instruments named as ’Trills’. The name came from the fact that one unit of
Trill pays one trillionth of the US nominal GDP at each period perpetually. The
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idea has been gaining interest again recently as many advanced countries are
suffering from high level of government debt (see Barr et al., 2014; Blanchard
et al., 2016; Bowman et al., 2016; Benford et al., 2016; IMF, 2017).
The previous works on GDP-indexed government bonds focus mainly on its
benefits in terms of government debt management. The two major benefits to
the government from issuing growth-indexed bonds are common in the liter-
ature. First of all, growth-indexed bonds may stabilise the government debt
dynamics particularly when the government cannot flexibly adjust its primary
surplus in response to slower growth or increase in debt-to-GDP ratio. Second
benefit is that it helps to reduce the pressure of conducting pro-cyclical fiscal
policy.
For the first benefit, consider the following debt-to-GDP ratio identity which
shows the evolution of a sovereign’s debt stock:
dt+1 − dt = (rt − gt+1)
1 + gt+1
dt − st+1, (3.1)
where dt is the debt-to-GDP ratio at time t, rt is the real interest rate on debt
at time t to be repaid at t + 1, gt+1 is the real GDP growth rate from t to t + 1,
and st+1 is the primary balance as a proportion of real GDP at period t + 1.
According to Equation (3.1), all else being equal, a slower GDP growth raises
the debt-to-GDP ratio. If the government cannot increase its primary surplus
enough to stabilise its debt-to-GDP for some reasons1, that may eventually lead
to a debt explosion. On the contrary, If the government debt repayments are
fully or partially indexed to GDP growth, a slower GDP growth also lowers the
repayment burden, and thus helps to stabilise the debt-to-GDP dynamics.
1As examples, we can think of emerging market countries which are usually forced to
maintain a higher level of primary surplus in downturns. For the case of advanced countries,
we can think of the EU member countries whose ability to increase their primary deficit was
constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact.
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Similarly, if a government is forced to keep its debt-to-GDP ratio lower than
a certain level2, a slower GDP growth forces the government to increase its
primary surplus accordingly. That is to say, the government is forced to under-
take a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. In this case, the use of GDP growth-indexed
bonds can help mitigate the pressure on pro-cyclical fiscal policy. This is the
second benefit.
Most of the previous papers illustrate these benefits by simulating Equa-
tion (3.1), and their conclusions are heavily dependent on the exogenous as-
sumptions for the process of key variables, gt, rt, and dt or st. For example,
Borensztein and Mauro (2004) illustrated the benefits of indexation under re-
strictive assumptions on these variables. They assumed a hypothetical country
where its interest rate and primary surplus over GDP are constant at 3.2%
and 0.5% respectively, initial debt-to-GDP level is 30%, and the interest rate of
indexed bond, rGt , is given by
rGt = rt + α (gt+1 − g) + premium, (3.2)
where the trend growth rate, g, is assumed to be 3.0%, the degree of indexation
,α, is 0.7, and the premium required for GDP-indexed bond is 40 basis points.
Under these assumptions, they simulated the path of debt-to-GDP ratio for
twenty years with two different scenarios, where the GDP growth deviates its
trend by ±4 percent points, and in both scenarios with and without indexation.
From this simple simulation they showed that the debt-to-GDP ratio can have
much narrower distribution when the debts are financed with GDP-indexed
bonds.
2For example, the Stability and Growth Pact requires EU member states to keep their debt-
to-GDP lower than 60%. In the case of the U.S., there exist a legislative limit, so-called debt
ceiling, on the amount of government debt issued by the Treasury. Recent empirical analysis by
Ostry et al. (2010) also suggests that many advanced countries have already or almost reached
their debt limits.
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They also showed that the use of GDP-indexed bonds could have allowed
many (including both advanced and emerging market) countries to conduct
less pro-cyclical fiscal policy during 1992-2001. They produced the series for
st by conducting counterfactual simulations with the assumption that all the
government debts were financed through GDP-indexed bonds, leaving all other
variables - dt, gt, rt - intact. Their results showed that the primary surplus
and GDP growth could have had much stronger positive correlation (implying
less pro-cyclical fiscal policy) when GDP-indexed bonds were used, for both
advanced and emerging countries. More recently, Bonfim and Pereira (2018)
conducted a similar analysis using the data from France, Spain and Portugal
from 2000 to 2015. They also showed that these countries could have experi-
enced more counter-cyclical fiscal policy if they had used GDP-indexed bonds.
Blanchard et al. (2016) also focused on the case of advanced countries.
They forecasted the distribution of debt-to-GDP ratios of the three European
countries - Spain, Italy and Germany - from 2015 to 2035, and showed that
the use of GDP-indexed bonds may significantly narrow the distribution of the
debt-to-GDP ratio. Their simulations were also conducted using exogenously
assumed paths of gt, st and rt (or r
G
t )
3. To construct those series, they assumed
that their expected paths are same as those forecasted by IMF’s World Eco-
nomic Outlook, and also assumed that there exist independently and identically
distributed shocks for these three variables, whose covariance matrix is con-
structed with the historical data. Benford et al. (2016) extended the results
of Blanchard et al. (2016) to both advanced and emerging market economies
using similar approach. By conducting one million simulations of debt-to-GDP
ratio for 20-year horizon, they showed that the 99% tail for the debt-to-GDP
3They specified rGt a little bit differently from Borensztein and Mauro (2004). In their model,
the expected return on GDP-indexed bond is same as the expected growth rate (gt+1) plus a
constant, κ. Therefore, one may freely choose the size of premium required for GDP-indexed
bonds over conventional bonds by adjusting κ.
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ratio for both advanced and emerging countries can be significantly reduced by
using GDP-indexed bonds.
While the papers mentioned above simply showed that the use of GDP-
indexed bonds narrows the distribution of debt-to-GDP ratio as the benefit of
the GDP-indexed bonds (e.g., Borensztein and Mauro, 2004; Blanchard et al.,
2016; Benford et al., 2016), some papers more explicitly show that the use of
GDP-indexed bonds can lower the probability of default (Chamon and Mauro,
2006; Ostry et al., 2010; Barr et al., 2014). For example, to explicitly incorpor-
ate the possibility of sovereign default, Barr et al. (2014) assumed a primary
surplus rule with an upper limit4 and that the government in the model declares
default when its debt-to-GDP ratio reaches a so-called debt limit, d, a concept
developed by Ostry et al. (2010) and Ghosh et al. (2013). More specifically,
when a positive shock to debt-to-GDP ratio occurs, the government responds
by raising primary surplus. However, if the shock is too large, at some point,
even the maximum level of primary surplus cannot stabilise its debt-to-GDP
ratio. They define that level of debt-to-GDP ratio as the debt limit. Then, the
probability of sovereign debt default in the next period is calculated as the
probability of dt+1 ≥ d, and this default probability is explicitly reflected to the
overall borrowing cost of the government (default risk premium). With this
model, they showed that the use of GDP-indexed bonds lowers the probability
of default since it reduces the tail risk of debt-to-GDP ratio and at the same time
pushes up the debt limit. The reduced probability of default lowers the overall
borrowing cost, and this further reduces the probability default.
So far, we summarised how the previous papers illustrated the potential
benefits of GDP-indexed bonds. However, those aforementioned benefits may
4This is a simplification of the concept of ’fiscal fatigue’ also developed by Ghosh et al. (2013),
who defined it as a situation where the primary surplus responds more and more slowly as debt
grows.
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disappear if replacing conventional government bonds with GDP-indexed bonds
excessively raises borrowing costs of the government. For example, Barr et al.
(2014) and Blanchard et al. (2016) argued that, if the additional cost is larger
than 150~300 basis points, the benefits to the government may disappear.
Comparing with the conventional government bonds, there may exist three
kinds of additional risk premiums associated with the GDP-indexed bonds. In-
vestors usually ask for a higher expected return for a new, unfamiliar, and more
complicated investment product (i.e., novelty risk premium). If it seems more
costly or to take more time to convert the GDP-indexed bond into cash than
for the case of the conventional bonds, such a risk should also be compensated
(i.e., liquidity risk premium). Lastly, as GDP-indexed bond investors take the
risk associated with uncertainty in GDP growth, there should be compensation
for that risk as well (i.e., growth risk premium).
However, from the experience of similar investment products traded in the
market, such as inflation-indexed government bonds5, it seems that the first
two among these three risks may disappear or become quite small in a short
time. According to Chamon et al. (2008), the novelty premium on Argentina’s
GDP-linked warrants have fallen by half in less than two years6. Given the
complexity of Argentina’s GDP-linked warranty7, the novelty premium on GDP-
indexed bonds with much simpler structure may be much lower and become
5The inflation-indexed government bonds are actively being traded around the world. Ac-
cording to IMF (2017), in many advanced countries the share of inflation-indexed government
bonds accounts for more than 10% of total government debts (the U.K., France, Italy, Sweden,
etc.), and it even takes more than half in Chile.
6Chamon et al. (2008) show that the novelty premium was around 1,200 basis points when it
was first issued, but it declined by more than 600 basis points in less than two years.
7The GDP warrants issued by Argentine government pays 5% of ’excess GDP’, which is the
difference between actual GDP and Base Case GDP, only if actual GDP growth and level of
reference year (1 year before the payment occurs) satisfy the following three conditions: (1)
actual GDP is greater than Base Case GDP, (2) actual GDP grows faster than Base Case GDP
does, and (3) the cumulative payment on the GDP warrants should be smaller than 48% of
notional amount. However, on the contrary, the GDP-indexed bonds considered in this papers
lacks of such complexity and has much simpler and symmetric payoff structures.
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Table 3.1: Estimates of growth risk premiums from the literature
Authors Method Premium Country/Region
Borensztein and Mauro (2004) CAPM 100 Argentina
Kamstra and Shiller (2009) CAPM 150 The United States
Benford et al. (2016) CAPM 140 Advanced countries
80 Emerging countries
Barr et al. (2014) consumption-based 35 Advanced countries
asset pricing model
Bowman et al. (2016) D-CAMP -500 to 1500 19 countries
Note: premiums are expressed in basis points.
smaller more quickly. Additionally, the experiences of Treasury Inflation Pro-
tected Securities (TIPS) of the U.S. and the index-linked gilt of the U.K. show
that liquidity premium may also disappear or become very small8 as the size
of the market grows. This implies that it is important to assess the likely size
of the premium associated with the uncertainty on future GDP growth, or the
growth risk premium. However, there are only few academic studies conducted
on this topic mainly because the GDP-indexed bonds have not existed yet and
thus there is no data available for an empirical analysis.
Most of the previous papers have estimated the growth risk premium using
the Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM. Table 3.1 summarises their estim-
ates. Borensztein and Mauro (2004) calculated the risk premium of hypothet-
ical GDP-indexed bond of Argentina using the historical data from 1970-2001.
To take the international risk sharing into consideration, they used S&P500 in-
dex as the market portfolio. Since the β of the country’s growth with respect to
8For example, the estimation of d’Amico et al. (2018) shows that 10-year TIPS liquidity
premiums were around 150 basis points in 1999, but fell below 100 basis points in 2000, and
then dropped steadily to close to zero around 2004. Gürkaynak et al. (2010b) also shows that
the liquidity premium was around 50 basis points when it was first introduced but steadily
decreased and almost disappeared around 2004. See also Chamon et al. (2008) and Campbell
and Viceira (2009).
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the return on S&P500 index was around 0.22 and the excess return of the mar-
ket portfolio over the risk-free rate was around 5%, the required excess return
on Argentina’s GDP-indexed bond was calculated to be around 100 basis points
over risk-free asset. Benford et al. (2016) updated the results of Borensztein
and Mauro (2004) with more recent data, and showed that the premiums are
expected to be on average 80 basis points for the emerging market countries,
and 140 basis points for the advanced countries.9 The estimate of Kamstra and
Shiller (2009) for the Trills is 150 basis points, also based on CAPM, which is
similar to the Benford et al. (2016)’s advanced country estimation.
Even though CAPM has been widely used to estimate the risk premium
on GDP-indexed bonds, there also exist different approaches. For example,
Chamon and Mauro (2006) suggested a simulation method for pricing growth-
indexed bonds relying on the joint stochastic process of growth, real exchange
rate, and primary balances constructed from the historical data10. Barr et al.
(2014) calculated the growth risk premium using consumption-based asset pri-
cing model calibrated with average of advanced country data. More specifically,
assuming all the assets in their model are perfectly substitutable, the price
of GDP-indexed bond is determined such that the expected utility of investing
in GDP-indexed bond equals that of investing in risk-free assets (no arbitrage
condition). Assuming the standard power utility function with CRRA of 4, the
9The larger average growth risk premium for the advanced countries reflects the fact that
their GDP growths are more closely correlated with the market portfolio.
10They simulated the debt-to-GDP dynamics of 10-year horizon for 250,000 repetitions using
the shocks extracted from the joint stochastic process. They assumed that a government
defaults on its debts when the debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds a trigger level, and further assumed
that the investors can recover only a certain proportion (recovery ratio) of the promised
payments. In this setting, the simulation can provide the distribution of future payoffs of the
10-year government bond investment, and thus the price of the bond for a given trigger level.
They also assumed that the trigger ratio is the debt-to-GDP ratio which makes the bond price
equal to its face value. They showed that, given the same trigger ratio, both the probability of
default and the borrowing cost of the government are lowered as the share of growth-indexed
bond increases.
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growth risk premium (for an average advanced country) was around 35 basis
points.
One of the shortcomings of the previous analyses on both growth risk premium
and the benefits of GDP-indexed bond is that they rely on partial equilibrium
models. For example, the required expected return of a risky asset calculated
with CAPM depends solely on the historical relationship between the return of
the asset and the market portfolio, and the relationship is summarised in the
asset’s β. Therefore the choice of the market portfolio may significantly change
the required return of GDP-indexed bonds (Bowman et al., 2016)11. However,
there is no consensus on how to choose the market portfolio.
Similarly, the benefits of using GDP-indexed bonds rely heavily on the as-
sumptions about the joint process of the key variables in debt-to-GDP dynamics
identity, Equation (3.1). Even though the premiums and benefits calculated
from DSGE models also depend on the relationship between the key variables,
the relationships are obtained by the results of optimal choices of rational,
forward-looking agents, not just by arbitrary assumptions. In particular, as
the theoretical prices of NGDP-indexed bonds and growth risk premiums are
determined by the relationship between stochastic discount factor (SDF) and
the growth; and given the fact that the DSGE models have become a dominant
modelling framework both in academia and central banks in analysing the
11Bowman et al. (2016) calculated the growth risk premiums of 19 selected countries with
four different measures as the market portfolio: US equity index, US GDP growth, world
equity index, and world GDP growth rate. Their estimates show that there exists considerable
uncertainty surrounding the estimates of the growth risk premium; they vary widely not only
across the countries, but also across the selection of market portfolio. Furthermore, the
uncertainty gets even larger when they used a downside CAPM (see Table 3.1). Compared
to the standard CAPM, D-CAPM focuses on the distribution of the below-average return. More
specifically, beta of D-CAPM (βDi ) for a risky asset i is defined as
βDi ≡
cov (ri, rm|rm < rm; ri < ri)
var (rm|rm) .
where ri, rm are the rate of return on an asset i and market portfolio, respectively, and rm and
ri are their sample means.
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inextricably linked relationship between the growth and other variables, we
may justify the use of DSGE models in pricing NGDP-indexed bonds and invest-
igating its potential benefits. Furthermore, from a more practical point of view,
DSGE models can give answers to the questions particularly important to policy
makers, such as which deep parameters the growth risk premium depends on
or under which conditions the government should use the NGDP-indexed bonds.
Partial equilibrium models cannot answer such questions.
For these reasons, in this paper, we calculate the theoretical price of nom-
inal GDP growth-indexed bonds (NGDP-indexed bonds) within the framework
of a medium scale New Keynesian DSGE model based largely on Smets and
Wouters (2007) and Rudebusch and Swanson (2012). We first examine whether
issuing NGDP-indexed bonds may or may not lower the borrowing cost of the
government using our baseline DSGE model estimated with the U.S. data. The
model shows that, if the other two risk premiums are ignored, replacing the
conventional government bonds with the NGDP-indexed bonds may reduce the
borrowing costs of the government as the inflation risk premium is greater
than the growth risk premium, at least, in this particular model. The model
also allows us to explore how the structural changes in the economy affects
the signs and sizes of the two premiums associated with uncertainty on growth
and inflation. More specifically, we examine how different specifications for
shock processes; parameters on consumer preference and nominal rigidity; and
monetary policy rules may affect the two premiums. A similar analysis has also
been conducted by De Paoli et al. (2010) who investigated how introducing
real and nominal rigidity into a typical New Keynesian model may affect bond
returns and term premium, but their analysis does not include growth-indexed
bonds. Our analysis extends their results by using more sophisticated model
with more frictions and shocks; and by adding analyses on NGDP-indexed bonds
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and growth risk premium. As we are interested in the size of risk premiums,
we solve the DSGE model using second order perturbation method.
Additionally, we try to see whether there exist aforementioned benefits to
the government using NGDP-indexed bonds. By simulating our baseline model
augmented with a fiscal policy rule where the presence of positive outstanding
debts are allowed, we show that the government in our baseline model benefits
from issuing NGDP-indexed bonds as it helps mitigate the pressure of conduct-
ing pro-cyclical fiscal policy.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.2 and
Section 3.3, we outline the model and its parametrisation. In section 3.4,
we calculate the price of NGDP-indexed bonds, and show that it may lower
the borrowing cost of the government. We also explore how different shocks
and parameters affect the sign and size of risk premiums. In section 3.5, the
benefits of NGDP-indexed bonds to the government is investigated, and section
3.6 concludes this chapter.
3.2 Summary of the DSGE model
The medium scale New Keynesian DSGE model used in this paper is based on
Smets and Wouters (2007), which is one of the most frequently cited paper in
the field of macroeconomics, augmented by Epstein-Zin preference following
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) which successfully matched term premium of
the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond without compromising the fit of macroeconomic
variables. The model presented here will contain similar ingredients as Smets
and Wouters (2007) such as external habit formation, price and wage stickiness
with partial indexation, capital utilization cost, investment adjustment cost,
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etc., with some minor modifications. These modifications will be explained in
the following subsections.
3.2.1 Households
In this model, there is a continuum of households who has the following non-
separable period utility function borrowed from Smets and Wouters (2007):
















where Ut (i) is the period utility for household indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], Ct (i) and
Ct−1 are individual and aggregate consumption of final goods in real terms,
respectively, and ht (i) denotes the supply of the homogeneous labour. Following
Smets and Wouters (2003), we assume the preference shock εbt follows a simple
AR(1) process. In each period, each household obtains utility from consumption
of final goods relative to a proportion of aggregate consumption in the previous
period (i.e., there exist external habit), and disutility from supply of homogen-
eous labour.
The most distinctive difference between this model and Smets and Wouters
(2007) is the assumption of Epstein-Zin type recursive preference (or EZ pref-
erence), which is commonly used in the asset pricing models in the New Keyne-
sian literature in these days as this helps to generate more realistic term premi-
ums (Tallarini, 2000; Bansal and Yaron, 2004; Darracq Paries and Loublier,
2010; Rudebusch and Swanson, 2012). In our model, an individual household i
maximises its welfare Vt (i) recursively given as below,







where β is the discount factor, and σEZ controls the coefficient of relative
risk aversion (CRRA). This functional form is borrowed from Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012). As Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) has shown, by adjusting
the size of σEZ , modellers can freely choose the size of term premium without
distorting the fit of other variables12. Note that the larger the absolute size of
σEZ , the more the household dislikes consumption volatility between states of
t+1, and note also that Equation (3.4) collapses to the standard expected utility
model when σEZ = 0.
Each household faces the following intertemporal budget constraint:























zt (i)Kt−1 (i)−a (zt (i))Kt−1 (i)+Dt,
where Pt is the price of a final good, It (i) is real investment, Bt (i) is units
of nominal bonds purchased at t, Tt is lump-sum government transfer in real
terms which is evenly distributed to all the households,W t is the homogeneous
nominal wage paid by labour unions, Rkt is nominal rent of the capital, and
zt (i) is the level of capital utilization. Dt denotes sum of the profits from the
union and intermediate firms, which is also evenly distributed. As we assume
the existence of nominal GDP growth-indexed bonds, one more term is added











denotes units of NGDP-indexed bonds purchased at t, and Qg,t is its unit price.
12Expected utility preference (EU preference) implicitly and arbitrarily assumes a tight
inverse relationship between risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES).
Therefore, under the assumption of EU preference, a very high level of risk aversion (i.e., very
low level of IES) which is required to match the level of premium observed in the data, seriously
distorts the fit of real variables such as consumption and output. The use of EZ preference
solves this problem by breaking the link between risk aversion and IES. By adjusting σEZ
under a given IES, any level of risk aversion can be chosen without compromising the fit of
the macroeconomic variable.
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units of money at t, which is same as the nominal output growth rate
from t− 1 to t.
There also exist capital adjustment costs and capital utilization costs fol-
lowing the standard specification from the literature. That is, the capital of
individual household is accumulated as follows:









It (i) , (3.6)
and there exists the following capital utilisation cost:
a(zt (i)) = δ1 (zt (i)− 1) + δ2
2
(zt (i)− 1)2 . (3.7)
Solving the household’s problem gives the first order conditions which are al-
most same as those in Smets andWouters (2007), except for the (real) stochastic















where Ξt denotes the marginal utility of consumption given by















is added due to the EZ preference.
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3.2.2 Labour market
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive unions indexed over the
same range as the households, j ∈ [0, 1], that purchase homogeneous labour
from the household at the hourly wage of W t, differentiate them, and sell the
differentiated labour, lt (j), to the labour packer at Wt (j). The labour packer










and then sell it to the intermediate good firms at Wt through a perfectly com-
petitive factor market. The union for type-j labour sets its optimal wage, Wˆt (j),
in order to maximise the sum of stochastically discounted future profits. The
profit of the union, the difference between differentiated wage Wˆt (j) and homo-
geneous wageW t, is fully transferred to the households and evenly distributed.
Following Calvo (1983), only 1 − ζw of the unions are given a chance to re-
optimise their wages in each period, and the rest of them partially index their














if s ≥ 1,
(3.11)
where Π∗ denotes steady state level of gross inflation. Combining all these











Wt+s (j)− εwt+sW t+s
]
lt+s (j) ,




where Wˆt (j) denotes the optimal wage when given the chance of re-optimising,










given from the labour packer’s optimisation problem. This problem is almost
same as that from Smets andWouters (2007) except that the stochastic discount
factor which is derived under the assumption of EZ preference. One more thing
to note is the existence of a wedge type wage markup shock, εwt in the problem.
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) used time-varying wage markup, i.e., λw,t in
Equation (3.10), in order to incorporate the wage markup shock into the model.
On the contrary, we use a constant parameter, λw, and thus we need to specify
a wage markup shock separately, using εwt which follows an AR(1) process. The
equilibrium equations about the wage setting in the appendix show how this
shock works in more detail.
3.2.3 Goods market
In the production sector, a continuum of firms indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] produces
intermediate goods in monopolistic competition using capital and the aggregate
labour supplied from perfectly competitive factor markets. They then provide
their intermediate goods to the final good firm which aggregates them into final
goods with a standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator analogous to what the labour
packer does in the labour market. The intermediate good producers also set
their intermediate good prices following Calvo price setting rules in the same
way as the unions do, and the discussion on wage markup shock applies to price
markup shock, εpt , as well. In short, an individual intermediate good producer
88














where 1 − ζp is the probability of getting a chance of optimization, Pˆt (z) is an
optimal price when given the chance, Xpt,s is the partial indexation factor for
non-optimising firms, and MCt+s is the nominal marginal cost of intermediate
good production.
3.2.4 Monetary policy and government sector
















where R∗ and Π∗ are the steady state levels of nominal policy rate and inflation
respectively, and Y ∗t ≡ y∗γt is trend level of output, y∗ is steady state level of
de-trended aggregate real output, and γ is deterministic trend growth rate.
Please note that we define the output gap in the monetary policy function in
a different way than Smets and Wouters (2007) did. In this paper, the output
gap is defined as a deviation of output from its deterministic trend as Taylor did
in his seminal paper (Taylor, 1993) and Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) more
recently did. In other words, the potential output increases with time with
certainty. On the contrary, Smets and Wouters (2007) defined the output gap
using so called an "efficient potential output" which is defined as the output
level from a hypothetical economy where prices and wages are fully flexible.
Therefore, the efficient potential output is affected by the shocks in the model
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unlike the potential output used in this paper. There exist some criticisms about
using deterministic trend as a potential output as it may cause inflation become
less stable than when the efficient potential output is used.14 However, we
choose to use this definition of potential output as it reduces the number of
variables used in the model and thus helps relieve the computations burden of
solving the model caused mostly by the fact that we calculate the long-term
bond prices in a standard recursive method (see subsection 3.2.5). Lastly, εrt is
a monetary policy shock following an AR(1) process.
Finally, the government faces the following intertemporal budget constraint:

















where government spending is defined as below
Gt ≡ εgt y∗γt,
and government spending shock, εgt , follows an exogenous AR(1) process. The
full list of equilibrium conditions, and steady state equations can be found in
Appendix 3.A and 3.B. Please note that the mix between government transfer
and debt is indeterminate and irrelevant as Ricardian equivalence holds in
14As Woodford (2001) and Orphanides (2001) already pointed out, a monetary policy rule with
deterministic output trend may not be optimal in terms of welfare. For example, suppose an
economy where its business cycles is mainly driven by supply shocks. A positive productivity
shock decreases output and increases price. The changes in price and output are larger
when the prices are sticky than when they are fully flexible. Under this circumstance, an
expansionary monetary policy is more desirable as it pushes the output closer to the efficient
potential output and stabilises the price level as well. On the contrary, the monetary policy
response becomes contractionary if the deterministic trend is used, and it may causes less
stable inflation process.
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this model, and therefore, these variables do not appear in the equilibrium
conditions15.
3.2.5 Bond prices and premiums
Theoretically, under no arbitrage assumption, the price of any asset should be
equal to the expected value of stochastically discounted state contingent payoff
of the asset. This gives the price of an n-period conventional zero-coupon bond

























where Mt,t+n denotes the real stochastic discount factor (SDF) from t to t + n,
and M$t,t+n is the nominal SDF defined as
M$t,t+n ≡Mt,t+nΠ−1t,t+n, (3.16)
where Πt,t+n ≡ Pt+n/Pt denotes the cumulative inflation of final good price from
t to t+ n.
Similarly, the price of inflation-indexed bond and its real return are given by
Q
(n)












15In section 3.4, we examine how the process of government transfer is affected by the use of
NGDP-indexed bonds. To pin down the size of government transfer and two types of bonds, we
add three more equations (Equation 3.25, 3.26, and 3.27) in Section 3.4.
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where Gt,t+n denotes cumulative growth in real output from t to t+ n.
16
Note that holders of the inflation indexed bond are exposed neither output
growth risk nor inflation risk. On the other hand, holders of the conventional
nominal bonds are exposed only to the inflation risk, and the NGDP-indexed
bond holders are exposed only to the growth risk. That means, the expected
return of the conventional bond contains inflation risk premium, and that of
the NGDP-indexed bonds contains growth risk premium. Therefore, we can
calculate the inflation risk premium and growth risk premium in terms of the
expected returns given above. The Inflation risk premium (IRP) can be defined
as the difference between the ex-ante expected real return of the conventional
16Unlike Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) which used so-called ’decaying consol’ when
calculating n-period bond prices, we calculated the price in a rather standard way. For example,




i,t = Et [Mt,t+1]
Q
(2)
















Therefore, to get the price of 10-year bonds, Q
(40)
i,t , we had to calculated additional 39 more
bond prices, Q
(1)
i,t , ..., Q
(39)
i,t too. As Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) is interested in both size and
volatility of term premium, they had to solve the third or higher order approximation of the
model, and in that case, the standard way required too much calculation time. On the order
hand, as the main focus of this paper is only the size of growth risk premium, the second-order
















and similarly, the growth risk premium is defined as the difference between the
ex-ante expected real return of the NGDP-indexed bond, R
(n)













Furthermore, once log-normality is assumed and Jensen’s inequality terms are
ignored, the two premiums in Equation (3.21) and (3.22) can be expressed in
terms of the covariance between logs of SDF and inflation, and negative of the












covt (mt,t+n, gt,t+n) . (3.24)
where mt,t+n ≡ logMt,t+n, gt,t+n ≡ logGt,t+n, and πt,t+n ≡ log Πt,t+n.
Let us briefly explain the implication of Equation (3.23) and (3.24). If an
asset provides an insurance against a bad event, risk averse investors require
a negative premium on the asset. If inflation and SDF are positively correlated,
holders of the conventional bonds get a smaller real payoff when a bad event
(i.e. higher SDF) happens, and thus a positive inflation risk premium should
be given as in Equation (3.23). In an analogous manner, if output growth
covaries positively with SDF, holders of NGDP-indexed bonds get a greater real
payoff when a bad event occurs. That is to say, in this case, NGDP-indexed
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bonds provide insurance against bad events, and thus, the growth risk premium
should be negative as in Equation (3.24).
An additional advantage of the expressions in Equation (3.23) and (3.24)
is that the covariances can be easily decomposed into standard deviations and
correlation coefficients as in Table 3.4, and that allows us to examine how much
each factor contributed to the premiums when we conduct sensitivity analysis
in the following sections. For example, if a certain change in the business cycle
affects mostly the volatility of SDF, that change may affects the absolute size of
both inflation and growth risk premiums to the same direction. On the contrary,
if the change makes inflation more volatile leaving other things hardly changed,
it would only increase the absolute size of inflation risk premium.
3.3 Parametrisation
Most of the structural parameters and the seven exogenous shock processes
are estimated using the seven U.S. macroeconomic data17 from the first quarter
of 1971 to the fourth quarter of 200818, except for the three parameters in
consumer preference, which are borrowed from the previous papers. These
parameters are the curvature of period utility function with respect to relat-
ive consumption for constant labour σc, the elasticity of labour supply σl, and
the Epstein-Zin parameter σEZ that controls CRRA. We set σc = 2.0 following
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) implying the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution in consumption of 0.5. It is a bit larger than the estimate of Smets
and Wouters (2007), 1.39, but still consistent with the estimates in micro and
macro literature (e.g., Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002; Havránek, 2015). We also set
17The detailed source of data can be found in Appendix 3.C
18Because our model does not explicitly incorporate zero-lower-bound for the short-term
interest rate, we excluded the data after 2008 for the estimation.
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σl = 1.9, borrowing the estimate of Smets and Wouters (2007). The steady state
ratio of government spending over output, εg
∗
, is set as 0.18 following Smets
and Wouters (2007). This is also standard in the literature where it is usually
in the range of 0.15 to 0.2. Finally, we calibrated σEZ = −89 such that the term
premium of 10-year nominal government bonds would be 100 basis points19.
Except for these four parameters, all the other structural parameters and
exogenous shock processes are estimated using the same Bayesian methodo-
logy used by Smets and Wouters (2007). The estimates of the parameter values
are reported in Table 3.2. On top of the parameters estimated in Smets and
Wouters (2007), we had to estimate the steady state ratios of price and wage
markups, λp and λw, because we used different assumptions on makrup shocks.
The estimates for λp and λw are 0.37 and 0.30, respectively. They are a bit
larger than those from many of the New Keynesian and fiscal policy literature,
where both of the parameters are usually assumed to be around 0.1 or 0.2
(Levin et al., 2006; Christiano et al., 2005; etc.). As our model structure and
data are only slightly different from Smets and Wouters (2007), and as we used
the same estimation methodology as they have used, most of the parameters
and shock processes are quite similar to those from Smets and Wouters (2007)
except for the degree of external habit in consumption, λ = 0.39, which is
somewhat smaller than the range of literature estimates of 0.5~0.7. The fact
that we exogenously set σc higher than the estimate of Smets and Wouters
(2007) played a role of making more stable consumption dynamics than when
using their estimate of σc = 1.39, and thus it was possible to match the data
with a lower degree of external habit than their estimate of λ = 0.71. Another
difference is found in the standard deviations of the two markup shocks. They
19Note that when matching the term premium, we used the decaying consol used by
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012). For more detailed explanation, refer to Rudebusch and
Swanson (2008).
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Table 3.2: List of parameters
(Structural parameters)
Baseline SW2007 Description
σc 2.00 1.39 IES in consumption
σl 1.90 1.90 elasticity of labour supply
σEZ -89 n.a. EZ parameter
λ 0.39 0.71 degree of consumption habit
λp 0.37 n.a steady state price markup
λw 0.30 n.a steady state wage markup
ξp 0.79 0.65 degree of price stickiness
ξw 0.69 0.73 degree of wage stickiness
ιp 0.24 0.22 price indexation
ιw 0.76 0.59 wage indexation
φp 1.49 1.61 fixed costs
ϕ 6.31 5.48 capital adjustment cost
ψ 0.64 0.54 elasticity of util. adj. cost (≡ δ2δ1 )
ρR 0.80 0.81 degree of policy rate smoothing
ψpi 1.94 2.03 policy response to inflation
ψy 0.06 0.08 policy response to output gap
ψ∆y 0.15 0.22 policy response to current output growth
α 0.18 0.19 capital share in income
εg∗ 0.18 0.18 steady state spending over output
pi∗ 0.60 0.81 steady state inflation
100
(
β−1 − 1) 0.21 0.16 discount factor
γ 0.40 0.43 trend growth rate
(Shock processes)
Baseline SW2007 Description
σa 0.43 0.45 Standard deviation of tech shock
σb 0.34 0.24 Standard deviation of preference shock
σg 0.51 0.52 Standard deviation of spending shock
σi 0.58 0.45 Standard deviation of investment shock
σr 0.23 0.24 Standard deviation of monetary policy shock
σp 2.18 0.14 Standard deviation of price markup shock
σw 4.10 0.24 Standard deviation of wage markup shock
ρa 0.98 0.95 AR(1) for tech shock
ρb 0.47 0.18 AR(1) for preference shock
ρg 0.97 0.97 AR(1) for spending shock
ρi 0.55 0.71 AR(1) for investment shock
ρr 0.26 0.12 AR(1) for monetary policy shock
ρp 0.80 0.90 AR(1) for price markup shock
ρw 0.89 0.97 AR(1) for wage markup shock
ρga 0.52 0.52 Correlation between spending and tech shock
Note: σc, σl, σEZ and ε
g
∗ are not estimated. pi∗ ≡ 100× log Π∗ and γ ≡ 100× log γ. Note
also that the estimated standard deviations for preference, spending, and investment
shocks do not correspond to the standard deviation in Section 3.2 as they are rescaled
so that they can be easily compared with the estimates from Smets and Wouters (2003,
2007).
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Table 3.3: Fit of the model
actual baseline actual baseline
σgy 0.80 1.00 ρgy ,gc 0.65 0.71
σgc 0.65 0.89 ρgy ,pi -0.18 -0.36
σpi 0.61 0.67 ρgc,pi -0.24 -0.40
σr 0.86 0.61 AR1(gy) 0.34 0.34
σgc/σgy 0.82 0.89 AR1(pi) 0.65 0.83
σpi/σgy 0.76 0.67
Note: σgy , σgc and σpi denote standard deviations of output
growth, consumption growth, and inflation in quarterly
percentage term. ρx,y denotes correlation coefficient between x
and y.
look much larger than those from Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). However,
as already explained in Section 3.2, we specified the two markup shocks quite
differently from them, and it does not seem appropriate to directly compare
them.
In order to generate sizeable premiums, we solved the model numerically
to a second-order approximation using Dynare20. Table 3.3 shows the fit of the
baseline model. It provides the standard deviations and AR(1) coefficients of
output growth, consumption growth, and inflation; and the correlations between
them calculated using the simulated data for 10,000 periods. The standard
deviations are slightly larger than actual data, but they well replicate the neg-
ative correlation between inflation and the other two variables, and the fact
that inflation is more persistent than output growth.
20We provided the non-linear equilibrium conditions and deterministic steady states to
Dynare, and let it solve the model using a second order approximation.
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Table 3.4: IRP and GRP, by different shocks
Baseline a p w b g i r supply demand
1√
40
σm 18.99 15.49 0.90 1.70 1.52 10.81 3.29 0.38 15.60 10.81
1√
40
σpi 1.90 1.39 0.39 0.91 0.14 0.35 0.38 0.59 1.72 0.79
1√
40
σgy 0.89 0.57 0.31 0.53 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.84 0.35
ρm,pi 0.46 0.65 0.96 0.90 0.97 0.55 -0.83 -0.66 0.60 0.19
ρm,y -0.44 -0.85 -0.56 -0.61 0.20 0.58 -0.34 -0.65 -0.65 0.24
IRP40 16.40 14.25 0.28 0.98 0.20 2.12 -1.09 -0.33 15.51 0.90
GRP40 7.03 7.24 0.14 0.54 -0.04 -1.13 0.26 0.03 7.91 -0.88
Note: Each column provides the decomposition of IRP and GRP under different
composition of shocks. The standard deviation of each shock is equal to the estimates in
Table 3.2. Supply shock denotes productivity (a), price and wage markup (p and w)
shocks. Demand shock includes preference (b), government spending (g), investment (i),
and monetary policy (r) shocks. All the numbers are quarterly average of 10-year
variables (not annualized). Premiums are expressed in basis points.
3.4 Simulated premiums
3.4.1 Baseline model
Table 3.4 shows the inflation risk premium (IRP) and the growth risk premium
(GRP) calculated from the baseline model simulation; and their decomposition
into standard deviations of SDF, inflation, and output growth, and the correl-
ation coefficients between them are also provided. To construct the table, we
used 10,000 periods of simulated data. Note that we compared the premiums
associated with the two kinds (conventional and NGDP-indexed) of government
bonds with maturity of 40 periods. That is, the first group of three rows provide
the standard deviations of 10-year average quarterly (not annualized) SDF (σm),
inflation (σpi), and output growth (σgy); and the next group of rows show the cor-
relation coefficients between them (ρm,pi and ρm,y). The final group of rows show
the IRP for 10-year conventional bonds and GRP for 10-year NGDP-indexed
bonds (IRP40 and GRP40).
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The baseline model results (first column) show that, for the maturity of 10
years, both premiums are positive, and the IRP is more than twice as large as
the GRP. When a government finances all its debt with NGDP-indexed bonds,
it needs to pay additional premium to compensate the growth risk, but at
the same time, it can save the inflation risk premium required when issuing
the conventional government bond. Therefore, theoretically, the additional
borrowing cost for issuing NGDP-indexed bonds equals GRP minus IRP. This
implies that the government in the baseline model may save around 38 basis
points (annualised)21 in borrowing costs through issuing NGDP-indexed bonds
instead of the conventional bonds22.
The second to tenth columns of Table 3.4 show how the two premiums are
affected when a different composition of shocks is assumed. Each column
shows the premiums when only one of the seven shocks exists, and the last
two columns are the cases where there exist only demand shocks (preference,
government spending, investment and monetary policy) or supply shocks (pro-
ductivity, price markup, and wage markup). When the main driver of the
business cycle changes, the joint process of consumption (thus SDF), output
and inflation are also changed, and so do the premiums, consistently.
Among the seven shocks the productivity shock plays the most significant
role; it accounts for most of the two premiums as seen in the table. This is
consistent with the analysis of Smets and Wouters (2007) where supply shocks
have been the dominant drivers for long-term business cycle of the U.S. eco-
nomy. The positive IRP and GRP of the baseline model can be explained from
this fact. When supply shocks are dominant, consumption growth covaries
negatively (positively) with inflation (output growth) as in Figure 3.1. The
21(16.40− 7.03)× 4
22Even when we consider “real” GDP growth-indexed bonds, whose holders are not immune
to inflation uncertainty, the additional borrowing cost is less than 30 basis points in annualised
terms (7.03× 4), which is a lot smaller than the estimates from the literature in Table 3.1
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positive covariance between inflation and SDF is consistent with positive IRP,
and the negative covariance between output growth and SDF results in positive
GRP as in Equation (3.23) and (3.24).
Figure 3.1 also explains why IRP is greater than GRP in the baseline model
when the productivity shock dominates. As seen from the top panel of the
figure, the response to the productivity shock is much more persistent in infla-
tion than in output growth. In fact, Table 3.3 already showed that the AR(1)
coefficient of inflation from the baseline model, 0.83, is a lot larger than that
of output growth, 0.34. This directly explains why the standard deviation of
the annualized 10-year average inflation is much larger than that of the output
growth in the first rows of Table 3.4, and the difference in the absolute size of
the two premiums too.
In general, the sign of both IRP and GRP are determined by how the output,
consumption and inflation respond to the main driver(s) of the business cycle.
The results from the baseline parametrisation are mainly due to the fact that
the main driver of the business cycle is the productivity shock, or differently
speaking, the characteristics of the business cycle data used for our estima-
tion are consistent with the case where productivity shock dominates. That
is to say, if the business cycle is driven by different shocks, the results can
be different, and Table 3.4 tells us how they will be changed. For example,
if the monetary policy shock dominates the long-term business cycle, as seen
from the middle panels of Figure 3.1, all the responses of inflation, output and
consumption to monetary policy shock have the same direction. This implies
that both the covariance of SDF and inflation and the covariance of SDF and
output growth are negative, and in such cases, as in the eighth column of Table
3.4, IRP becomes negative and GRP becomes positive. On the other hand, if
the government spending shock is dominant the two premiums can have the
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses function for key variables










































































































opposite signs (positive IRP and negative GRP). As an increase in government
spending has a negative effect on consumption and a positive effect on inflation,
both the covariance of SDF and inflation and the covariance of SDF and output
growth become positive. That explains the positive IRP and negative GRP in
the sixth column of Table 3.4.
3.4.2 Alternative parametrisation
In this chapter, we are also interested in how various assumptions used in New
Keynesian models to better match the fit of business cycle affect the size and
sign of the premiums. More specifically, we examined how the parameters
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Table 3.5: IRP and GRP, by different parameterisation (preference)
Baseline σEZ = −150 σc = 1.2 σc = 2.2 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.8
1√
40
σm 18.99 30.74 2.64 24.54 18.01 31.94
1√
40
σpi 1.90 1.91 1.77 1.94 1.94 2.18
1√
40
σgy 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.91 0.79
ρm,pi 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.51 0.38
ρm,y -0.44 -0.44 -0.52 -0.44 -0.51 -0.21
IRP40 16.40 27.82 1.06 23.31 17.07 32.20
GRP40 7.03 11.55 1.05 9.15 7.92 4.98
Note: Baseline parameters are σEZ = −89, σc = 2.0, λ = 0.39.
that affect the preference of consumers or nominal rigidity may affect the two
premiums in our New Keynesian DSGE model. For example, the parameters
in consumer preference such as σc, σEZ and λ affect how much consumers
dislike consumption volatility between time or states, and thus we may expect
that these parameters would affect the premiums mostly through the stochastic
discount factor. The parameters that control the degree of nominal rigidity such
as ζp and ζw would also affect the premiums, but mainly through the volatility
of inflation and/or output growth. We also examined the role of monetary policy
coefficients.
Table 3.5 shows how the changes in the parameters governing preference
may affect the IRP and GRP given other parameters unchanged from the baseline
parametrisation. As Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) have illustrated, an in-
crease in the absolute size of σEZ linearly increases the risk aversion of con-
sumers leaving other variables nearly unchanged. This is consistent with the
second column of Table 3.5, where the increase in both premiums are mostly
attributable to more volatile SDF when the absolute value of σEZ is increased
from 89 to 150. The third and fourth columns show that the changes in σc
positively affect both premiums, and similarly to the case of σEZ , most of the
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Table 3.6: IRP and GRP, by different parameterisation (price/wage
stickiness, monetary policy)
Baseline ζp = 0.0 ζp = 0.9 ζw = 0.0 ζw = 0.9 ψy, ψ∆y = −0.2
1√
40
σm 18.99 19.36 18.38 18.97 19.01 19.24
1√
40
σpi 1.90 2.46 1.59 1.97 1.82 4.14
1√
40
σgy 0.89 1.12 0.80 0.89 0.94 1.35
ρm,pi 0.46 0.49 0.42 0.46 0.49 -0.39
ρm,y -0.44 -0.42 -0.41 -0.44 -0.43 -0.40
IRP40 16.40 21.50 13.09 16.54 16.93 -42.78
GRP40 7.03 8.52 5.68 6.96 7.41 10.19
Note: Baseline parameters are ζp = 0.79, ζw = 0.69, ψy = 0.06 and ψ∆y = 0.15.
changes are attributable to the changes in SDF leaving the volatility of infla-
tion or output growth scarcely changed. Therefore, the increase in these two
parameters, σEZ and σc, affect the absolute size of the two premiums, but not
substantially their relative sizes or signs.
Meanwhile, column 5 and 6 show that an increase in the degree of external
habit λ raises the IRP but decreases GRP in our baseline model. In general,
macroeconomic models incorporate the habit in consumption in order to match
the hump-shaped responses of variables to various shocks (Fuhrer, 2000). From
the asset pricing point of view, on the other hand, an existence of the habit
enables more volatile marginal utility of consumption leaving the volatility of
consumption unchanged, which implies larger risk premiums in absolute terms.
At the same time, higher λ lowers the correlation between output growth and
consumption growth (and thus SDF), which has negative effects on the GRP.
Overall, higher degree of habit increases the IRP, but its effect on the GRP is
hard to predict.
Now let us move to Table 3.6. The second to fifth columns in the table show
how price and wage stickiness affects the two premiums. We compared the
two cases where there is no friction (ζp = 0, ζw = 0) and where only 10% of
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firms or unions are given chances to optimise their prices or wages (ζp = 0.9,
ζw = 0.9). In our model, when other things are equal, the degree of price
rigidity ζp has negative effects on both IRP and GRP (see column 2 and 3), and
it can be explained from the fact that the productivity shock is the dominant
driver of business cycle in our model23. A positive productivity shock in general
increases output and decreases price regardless of the existence of nominal
rigidity. However, when price becomes stickier, the responses of price and
output become smaller and smaller (as the friction increase the price markup)
than the flexible price case, and this makes the absolute size of both premiums
smaller. The top two panels of Figure 3.2 support this explanation. They show
the responses of output and inflation to a productivity shock with and without
price/wage stickiness. Comparing the solid black line (baseline case) and the
solid blue line (only-wage-sticky case) in the top panels shows that adding price
rigidity (i.e. moving from the solid blue line to the solid black line) makes the
responses of both output and inflation smaller.
However, the role of wage stickiness to the premiums are not clear in our
model where productivity shock dominates. In general, wage rigidity amplifies
the response of output to a productivity shock. It is because, as a fraction of
households cannot increase their wages in response to the positive productivity
shock, the increase in real wage in the economy becomes smaller than the
flexible wage economy, and thus the output responses more strongly when wage
is stickier. Nevertheless, the effect of wage rigidity seems negligible in this
model as seen from the top panels in Figure 3.2. In the figure, there are only
negligible differences between the dotted blue lines (only-price-sticky case)
and the solid black lines (baseline case) for the responses of both output and
inflation. The premiums in Table 3.6 are consistent with what the figure shows.
23This is also consistent with the analysis of De Paoli et al. (2010) about term premium and
nominal rigidity.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse respones and role of nominal rigidity

























































The differences in premiums between baseline case and flexible wage case (i.e.,
only-price-sticky case) seems negligible, and even when we increase the degree
of wage rigidity further up to 0.9, we can only see very small differences in
the standard deviations of output growth and inflation from the flexible wage
economy (compare first and fifth columns of Table 3.6), and thus very little
changes in both GRP and IRP.
It is also worth mentioning that the effects of these nominal rigidities on the
premiums can be different when the main shock in the economy changes. As an
example, the bottom panels in Figure 3.2 shows how the responses of inflation
and output to a monetary policy shock are affected as the degrees of price and
wage rigidity change. In the case of inflation, the figure shows that its response
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becomes smaller when the price becomes sticky (from wage-only-sticky case to
baseline case), which is same as the effect of productivity shock. However, in
the case of output, price stickiness makes its response to the monetary policy
shock greater, which is opposite to the case of productivity shock in the top
panel. If both price and wage are fully flexible, monetary policy shock has no
effect on real variables because the changes in price and wage can fully absorb
the shock and leave the real interest rate not being affected at all. However,
if the price (or wage) becomes sticky, changes in price and wage cannot fully
absorb the shock, and thus output and consumption begin to respond to the
shock.
In the bottom panels of Figure 3.2, comparing the solid black lines (baseline
case) and solid blue line (only-wage-sticky case), we see that, when the monet-
ary policy prevails, price rigidity results in more volatile output and more stable
inflation. As this makes consumption growth (and thus SDF) more volatile, the
GRP is expected to increase when the price becomes stickier, but it is hard
to predict how the IRP is affected by the price stickiness since the changes in
volatilities of SDF and inflation are in opposite directions.
Now let us think about the role of the wage stickiness in the economy
where monetary policy shock dominates. A tighter monetary policy shock gives
downward pressure on both price and wage. If wage becomes stickier the
average level of wage becomes higher compared to the case of flexible wage
economy, and thus the negative effect of a monetary policy shock on output is
amplified, but its negative effect on inflation is mitigated. This can be shown
by comparing the dotted blue line (only-price-sticky case) and the solid black
line (baseline case) in Figure 3.2. However, similar to the case of productivity
shock, the effects of wage stickiness on output and inflation in this model are
very small, implying its negligible impacts on the premiums.
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The last column in Table 3.6 is about how an extreme monetary policy rules
can change the premiums. We examined a particular example of a bad monetary
policy that may significantly affect the premiums. In our example, the monet-
ary policy responds negatively to both output gap and current output growth
(ψy = ψ∆y = −0.2), but its response to inflation gap is unchanged from the
baseline model. In this case, the monetary policy plays a role of destabilizing
the economy. Under this monetary policy rule, as seen from the table, both
premiums become much larger in absolute terms mainly because the monetary
policy rule substantially destabilises the business cycle. Furthermore, as the
monetary policy shock becomes the main driver of business cycle, the IRP
becomes negative as seen from the eighth column in Table 3.4.
3.5 Potential Benefits to the government
In section 3.4, we showed that the government in our baseline DSGE model
estimated with the U.S. data may save the borrowing cost when it replaces the
conventional government bonds with the nominal GDP growth-indexed bonds.
We also showed that the result relies on the fact that our model economy
is driven mainly by the productivity shock that causes a positive correlation
between SDF and inflation and a negative correlation between SDF and output
growth, and the fact that the inflation is much more persistent than the output
growth.
In this section, we assess whether the benefits to the government aforemen-
tioned by the previous papers can be obtained from the baseline model of this
chapter. Governments that cannot flexibly adjust its debt-to-GDP ratio may face
the pressure of conducting more pro-cyclical fiscal policy when other things
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are equal, and the previous papers have illustrated that such governments can
mitigate the pressure by issuing NGDP-indexed bonds.
Before examining the benefit, we admit that our analysis in this section is
very limited. In our model, the government’s structure of finance (conventional
vs. NGDP-indexed bonds) only affects the mix between debt and primary sur-
plus, but cannot affect the optimal choices of consumers. The agents in our
model are rational and forward-looking; and there exists neither borrowing
constraint nor distortionary tax in this model. In other words, the Ricardian
equivalence holds in the model, and in such models, a particular time path of
debt and/or primary surplus is irrelevant. Therefore, we limit our discuss to
the pros and cons of issuing NGDP-indexed bonds from the perspective of the
government debt management, but not its effect on household welfare.
As mentioned earlier, previous works suggest the benefits to the government
from the use of NGDP-indexed bonds in two ways. On one hand, a government
may reduce the likelihood of debt explosion (or default) for a given path of
primary surplus. On the other hand, a government that is constrained to keep
a certain level of debt-to-GDP ratio may get more room for counter-cyclical
fiscal policy by issuing NGDP-indexed bonds. In this section, we examine the
benefits of NGDP-indexed bonds from the latter point of view. That is, we focus
on whether and under what conditions the use of NGDP-indexed bonds may
mitigate the pressure of conducting pro-cyclical fiscal policy.
For the analysis on cyclicality of fiscal policy, we add one more assumption
on government sector24. That is, we assume that our model government should
24As Ricardian equivalence holds in our model, the mix between debt and transfer is
indeterminate, and thus bt, bg,t and tt disappear from the equilibrium conditions in the previous
sections. In order to pin them down, we add three more equations (Equation 3.25, 3.26, and
3.27).
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where bt (or bg,t) denotes the unit of real, detrended conventional (or NGDP-
indexed) government debt, and ωG ∈ {0, 1} is the fraction of NGDP-indexed
bonds. In other words, we assume that total real amount of new debt issued at
time t equals Dyt regardless of the choice of bond type. Under this assumption,













+ (−tt − εgt y∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
primary surplus
, (3.27)
where tt and ε
g
t y∗ are detrended real government transfer and government
spending, respectively. Then we can rewrite the constraint as follows:
tt = ∆Dt − εgt y∗, (3.28)
where∆Dt denotes the net increase in the amount of debt (= new debt issuance
- debt repayment) between t − 1 and t. This implies that the amount of gov-
ernment transfer equals net increase in debt minus (exogenous) government
spending. Under these assumptions, the only way the government can change
the government transfer is by choosing the type of bond.
We simulated the baseline model augmented with the constant debt-to-GDP
constraint for 10,000 periods. To compare the cyclicality of fiscal policy under
the two different government financing structure (100% conventional bonds
vs. 100% NGDP-indexed bonds), we calculated the sample correlation between
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Table 3.7: Correlation between output and government transfer
D =0% 63% 100% 150% 200%
Conventional (ωG = 0) -0.38 -0.08 -0.00 0.05 0.08
NGDP-indexed (ωG = 1) -0.38 -0.21 -0.14 -0.09 -0.05
Note: The numbers in this table show the correlation between output and
government transfer.
output and lump-sum government transfer with the simulated data. Note that
the smaller the correlation, the more counter-cyclical the fiscal policy. Table 3.7
summarises the results. The first row shows the correlation between output and
government transfer with different level of D when the government finances all
its debt with conventional government bonds, and the second row shows the
correlations when it is financed with NGDP-indexed bonds.
The first column in Table 3.7 shows that, when there is no outstanding
debt in the economy (D = 0), fiscal policy is most counter-cyclical and type
of bonds makes no difference. In this case, the government budget constraint,
Equation (3.28), becomes tt = −εgt y∗. As the government spending, εgt y∗, cov-
aries positively with output, the lump-sum government transfer, tt, should be
negatively correlated with output. The table also shows that, when there exists
positive outstanding debt, the government is forced to conduct less and less
counter-cyclical (less negative correlation) fiscal policy as D becomes larger.
Comparing the two rows in the table tells us that, when all the debts are
financed by NGDP-indexed bonds, the correlation between output and govern-
ment transfer increases more slowly than when the conventional bonds are
used. In other words, indexation helps to relieve the burden of conducting less
counter-cyclical fiscal policy.
Let us more closely see why and under what condition the use of NGDP-
indexed bonds makes the fiscal policy more counter-cyclical. As εgt y∗ and yt is
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positively correlated, if we remove ∆Dt term from Equation (3.28), correlation
between tt and yt becomes strongly negative. However, if ∆Dt is positively
correlated with yt, the existence of positive outstanding debt plays a role of
making fiscal policy less counter-cyclical. Therefore, in order to clearly see the
role of NGDP-indexed bonds, we have to examine how the correlation between
∆Dt and yt varies depending on the type of bonds. The relation can be more













if ωG = 1.
(3.29)
The expression above shows that, when conventional bonds are used (ωG =
0), an increase in yt clearly increases the government’s ability to issue new
debt, Dyt, but its effect on debt repayment, Dyt−1Rt−1/πtγ, is not clear. If the
increase in yt decreases the latter, or increases it but less than the new debt,
∆Dt covaries positively with yt. If this is the case, the existence of positive debt
(D > 0) plays a role of making the correlation between yt and tt less negative
(or less counter-cyclical), and the larger D, the stronger this effect. The first
row in Table 3.7 shows this.
When NGDP-indexed bonds are used (ωG = 1) instead, an increase in yt
increases both new debt issuance and debt repayment, thus its net effect on
∆Dt is hard to predict whether it would be positive or negative. Even if it is
positive, however, it is likely to be smaller than the conventional bond case.
In our particular model, Table 3.7 shows that the existence of positive debt in
NGDP-indexed bonds cases also plays a role of making the fiscal policy less
counter-cyclical, but as mentioned, at much smaller degree than conventional
bond cases.
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Table 3.8: Correlation between output and government transfer
Baseline a p w b g i r supply demand
ωG = 0 -0.08 -0.90 0.45 0.33 0.28 -0.64 -0.10 0.80 -0.39 -0.07
ωG = 1 -0.21 -0.89 0.48 0.34 -0.51 -0.91 -0.52 0.74 -0.39 -0.44
Note: D = 63% is used for all the cases.
In summary, if current output and net debt changes (∆Dt) covary positively,
the existence of positive outstanding debt gives a pressure for less counter-
cyclical fiscal policy at least for our baseline parametrisation. In other words,
when growth slows, government’s ability to issue additional debt (∆Dt) also
shrinks and the government should reduce its government transfer accordingly.
In such economy, issuing NGDP-indexed bond weakens the positive relationship
between yt and ∆Dt, and thus helps mitigate the pressure of conducting less
counter-cyclical fiscal policy (than conventional bond case).
Table 3.8 shows more general idea about the cyclicality of fiscal policy and
the DSGE model; i.e., how different shocks change the correlation between
output and government transfer. As already mentioned, given the assumption
that the government spending is an exogenous process, the relation between
output and government transfer is mainly affected by the relation between
output, yt, and net increase in debt, ∆Dt, and this relation makes the difference
between the two bonds types. As the amount of new debt issuance is given by
Dyt, regardless of the type of the bond, the difference between the two type of






is related. Equation (3.29) clearly shows that the relation between yt and debt
repayment depends on how yt and πt covary. In a nut shell, how the issuance of
NGDP-indexed bond affects cyclicality of fiscal policy depends on the relation
between yt and πt, and this relation fundamentally depends on the type of the
main shock in the business cycle.
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We simulated the model for 10,000 periods with baseline structural para-
meters, but with different set of shocks, and the sample correlation between yt
and tt in each case is reported in Table 3.8. From the table, we can see that
the government can significantly benefit from issuing NGDP-indexed bonds, in
terms of counter-cyclical fiscal policy, when the economy is mainly driven by
demand shocks (b, g, i, r). However, the benefit becomes negligible when the
main driver of the business cycle is a supply shock (a, p, w).
Demand shocks move output and inflation to the same direction. When all
the debts are financed by the conventional bonds, Equation (3.29) shows that
an increase in yt is associated with an increase in new debt issuance, and at
the same time, with a decrease in debt repayment burden (as πt increases as
well), and thus results in an increase in ∆Dt. This means that the existence
of a positive debt plays a role of making the correlation between yt and tt less
negative (or more pro-cyclical). When we replace the conventional bonds with
NGDP-indexed bonds, the effect from the positive correlation between yt and
πt disappears, and the pressure of conducting pro-cyclical fiscal policy can be
significantly reduced.
On the contrary, the responses of yt and πt to supply shocks are the opposite
directions. In this case, even when all the debts are financed with conventional
bonds, an increase in yt is associated with an increase in both new debt issuance
and debt repayment, and thus their impacts on ∆Dt cancel out each other. This
explains why the government can expect much smaller benefit from issuing
NGDP-indexed bonds when a supply shock is the main driver of the business
cycle.
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3.6 Conclusion and Summary
In this chapter, we tried to calculate the theoretical price of nominal GDP
growth-indexed bonds within the framework of New Keynesian DSGE model
largely based on Smets and Wouters (2007) augmented with EZ preference.
We estimated the model with the U.S. macroeconomic data and matched the
term premium for the 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds by calibrating EZ preference
parameter accordingly. In other words, the main focus of this chapter is to
examine whether an advanced country government like the U.S. may save the
borrowing cost by issuing NGDP-indexed bonds instead of the conventional
nominal bonds.
In our baseline model, the growth risk premium is around 30 basis points
and the inflation risk premium is around 70 basis points for 10-year government
bonds. The positive premiums are mainly due to the fact that the business cycle
in our model is driven mostly by supply shocks in 10-year horizon, and the infla-
tion risk premium is higher since the inflation is much more persistent than the
growth in output. As the additional borrowing cost the government should bear
by issuing nominal GDP growth-indexed bonds instead of conventional nominal
bonds is same as the difference between growth risk premium and inflation
risk premium (GRP - IRP), the additional cost is negative in our baseline model
estimated with the U.S. data. This result may relieve the concern that excessive
premiums may have to be paid when a government issues NGDP-indexed bonds.
Contrary to the previous papers mostly based on partial equilibrium models,
we calculated the bond prices and premiums consistently with macroeconomic
theories with the help of DSGE model. This also enabled us to analyse how
different compositions of shocks and different parameters may affect the sign
and size of the premiums. In DSGE models, the sign and size of both premiums
are determined by the main driver of the business cycle, and our baseline
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results are mainly attributable to the fact that the productivity shock dominates.
This also suggests that it may be possible that an economy where a different
shock dominates can have different results.
We also have shown that the parameters related with consumer preference
and nominal rigidity also play important roles in determining the sign and size
of the premiums. The parameters on consumer preference determine how
much consumers dislike volatility in consumption. In our model, the changes
in these parameters affected the absolute size of premiums mostly via the
stochastic discount factors, but their effects via the changes in volatility of
output growth or inflation were not substantial. On the other hand, the effects
of the two nominal rigidity parameters on the premiums were largely through
the volatilities in inflation or output growth, and their signs varied depending
on the main driver of the business cycle.
Lastly, we shortly examined the benefits of issuing NGDP-indexed bonds
to the government, but only in terms of cyclicality of fiscal policy. In our
model, the government with constant debt-to-GDP ratio benefits from issuing
NGDP-indexed bonds as the use of NGDP-indexed bonds reduces the pressure
of conducting pro-cyclical fiscal policy. However, as is the case of the premiums,
the sensitivity analysis showed that the benefit also is strongly affected by
the characteristics of the business cycle. That is to say, the government may
benefit significantly from issuing NGDP-indexed bonds when the business cycle
is driven mainly by demand shocks, but not much benefit is expected when
supply shocks are dominant.
The reader should also keep in mind the limitations of our analysis, espe-
cially about the benefit. We showed that the government in our DSGEmodel can
conduct more counter-cyclical fiscal policy when it uses NGDP-indexed bonds.
However, as the cyclicality of fiscal policy cannot affect the level of consumption
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in our model (Ricardian equivalence), the model cannot explicitly show why
more counter-cyclical fiscal policy is better from the household’s perspective.
In this paper, we made this implicit assumption. Explicit analysis on the benefit
in terms of consumer welfare requires a model where Ricardian equivalence
does not hold. One of the most widely supported assumption is the presence of
hand-to-mouth households as in Galí et al. (2007) and/or distortionary taxes on
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rkt = δ1 + δ2 (zt − 1) (3.45)
27it ≡ Itγt
28ut ≡ Utγt(1−σc) , vt ≡ Vtγt(1−σc) , ct ≡ Ctγt , β ≡ βγ−σc
29wt ≡ W tPtγt , λt ≡ Ξtγσct
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• Wage setting30
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32φp ≡ 1 + Φyt , 1 plus share of fixed cost in the production.
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• Law of motion : price dispersion
























• Law of motion : wage dispersions
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3.B List of steady states
• z∗ = 1 is assumed, Π∗ is estimated from the data, and g∗ is exogenously
calibrated.
• Then, all the steady state conditions are analytically given:












mc∗ = 1/ (1 + λp)




































































































































3.C Source of data for the estimation
For the estimation, we used the seven U.S. macroeconomic data following Smets
and Wouters (2007); output growth, consumption growth, investment growth,
inflation, wage growth, labour supply, and short-term interest rate. The output
growth denotes quarterly growth in per capital real GDP. It is calculated by
dividing the real GDP (NIPA table 1.1.6) by the civilian non-institutional pop-
ulation over 16 (BLS code: CNP16OV). Similarly, per capita consumption and
the investment are also calculated by dividing the real personal consumption
expenditure (NIPA table 2.2.3) and the real private fixed investment index (NIPA
table 5.3.3) by the population. The inflation denotes quarterly changes in
the GDP deflator (NIPA table 1.1.9). The real wage growth denotes quarterly
changes in real hourly compensation, which is obtained by dividing the nominal
hourly compensation (BLS code: PRS85006103) by the GDP deflator. The index
of labour supply is obtained by dividing total hours by the population. The
former denotes the average weekly hours worked (BLS code: PRS85006023)
multiplied by the civilian employment (BLS code: CE16OV). The percentage
deviations of this index from its sample mean is used for the index of labour
supply. Lastly, the quarterly averages of the daily 3-month Treasury Bill rates
are used as the short-term rates (FRED code: TB3MS).
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Chapter 4
Welfare effects of nominal GDP
growth-indexed bonds
4.1 Introduction
Since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, a number of countries, including both
advanced and emerging, have been suffering from rapidly increasing govern-
ment debt. As of the end of 2016, the government debt of the U.S. is more than
100% of its GDP, which is much higher than its post-war average of 63%, and
that of the U.K has also rapidly increased and now approaching 90%. From this
background, the interest in linking government debt cash flows to the growth
rate of issuing country’s GDP has been gradually growing both in academia and
practitioners (see Barr et al. 2014; Bowman et al. 2016; Benford et al. 2016;
Blanchard et al. 2016; Cabrillac et al. 2016; Kim and Ostry 2018).
The main advantage of issuing GDP-indexed bonds is that it helps reduce
the upper tail risk of debt-to-GDP ratio by narrowing its distribution, and thus
lowers the probability of sovereign default (Chamon and Mauro, 2006; Barr
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et al., 2014). For example, from the following debt-to-GDP dynamics,
dt+1 − dt = (rt − gt+1)
1 + gt+1
dt − st+1, (4.1)
we can see that a slow-down in growth, gt+1, leads to a higher level of debt-
to-GDP ratio, dt+1, when the other variables - the interest rate, rt, and primary
surplus to GDP ratio, st - are unchanged. However, if the government finances
its debt with GDP growth-indexed bonds, a slower growth also reduces the
burden of interest payment, and thus mitigates the increase in debt-to-GDP
ratio compared to the case where the conventional government debt is used.
Another advantage suggested by the literature is that the use of GDP growth-
indexed bonds gives more room for conducting a counter-cyclical fiscal policy
(Borensztein and Mauro 2004; Barr et al. 2014; Kim and Ostry 2018; Bonfim
and Pereira 2018). If a government has very little or no fiscal space1, the
government has to increase the primary surplus to maintain debt-to-GDP ratio
even when there is a negative shock on output (i.e., pro-cyclical fiscal policy). A
government trapped in such a situation would get a larger room for conducting
a counter-cyclical fiscal policy when its debts are fully or partially linked to
the country’s growth rate. Borensztein and Mauro (2004) showed this by con-
ducting counterfactual simulations using the data from several advanced and
emerging countries in 1990s2, and Bonfim and Pereira (2018) also showed the
similar results with recent data from France, Spain and Portugal.
The third chapter of this thesis showed that such an advantage can be found
within the framework of a new Keynesian DSGE model as well. Unfortunately,
1Ostry et al. (2010) has developed a concept of ’debt limit’ which means an upper bound on
how high debt-to-GDP ratio of a country can increase before the default risk becomes too high.
The fiscal space means the gap between current debt-to-GDP ratio and the debt limit.
2They showed that the correlation betwen GDP growth and primary surplus-to-GDP ratio
could have been much higher if those countries had linked all their government debts to their
GDP growth. Such results held for both advanced and emerging market countries.
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however, the analysis of the third chapter was limited to the effect of issuing
GDP growth-indexed bonds only in terms of the cyclicality of fiscal policy, but
its impacts on welfare and business cycle were not able to be analysed. It is
mainly because, in the third chapter, we assumed a rational, forward-looking
representative household who is able to smooth consumption intertemporally
by trading in both financial and capital markets. Under such assumptions, the
consumption of the representative household is a function of permanent in-
come rather than current disposable income, and thus the structure of govern-
ment finance (the choice between the two bonds) only affects the mix between
outstanding debt and fiscal balance, and a particular mix is irrelevant to the
household’s decision on consumption and the business cycle. Generally speak-
ing, since Ricardian equivalence holds in the standard DSGE model used in
the third chapter, the model was not suitable for analysing the effect of the
counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy on business cycle.
However, there are plenty of empirical evidence which shows that con-
sumption relies more strongly on current disposable income than the standard
DSGE model suggests (Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; Mankiw, 2000). Based on
such empirical evidence, Mankiw (2000) suggested a new model where some
households follow the permanent income hypothesis and the rest of them are
so-called rule-of-thumb households3. Galí et al. (2007) is the first paper that
incorporated Mankiw’s idea of rule-of-thumb households into the New Keyne-
sian DSGE model with sticky-price in order to analyse the effect of government
spending on consumption. Following the seminal paper of Galí et al. (2007),
the idea of rule-of-thumb household has been widely used in the fiscal policy
literature. Coenen and Straub (2004) extended one of the most famous medium
3His justification for the presence of such households can be either they are irrational,
myopic, or have limited access to the financial or capital market. In this chapter, we assumed
the presence of “hand-to-mouth households” who are rational, forward-looking, but has no
access to those markets.
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scale New Keynesian DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2003) by incorporat-
ing rule-of-thumb households, various distortionary and lump-sum taxes, and a
fiscal policy rule that stabilises debt-to-GDP process. They estimated the share
of rule-of-thumb households in the Euro area with the Bayesian estimation
methodology. Their estimates for the share of rule of thumb households range
from 24% to 37% depending on their assumptions on the fiscal policy rule. Sim-
ilarly, Cogan et al. (2010) used extended version of Smets and Wouters (2007)
model augmented with rule-of-thumb households to analyse the role of fiscal
policy with the zero-lower-bound in nominal interest rate. They also estimated
the model with the Bayesian methodology with the U.S. data, and their estimate
of rule-of-thumb household share was around 29%. More recently, Drautzburg
and Uhlig (2015) also relied on similar model to examine how and whether the
presence of zero-lower-bound affects the sign and size of government spending
multiplier.
These models relied on the idea of rule-of-thumb consumers mostly in order
to examine the role of government spending on consumption. In this chapter,
we also adopted their assumption on the presence of rule-of-thumb households.
However, the focus of this chapter is different from the previous papers in
that we are intended to examine whether and how the type of government
bonds (conventional nominal bonds and GDP growth-indexed bonds) affects the
business cycle and the welfare of the economy. The model in this chapter is
also based on Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), augmented with hand-to-mouth
households, lump-sum and distortionary taxes and Epstein and Zin type recurs-
ive preference.
We show that, under certain conditions, the use of GDP growth-indexed bond
may help stabilise the business cycle and improve the welfare of hand-to-mouth
households. In our model, the hand-to-mouth households are assumed to be
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rational and forward-looking, and they have desires for consumption smooth-
ing, but they do not have access to either financial or capital market. That is
to say, they cannot save, borrow, and invest in capital. As mentioned above,
when there exist only Ricardian households, even if the government’s choice
on the type of bonds can affect the fiscal balance, it has no impact on business
cycle and welfare. However, when there exist non-Ricardian or hand-to-mouth
households, their consumption is directly affected by the changes in primary
surplus.
Furthermore, in our model, the consumption and leisure choices of the two
types of households are interconnected via labour market. More specifically,
the increase in current disposable income of hand-to-mouth households leads to
an increase in aggregate demand, and at the same time, to a decrease in labour
supply from the hand-to-mouth households (i.e., intratemporal consumption
smoothing). Therefore, the increased demand in aggregate labour should be
met by an increase in labour supply from the Ricardian households. This is
a more realistic assumption than the previous papers where the two types
of households supply identical amount labour and the hand-to-mouth house-
holds can smooth their consumption neither intertemporally nor intratempor-
ally. Through this channel, the changes in fiscal balance affects not only the
consumption/leisure choices of the hand-to-mouth households, but also those
of the Rational households.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 briefly
outlines the model focusing on the differences from existing models, and the
model parameters are discussed in section 4.3. The results from the baseline
model, and the mechanism behind the results are in Section 4.4 with the sens-
itivity analysis with different key parameter values. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 The DSGE model
To analyse the effect of the use of GDP growth-indexed bonds on the business
cycle and welfare, we built our DSGE model based on the medium scale New
Keynesian DSGE model of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). We kept most
of the key features of the Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) models, which
include two nominal frictions: sticky prices and wages; four real rigidities:
external consumption habit, investment adjustment cost, variable capital util-
isation, monopolistically competitive goods and labour markets; and seven exo-
genous shocks on productivity, preference, government spending, investment,
monetary policy, price markup and wage markup shocks. On top of them, we
further assumed that the households in our model have a recursive preference
following Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) to better reflect the difference in
the government’s borrowing cost between the two type of bonds. We also
assumed the presence of hand-to-mouth households following Galí et al. (2007)
so that the Ricardian equivalence does not hold anymore. Lastly, we assumed
that the government finances exogenous government spending and lump-sum
government transfer via debts and distortionary taxes on labour and capital
income.
4.2.1 Households
There exist a continuum of households with a unit mass indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]
grouped into two types - Ricardian and hand-to-mouth households - in this
model economy. A fraction 1 − ω of the households are Ricardian household
who are rational, forward-looking and able to access to both financial and
capital markets. The rest of the households, a fraction of ω, are hand-to-
mouth households. They are also rational and forward-looking, but they have
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no vehicle to save or borrow as they cannot access those markets. That is
to say, the hand-to-mouth households in this model have a desire to smooth
their consumption, but their ability to do this is severely restricted as they
cannot do it intertemporally. They can smooth their consumption only through
changes in their labour supply. Therefore, in each period, they consume all
their disposable income (= after-tax labour income plus government transfer).
Such assumption is a bit different from the previous papers in the fiscal policy
literature (Galí et al., 2007; Coenen and Straub, 2004; Drautzburg and Uhlig,
2015). In those papers, non-Ricardian households are assumed to simply take
wages and working hours determined by the labour union, and they optimise
neither intertemporally nor intratemporally. This also means that the labour
supplies of the two household groups are identical at all times even though the
consumption level of the two groups can be different.4 On the contrary, in our
model, we make a bit more realistic assumption. That is, the hand-to-mouth
households optimise at least intratemporally, and thus the labour supplies of
the two households need not be the same.
An individual household j in this model is assumed to have the following






















H if j ∈ [0, ω]
R if j ∈ [ω, 1] .
4In some papers, it is simply assumed with no justification (Coenen and Straub, 2004;
Drautzburg and Uhlig, 2015), and in other papers, this is guaranteed by the assumption that
the wage markup is large enough such that the wage is always higher than the MRS of both
households (Galí et al., 2007).
5The functional form of the period utility is same as one in Smets and Wouters (2007).
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The superscript H and R denote hand-to-mouth and Ricardian households,
respectively. The household obtains utility from the difference between indi-
vidual current consumption, CXt,j, and the group-wise aggregate consumption
in the previous period, CXt−1. That is to say, there exists an external habit
in consumption and each household in this model tries to keep up with the
other households only in the same group. The household also obtains disutility
from supplying homogeneous labour, hXt,j, to the union. As the two types of
households are identical except for their ability to access financial and cap-
ital markets, the quality of their labours are homogeneous regardless of the
household type, and thus same hourly wage rate, W t, are applied. Following
Smets and Wouters (2003), we assume the preference shock εbt that affects the
intertemporal substitution of households follows a simple AR(1) process.
Following Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)6, we assume that an individual
household in this model maximises its welfare V Xt,j recursively given as below:






)1−σEZ] 11−σEZ , (4.3)
where βX is a discount factor for household type X, but we assume that the
two household groups share the same discount factor, β = βR = βH . This
assumption is also consistent with our key assumption that the two types of
households are heterogeneous only in terms of their ability to save or borrow,
not in terms of their preference.
6Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) rewrote the recursive preference suggested by Epstein and
Zin (1991) as in Equation (4.3) for notational clarification.
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(Ricardian households) A Ricardian household j faces the following inter-
temporal budget constraint:



























+τrδKt−1,j − a (zt,j)Kt−1,j +Dft,j + (1− τw)Dut,j + Tt,j. (4.4)
In the left-hand side, the household j consumes, invests, and saves by pur-
chasing bonds. As only Ricardian households can invest or save, we abstract
superscripts R from real investment It,j, capitalKt,j, the two bonds Bt,j and B
G
t,j,
and related variables such as their prices. Bt,j is the units of 1-period nominal
conventional government bond purchased at t at the unit price of 1/Rt, and
BGt,j is the units of nominal GDP growth-indexed bonds (NGDP-indexed bond)
purchased at the price of QGt . On the right-hand side, the household finances
its expenditure from the repayment of the bonds purchased from the previous
period, after-tax labour and capital rental incomes, profits from intermediate
firms and labour unions, and lump-sum transfer from the government. The











t in terms of the final goods7. The distortionary taxes are levied on labour
and capital rental income, and the same constant tax rates, τw and τr, are
applied to both household groups. Dft,j is the real profit from the intermediate
firms, and it is evenly distributed among the Ricardian households because we
assume that the firms are owned by only the Ricardian households. Dut,j denotes
real profit from the unions, and it is evenly distributed to all the households
regardless of the household type. Note that the profit from the labour union








is also taxed at the rate of τw; and tax allowance is assumed to apply to costs
due to depreciation of capital, τrδKt−1,j. Tt is lump-sum government transfer
in terms of final goods, which is also evenly distributed to all the households
regardless of the household types. zt,j is the level of capital utilisation, and
a (zt,j) is the quadratic cost of capital utilisation given as below:
a (zt) = δ1 (zt − 1) + δ2
2
(zt − 1)2 . (4.5)
Lastly, the Ricardian household accumulates its capital following the law of
motion based on Christiano et al. (2005) as below :










where γ is trend productivity growth, and the investment shock, εIt , follows a
simple AR(1) process.
(Hand-to-mouth households) The hand-to-mouth households can neither
trade bonds nor accumulate capital, and do not have the ownership of inter-
mediate firms. Thus, the sources of their income are after-tax wages, profits
from the unions, and the lump-sum transfer from the government only. This
gives the following simple budget constraint of hand-to-mouth households:









(First order conditions: Ricardian households) The Ricardian households




t,j, It,j, Kt,j and zt,j subject
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= δ1 + δ2 (zt − 1) (4.14)
where Πt+1 ≡ Pt+1/Pt, and MRt,t+1 is the real stochastic discount factor for the


















is so-called Tobin’s q, and Ξkt is the Lagrangian multiplier for the law of
motion of capital.
(First order conditions: hand-to-mouth households) The hand-to-mouth
households also maximises Equation (4.3), but by choosing only consumption
CHt,j and labour supply h
H
t,j subject to Equation (4.7). This gives the two first




























The production sector in this model is very similar to that of Smets and Wouters
(2003) except for some simplications. In order to recursively express the non-
linear equilibrium conditions for the price setting (and wage setting as well),
we made a modification on the price markup shock9. The perfectly competitive










and the optimisation problem of the final good producer gives the following












where Pt,i denotes the price of the ith intermediate good.
There exists a continuum of firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] operating under
monopolistic competition, and an individual firm i produces its intermediate








)1−α − γtΦ, (4.20)
9Smets and Wouters (2003) assumed that the substitutability parameter, λp,t, is time-varying
in order to incorporate price markup shocks into the model. Instead, we assumed the parameter
to be constant, but added a wedge type markup shock, εpt , to the price setting problem of
intermediate good producers (see Equation 4.21). In both cases, the steady state level of price
markup is given by λp.
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where KSt,i ≡ ztKt−1,i is the capital service rented from the Ricardian house-
holds, lt,i is the labour index supplied by the labour packer, and Φ is the fixed
costs in production. The intermediate firm imaximises the sum of stochastically
discounted future profits by choosing optimal price of ith good, Pˆt,i. Following
Calvo (1983) pricing scheme, we assume only 1 − ζp of them are allowed to
re-optimise their prices and the rest of the firms just partially index their prices
by past inflation. That is to say, each individual intermediate good producer
















subject to the demand schedule given in Equation (4.19). Note again that the
intermediate good firms are owned only by the Ricardian households, thus all
the profits are given only to them. Therefore, the future profits from the firms
are discounted using the stochastic discount factor of the Ricardian households.
MCt+s denotes the nominal marginal cost for intermediate good production,














if s ≥ 1,
where Π∗ is the steady state level of gross inflation. Note also that there exists
a price markup shock, εpt , that follows an AR(1) process.
4.2.3 Labour market
The assumptions on the labour market structure are not much different from
the standard New Keynesian DSGE model with sticky wages. We assumed that
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there exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive labour unions indexed
by z ∈ [0, 1]. Each union differentiates the homogeneous labours purchased
from the households at the wage of W t, and provides the differentiated labour,
lt,z, to the labour packer at the wage ofWt,z. The household types and the labour
types are independent each other10, and the union cannot tell the household
type. That is why all the households gets the same hourly wages and there is no
superscript R or H on the differentiated labour. The labour packer aggregates











Analogous to the final good producer, the optimisation problem of labour packer










A union for type-z labour solves the following optimisation problem to max-














γsXwt,sWˆt,z − εwt+sW t+s
]
lt+s,z, (4.24)













if s ≥ 1.
10In other words, the fraction of hand-to-mouth households and Ricardian households is
uniformly distributed across unions.
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As mentioned earlier, the union cannot tell from which group the individual
household comes. However, the Ricardian households account for the majority
of the population, we assume that the unions discount future profits using the
stochastic discount factor of the Ricardian households.11 There exists a wage
markup shock, εwt , that follows AR(1) process as well.
4.2.4 Monetary and fiscal policy
















where R∗ and y∗ are the steady state levels of nominal short-term interest rate
and detrended output, respectively, and Y ∗t ≡ y∗γt is trend level of output. This
monetary policy rule is same as that in Smets and Wouters (2007) except that
the output gap in this model is defined as the deviation from trend output
rather than a deviation from the flexible-price-economy output. There exists
the monetary policy shock, εrt , that follows an AR(1) process.





























where Gt ≡ εgtY ∗t is the level of real government spending. In other words, the
government consumes Gt units of final good in each period. Following Smets
and Wouters (2007), we assume that the government spending is also affected
11This assumption is following Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015) who justified their assumption
with a median-voter decision rule.
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denotes the steady state government spending over output ratio. Note
also that Wtlt is the tax base for labour income, which equals the sum of the
wages paid to the households, W t
(
ωhHt + (1− ω)hRt
)
, and the unions’ nominal
profits, PtD
u
t = Wtlt −W t
(
ωhHt + (1− ω)hRt
)
.12
We further assume that the fiscal authority is constrained to keep its debt-to-
GDP ratio at a constant level, D. Under this assumption, the model government
has no autonomy in fiscal policy since the distortionary tax rates are constant,
government spending is exogenous, the debt-to-GDP ratio is constant, and these
three determine the size of lump-sum government transfer. This assumption
seems a bit extreme. However, as the goal of this paper is to examine how and
whether the government can rely on NGDP-indexed bonds as an alternative
fiscal policy tool for stabilising business cycle (or improving welfare) when all
the other fiscal policy tools are lost, such an extreme assumption can help us
to see the effect more clearly. Furthermore, the experiences after the financial
crisis of 2007 may support this assumption as well. After the crisis, the debt-to-
GDP ratios in many advanced countries have approached closely to their debt
limits13 (Ostry et al., 2010), and this forced many countries to use austerity
measures even when they were in recession. From the assumption of constant
debt-to-GDP ratio, the value of newly issued debt at t should always be equal to
12The labour packer receivesWtlt from the intermediate good producers by supplying labour,
and as the labour packer earns zero profit in the perfectly competitive labour market, the
total revenue of the labour unions from the labour packer should be Wtlt as well, or Wtlt =´ 1
0
wt,zlt,zdz.
13The empirical analysis by Ostry et al. (2010) shows that many advance countries have
already or almost reached their debt limits, which are defined as the theoretical threshold level
of debt-to-GDP where a government with debt-to-GDP ratio higher than this level is excluded













where ωG = 0 or 1 is the share of NGDP-indexed bonds.
4.2.5 Aggregation and Equilibrium
Aggregating the individual households’ budget constraints, Equation (4.4) and
(4.7), within each group gives the two group-wise aggregate budget constraints
below:





























+Dft + (1− τw) (1− ω)Dut − a (zt)Kt−1 + (1− ω)Tt









where Dft and D
u














ωhHt + (1− ω)hRt
)
.
Combining the two group-wise budget constraints, Equation (4.30) and (4.31),
and the government’s budget constraint, Equation (4.26), gives the following
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aggregate resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + a (zt)Kt−1. (4.32)
Aggregating the demand schedules for the intermediate goods, Equation







where spt is the price dispersion with the following law of motion:

























t + (1− ω)hRt , (4.35)
where swt is the wage dispersion with the following law of motion:

























The full list of equilibrium conditions are attached in the Appendix 4.A.
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4.3 Parameters
To calibrate the parameters for our baseline model we assume that the govern-












where tt is government transfer and dt denotes the real detrended value of new








instead of the fixed debt-to-GDP rule assumed in the previous section. This
is simply because that the U.S. government had not been constrained by the
fixed debt-to-GDP rule while the U.S. data we try to match was being produced.
This flexible-debt-rule implies that the government tries to keep the debt-to-
GDP ratio near its steady state, D, by adjusting its government transfer. In
Equation (4.37), α1 < 0 controls the volatility of debt-to-GDP ratio. The larger
the absolute size of α1, the more strongly the government tries to keep the
debt-to-GDP ratio near its steady state. For example, when α1 becomes an
extremely large negative number, the model becomes similar to the baseline
model with constant debt-to-GDP ratio. In this section, we set α1 = −10 in
order to allow the debt-to-GDP ratio flexibly fluctuates14.
Most of the parameters in our model are standard in the literature (see
the list of parameters in Table 4.1 and 4.2). We set the curvature of period
utility function with respect to relative consumption for constant labour, σc =
2.0. It is in the range of parameter values from most of the New Keynesian
literature even though it is a bit larger than the estimates of Smets and Wouters
14This implies that 2% deviation of debt-to-GDP ratio leads to -20% deviation of government
transfer. With α1 = −10, the highest level of simulated debt-to-GDP was around 30% higher
than the steady state level in our simulation.
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(2003, 2007) of around 1.4. The inverse of the elasticity of labour, σl = 1.9 is
borrowed from Smets and Wouters (2007). We set the degree of external habit,
λ, at 0.7. The fraction of firms and unions which are not given the chance
of re-optimising, ζp and ζw, are set to be 0.78 and 0.75 respectively, which
imply an average period of around four quarters between re-optimising, and
the indexation parameter for the price and wage, ιp and ιw, are set to be 0.1
and 0.5, respectively. The steady state level of both price and wage markups
are assumed to be 0.1. The monetary policy rule coefficients are also borrowed
from Smets and Wouters (2007). α = 1/3 implies a steady state share of labour
income of 66%, and depreciation rate δ = 0.025 means an annual depreciation
of 10%. The discount factor, β ≡ βγ−σc = 0.9905 implies around 4% annual real
interest rate in steady state. We assume the trend annual productivity growth
rate slightly lower than 1%, γ = 1.002, and steady state gross inflation rate,
π∗ = 1.008, or around 3.2% annually. φp = 1.0 implies that there is no fixed cost
in the production of intermediate goods. The parameters for the investment
adjustment cost φ and the elasticity of the capital utilisation cost ψ are assumed
to be 5.5 and 0.5, respectively. All the parameters above are standard among
New Keynesian literature (see Levin et al. 2006; Christiano et al. 2005; Smets
and Wouters 2007).
The Epstein-Zin parameter σEZ is set to be -360 to match the term premium
of 100 basis points on 10-year zero-coupon U.S government bonds. This is much
larger (in absolute term) than the parameter value of -148 used in Rudebusch
and Swanson (2012), but much smaller than that of Darracq Paries and Loublier
(2010). There seems to be no consensus as to the size of this parameter.
Darracq Paries and Loublier (2010) showed that the absolute size of Epstein-Zin
parameter should be around 1,000 to generate term premium of 100 basis
points if one uses the exactly same model as Smets and Wouters (2007). In
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Table 4.1: List of parameters
Parameter Value Description
σc 2.0 IES in consumption
σl 1.9 labour supply elasticity
σEZ -360 Epstein ann Zin parameter
λ 0.7 degree of consumption habit
ζp 0.78 price stickiness
ζw 0.75 wage stickiness
ιp 0.1 price indexation
ιw 0.5 wage indexation
λp 0.1 steady state price markup
λw 0.1 steady state wage markup
ρR 0.8 policy rate smoothing
ψ1 2.0 inflation gap coefficient
ψ2 0.1 output gap coefficient
ψ3 0.2 output growth coefficient
α 1/3 share of capital
δ 0.025 depreciation
β 0.9905 discount factor
γ 1.002 trend growth in productivity
pi∗ 1.008 steady state inflation
φp 1.0 parameter for fixed cost
ψ 0.5 utilisation adjustment cost
φ 5.5 investment adjustment cost
εg∗ 0.17 share of government spending
D 2.52 steady state debt to GDP ratio
ω 0.1 share of hand-to-mouth households
τr 0.36 labour income tax rate
τw 0.28 capital rental income tax rate
note: β ≡ βγ−σc , φp ≡ 1 + Φ/yt is 1 plus share of fixed cost in the
production, and ψ ≡ δ2/δ1 is elasticity of the capital utilisation cost
function.
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Table 4.2: List of shocks
Parameter Value Description
ρa 0.95 AR(1) coefficient of productivity shock
ρb 0.20 AR(1) coefficient of preference shock
ρg 0.90 AR(1) coefficient of government spending shock
ρi 0.60 AR(1) coefficient of investment shock
ρr 0.20 AR(1) coefficient of monetary policy shock
ρp 0.80 AR(1) coefficient of price markup shock
ρw 0.89 AR(1) coefficient of wage markup shock
ρga 0.52 correlation between a and g shocks
σa 0.45 standard deviation of productivity shock
σb 0.24 standard deviation of preference shock
σg 0.30 standard deviation of government spending shock
σi 0.45 standard deviation of investment shock
σr 0.24 standard deviation of monetary policy shock
σp 2.40 standard deviation of price markup shock
σw 2.40 standard deviation of wage markup shock
general, to match a given size of term premium, the smaller σc, the larger σEZ is
required. Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) was able to match the term premium
of 100 basis points with a relatively small σEZ with the help of a very large σc
(≈ 9)15. On the contrary, σc in Smets and Wouters (2007) is estimated to be only
1.39, and this is why an extremely larger σEZ is required. In this paper, we set
σc to be 2, which is larger than that of Smets and Wouters (2007) but still in the
range of the models in the literature.
The steady state ratio of government spending over output, εg
∗
= 0.17, is from
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) who calibrated the value using the historical U.S.
data. We set the baseline value for the fixed ratio of debt-to-GDP, D = 2.56, or
the level of debt being 63% of annual GDP, using the post-war average U.S. data.
15In fact, in their baseline model where σc = 2, the term premium is only a third of the best
fit model where σc is around 9.
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The constant labour and capital rental income tax rates, τr = 0.36 and τw = 0.28,
are also from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Lastly, we set the fraction of the hand-
to-mouth households, ω, to 10% of the population. This is somewhat smaller
than the fraction of the rule-of-thumb households assumed (or estimated) in
the literature. For example, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) estimated that the
fraction is around 50% of the population, and Galí et al. (2007) also used the
same ratio. Recent papers in fiscal policy literature estimated that the fraction
falls between 20% to 33% (see Coenen et al. 2012; Erceg and Lindé 2014;
Cogan et al. 2010; Drautzburg and Uhlig 2015). However, we chose to use a
smaller fraction of 10%. Our definition of the hand-to-mouth households are
those who are fully rational and forward-looking but does not have any tool for
saving or investing. It is hard to believe such households take up more than
20% of the population. Our assumption of 10% is slightly above around 7~8%
of the fraction of the U.S. population who do not have a bank account (FDIC,
2015). We will see how the results are affected by ω in subsection 4.4.3. The
autocorrelation coefficients and standard deviations of the exogenous shock
processes are provided in Table 4.2.
Table 4.3 presents the standard deviations, autocorrelations, and cross cor-
relations for key macroeconomic variables using the simulated data (for 10,000
periods) from the baseline model with flexible debt rule and conventional bonds.
Note that the simulated model is not different from standard New Keynesian
DSGE models except that we assume that 10% of the households are non-
Ricardian and there exist distortionary taxes. As the table shows, our model
well replicates the actual data of the U.S. despite the assumption of hand-to-
mouth households. It replicates the negative correlation between inflation and
output growth, and the highly persistent inflation process of the actual data,
even though the inflation is a little bit more persistent than the actual data.
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Table 4.3: Key moments of the benchmark model (ω = 0)
σ∆y σ∆c σpi ρ∆y,pi ρ∆y,∆c AR1(∆y) AR1(pi)
Model 0.79 0.64 0.64 -0.16 0.73 0.30 0.75
US data 0.80 0.65 0.61 -0.18 0.65 0.34 0.65
note: σx denotes the standard deviation of variable x, and ∆x means the
quarterly percentage growth of the variable. σx,y denotes sample
correlation coefficient between x and y. The U.S. actual data from 1971Q3
to 2016Q4 were used.
The impulse responses in Figure 4.1 also show the similar patterns given from
the standard New Keynesian DSGE models16.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Baseline results
Table 4.4 compares the simulation results from the benchmark model where
there exist only Ricardian households (first four columns) and the baseline
model where 10% of the population are hand-to-mouth households. Note that
the fixed debt-to-GDP ratio is assumed in this subsection. Let us first compare
the benchmark and the baseline results for the case where only the conven-
tional bonds are used (first and second columns vs. fifth and sixth columns).
The presence of the hand-to-mouth households only slightly changes the mean
of the key variables, but its effect on volatility is substantial even though the
fraction of hand-to-mouth households is only 10%. Especially, the consumption
and labour supply of hand-to-mouth households are much more volatile than
those of the Ricardian households in the benchmark model. Even the Ricardian
16All the figures are in Appendix 4.C.
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Table 4.4: Baseline results
Benchmark (ω = 0) Baseline (ω = 0.1)
Conv. NGDP Conv. NGDP
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
output 3.54 2.87 3.54 2.87 3.53 3.12 3.54 2.98
consumption 2.21 2.42 2.21 2.42 2.20 2.85 2.21 2.68
(Ricardian) 2.21 2.42 2.21 2.42 2.25 2.59 2.25 2.48
(H2M) n.a n.a n.a n.a 1.76 7.54 1.77 6.30
inflation 0.68 0.63 0.68 0.63 0.70 0.64 0.71 0.63
labour supply 1.28 1.97 1.28 1.97 1.28 2.36 1.28 2.16
(Ricardian) 1.29 1.97 1.29 1.97 1.27 2.79 1.27 2.41
(H2m) n.a n.a n.a n.a 1.46 5.84 1.45 3.59
capital supply 27.08 3.76 27.08 3.76 27.12 4.01 27.15 3.91
wage 1.66 3.13 1.66 3.13 1.66 3.36 1.66 3.32
rent rate 0.04 1.91 0.04 1.91 0.04 2.08 0.04 2.01
interest rate 1.02 0.63 1.02 0.63 1.02 0.69 1.02 0.64
net transfer -0.66 15.70 -0.66 12.36 -0.66 23.21 -0.66 14.78
corr(y,NT ) -0.00 -0.14 0.08 -0.10
welfare cost, %
(Ricardian) 2.75 2.75 2.92 2.89
(H2m) n.a n.a 16.52 13.67
Note: Conv. and NGDP denote the case where ωG = 0 and ωG = 1, respectively.
The standard deviations are calculated using log of the variables except for the
inflation, and they expressed in percent. The correlation coefficient between output
and net transfer (= transfer minus distortionary taxes) is presented to show the
cyclicality of fiscal policy. See Equation (4.40) for the definition of welfare cost of
business cycle.
households also experience more volatile labour supply in the baseline model
than in the benchmark model.
The mechanism behind the larger volatility when there exist hand-to-mouth
households is explained as follows. Under the assumption of constants debt-to-
GDP ratio in this model, the net government transfer, NTt, which is defined as
the lump-sum government transfer minus distortionary taxes, can be expressed
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as below:17






This equation is given by substituting Equation (4.28) into the government
budget constraint (Equation 4.26)18. τt denotes sum of the tax revenues from
both labour and capital rental incomes. Equation (4.38) shows that a decrease
in current output reduces the government’s capacity of issuing new debts as
the size of new debts should be proportional to the current output. At the same
time, as the decrease in current output lowers current inflation19, the burden
of debt repayment becomes larger. All in all, a negative shock on current
output has a negative impact on NTt. Up to this point, there is no difference
between the benchmark and the baseline models. However, contrary to the
benchmark model where changes in NTt has no effect on the business cycle, it
has substantial effects in the baseline model. As the hand-to-mouth households
are lack of consumption smoothing tools, a substantial portion of the change
in net transfer goes to their consumption via the change in their disposable
income.
On top of the direct effect on the consumption of hand-to-mouth households,
there also exist second round effects. Figure 4.3 summarises this. The de-
creased consumption in hand-to-mouth households means a reduced demand in
aggregate output, and in turn reduced demands in labour and capital service as
well. This further decreases the net transfer, and this cycle goes on and on. At
17This expression is for the case where only conventional bonds are used.
18Note that the lower case variables are detrended variables.
19In fact, this is not the case in the benchmark model. In the benchmark model with no hand-
to-mouth households, supply shock dominates, and thus output and inflation covary negatively.
In the baseline model, however, demand shocks play more important roles for the business
cycle. This is also explained by Equation (4.38). The difference between the baseline and
the benchmark model is whether the changes in net transfer affect the business cycle, and
the terms that determine the response of net transfer in the baseline model are the terms in
parentheses in Equation (4.38). As the demand shocks move output and inflation in the opposite
direction, the terms in the parentheses react much more strongly to the demand shocks then
the supply shocks.
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the same time, the hand-to-mouth households try to smooth their consumption
in response to the decrease in disposable income by supplying more labour.
That means, the decreased demand in aggregate labour should be met by less
labour supply from the Ricardian households. In equilibrium, the cycle ends
up with lower CH , higher hH , and lower hR. This is why the labour supply of
not only the hand-to-mouth but also the Ricardian households become more
volatile in the baseline model. Also, the opposite responses of the two labour
supplies, hH and hR, explain why aggregate labour supply is less volatile than
both of the group-wise labour supplies are. To sum up, when the government is
forced to keep its debt-to-GDP ratio constant, a shock that changes output leads
to a change in net transfer. If all the households are Ricardian, the business
cycle is immune to this change, but when there exist hand-to-mouth households,
the changes in net transfer can have significant impact on the business cycle
through their consumption.
Let us then examine whether and how the use of NGDP-indexed bonds may
stabilise the business cycle and improve the welfare of hand-to-mouth house-
holds in the baseline economy. The fifth to eighth columns of Table 4.4 contrast
the simulation results from the baseline model under the two different financing
structure: 100% conventional bonds vs. 100% NGDP-indexed bonds. The
results show that using the NGDP-indexed bonds only slightly changes the
mean of key variables, but it decreases their volatility significantly. When the
government relies 100% on the NGDP-indexed bonds, the equation for the net
transfer is given as follows:







In this case, a decrease in yt reduces not only the government’s ability to
issue new debts, but also the repayment burden of previously issued bonds.
Therefore, given the same size of shock (e.g., a negative shock on output),
the decrease in net transfer is smaller in size in the case of NGDP-indexed
bonds than in the case of conventional bonds. This, in turn, reduces the decline
in consumption of hand-to-mouth households, and thus, reduces the changes
in output, labour and capital service as well following the cycle described in
Figure 4.3. In short, NGDP-indexed bonds can be used as a kind of automatic
stabiliser.
The impulse response functions in Figure 4.2 tell us more stories. Using
NGDP-indexed bonds greatly reduces the responses to demand shocks (pref-
erence, government spending, investment and monetary policy shocks) of key
variables, while the responses to supply shocks (productivity, price markup,
and wage markup shocks) are not affected much. This can also be explained
from Equation (4.38) and (4.39). When a demand shock comes, both output
and inflation move to the same direction. This implies, from Equation (4.38)
where only conventional government bonds are used, a positive demand shock
increases the government’s capacity of issuing new debts and reduces the
burden of debt repayment in real terms. As a result, the shock significantly
increases the lump-sum transfer, and through the increase in disposable in-
come of hand-to-mouth households, destabilises the entire economy. When
NGDP-indexed bonds are used instead, the positive demand shock increases
both new and old debts as in Equation (4.39), and thus the response of the net
transfer becomes a lot smaller, and so do the responses of the other variables.
On the contrary, to a supply shock, output and inflation respond to the opposite
directions. In case of the conventional bonds, a positive supply shock increases
both new and old debts, and thus its impact on transfer cancel out each other.
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For this reason, the business cycle stabilising effect of issuing NGDP-indexed
bonds is also reduced.
Meanwhile, the last two rows in Table 4.4 show the welfare costs of business
cycle under various assumptions. In order to measure the changes in welfare in



















1− βγ , (4.40)
where vmean is the simulated mean of detrended welfare level, vt
20; and c∗
and h∗ are deterministic steady state levels of detrended consumption and
working hours, respectively. This definition implies that the welfare cost, WC,
shows the welfare loss incurred from the existence of business cycle in terms
of deterministic steady state consumption level. In other words,WC shows the
amount of the steady state consumption loss needed to lower the deterministic
steady state welfare level down to the average welfare level when there exist
business cycles.
Because the presence of hand-to-mouth households significantly destabilises
the business cycle, even the Ricardian households face higher welfare cost in
the baseline model than in the benchmark model (2.75%→2.92%)21. When the
NGDP-indexed bonds are used in the baseline model, while there is no notable
change in the welfare cost of the Ricardian households, the hand-to-mouth
households can benefit substantially in terms of welfare cost (16.52%→13.67%).




21The welfare cost of around 3% in the benchmark model may seem a lot lager compared
with the literature. For example, Lucas (1987) showed that the welfare loss from fluctuations
in consumption is less than 0.01% under the assumption of logarithmic preference. However, it
is known that the welfare cost of business cycle can be much larger for models with recursive
preferences (see Dolmas, 1998; Tallarini, 2000; Barrillas et al., 2006).
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Table 4.5: Sensitive analysis (share of H2M households)
(ω = 0.07) (ω = 0.15)
Conv. NGDP Conv. NGDP
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
output 3.53 3.03 3.54 2.94 3.52 3.48 3.54 3.13
consumption 2.20 2.69 2.21 2.59 2.19 3.44 2.20 2.96
(Ricardian) 2.24 2.52 2.24 2.46 2.27 2.85 2.28 2.58
(H2M) 1.76 7.00 1.77 6.05 1.75 9.44 1.77 7.08
inflation 0.70 0.64 0.70 0.63 0.72 0.65 0.72 0.62
labour supply 1.28 2.22 1.28 2.09 1.28 2.88 1.28 2.37
(Ricardian) 1.28 2.47 1.28 2.26 1.26 4.21 1.26 2.96
(H2m) 1.45 5.10 1.45 3.31 1.47 9.13 1.45 4.85
capital supply 27.11 3.92 27.13 3.86 27.11 4.32 27.19 4.08
wage 1.66 3.29 1.66 3.26 1.66 3.54 1.67 3.47
rent rate 0.04 2.02 0.04 1.98 0.04 2.27 0.04 2.12
interest rate 1.02 0.67 1.02 0.64 1.02 0.76 1.02 0.66
net transfer -0.66 20.20 -0.66 13.86 -0.66 42.67 -0.66 19.02
corr(y,NT ) 0.05 -0.12 0.20 -0.02
welfare cost, %
(Ricardian) 2.85 2.84 3.07 3.06
(H2m) 14.90 13.28 25.73 15.87
note: See the note in Table 4.4
One thing to note is that the focus of this chapter is not calculating the exact
magnitude of welfare gain by the use of NGDP-indexed bonds, especially be-
cause of the simplistic assumptions on the government sector. Instead, we
focus more on the mechanism how the use of NGDP-indexed bonds can affect
the business cycle and welfare, and the condition under which the government
and the households can benefit. We will discuss this with the sensitivity analysis
in the next subsection.
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4.4.2 Sensitivity analysis
In the baseline model, we assumed that the fraction of hand-to-mouth house-
holds, ω, is only 10% of the population. As mentioned already in section 4.3,
this is somewhat lower than the fractions used in the literature. Therefore,
it would be worthwhile to examine how different fractions of hand-to-mouth
households change the results. Table 4.5 presents the simulation results when
the fraction is changed to 7% and to 15%, leaving all the other parameters un-
changed from the baseline. Obviously, the results show that the business cycle
becomes more volatile when the share of hand-to-mouth households grows. In
this model, the key channel through which the changes in net transfer can affect
the business cycle is the consumption of hand-to-mouth households. Therefore,
given the same change in net transfer, it is natural the larger the fraction of
hand-to-mouth households, the more volatile the economy becomes. This also
explains why the welfare gain from the use of NGDP-indexed bond gets larger
as ω grows.22
Another key assumption in our model is that the government should keep its
debt-to-GDP ratio at a constant level, and we assumed that this ratio is 252% of
quarterly GDP (or 63% of annual GDP) from the U.S. data. Table 4.6 shows how
the baseline results are altered when we apply different debt-to-GDP ratios. In
the first four columns, we assume that the government keeps no debt at all
times (D = 0.0), and the next four columns show the simulation results when
the ratio is 90% of annual output (D = 3.6).
When the government keeps no outstanding debt, most of the variables
become more stable than the baseline model. This is because the existence
22Even though we did not mention in this paper, the assumption on how the government
transfer is distributed between the two groups can also affect the results. Cogan et al. (2010)
have showed that the government spending multiplier gets larger when the rule-of thumb
households get more fraction of government transfer.
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Conv. NGDP Conv. NGDP
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
output 3.54 2.87 3.54 2.87 3.53 3.30 3.54 3.05
consumption 2.21 2.56 2.21 2.56 2.20 3.09 2.21 2.77
(rational) 2.25 2.41 2.25 2.41 2.25 2.72 2.26 2.53
(H2M) 1.81 5.13 1.81 5.13 1.75 9.83 1.75 7.38
inflation 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.72 0.64 0.72 0.62
labour supply 1.28 2.02 1.28 2.02 1.28 2.61 1.28 2.25
(rational) 1.27 2.21 1.27 2.21 1.27 3.40 1.27 2.59
(H2m) 1.43 1.55 1.43 1.55 1.48 10.37 1.46 5.55
capital supply 27.22 3.78 27.22 3.78 27.08 4.15 27.13 3.98
wage 1.66 3.25 1.66 3.25 1.66 3.41 1.66 3.35
rent rate 0.04 1.94 0.04 1.94 0.04 2.16 0.04 2.06
interest rate 1.02 0.67 1.02 0.67 1.02 0.70 1.02 0.63
net transfer -0.60 4.88 -0.60 4.88 -0.69 53.49 -0.69 22.74
corr(y,NT ) -0.40 -0.40 0.17 -0.03
welfare cost, %
(rational) 2.76 2.76 2.94 2.93
(H2m) 9.08 9.08 28.50 18.96
note: See the note in Table 4.4
of positive debt plays a role in making fiscal policy more pro-cyclical as seen
from Equation (4.38) and (4.39). When D = 0.0, the two equations collapse
into NTt = −εgt y∗, and net transfer becomes strongly negatively correlated
with output. This allows the hand-to-mouth households to have more stable
consumption and labour path. For the same reason, as D becomes higher, it
puts more pressure of pro-cyclical fiscal policy, and thus makes the consumption
of hand-to-mouth households more volatile. As the use of NGDP-indexed bonds
mediates the pressure of conducting pro-cyclical fiscal policy, we may expect
more welfare gain when D becomes higher.
Lastly, we examined how the baseline results may be affected if we relax the
assumption of constant debt-to-GDP ratio. To see this, we replaced the constant
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Table 4.7: More flexible debt rule
Baseline Flexible-debt-rule
Conv. NGDP Conv. NGDP
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
output 3.53 3.12 3.54 2.98 3.54 2.88 3.54 2.87
consumption 2.20 2.85 2.21 2.68 2.21 2.52 2.21 2.51
(Ricardian) 2.25 2.59 2.25 2.48 2.26 2.40 2.26 2.39
(H2M) 1.76 7.54 1.77 6.30 1.76 4.73 1.77 4.62
inflation 0.70 0.64 0.71 0.63 0.69 0.64 0.70 0.64
labour supply 1.28 2.36 1.28 2.16 1.29 2.01 1.29 1.99
(Ricardian) 1.27 2.79 1.27 2.41 1.27 2.18 1.27 2.15
(H2m) 1.46 5.84 1.45 3.59 1.45 1.41 1.45 1.51
capital supply 27.12 4.01 27.15 3.91 27.19 3.77 27.18 3.76
wage 1.66 3.36 1.66 3.32 1.66 3.22 1.66 3.21
rent rate 0.04 2.08 0.04 2.01 0.04 1.93 0.04 1.92
interest rate 1.02 0.69 1.02 0.64 1.02 0.67 1.02 0.66
net transfer -0.66 23.21 -0.66 14.78 -0.67 5.80 -0.67 6.96
corr(y,NT ) 0.08 -0.10 -0.50 -0.50
welfare cost, %
(Ricardian) 2.92 2.89 2.77 2.80
(H2m) 16.52 13.67 10.60 11.81
debt-to-GDP rule in the baseline model with the flexible-debt-rule of Equation
(4.37) in Section 4.3.
Table 4.7 compares the two cases: flexible-debt-rule model and the baseline
model. We can see that the flexible-debt-rule significantly stabilises the con-
sumption and labour of hand-to-mouth households even with conventional bonds.
Under the flexible-debt-rule, the government still needs to adjust its transfer in
response to the shocks that affect debt-to-GDP ratio, but as there is a leeway
allowed in the debt-to-GDP ratio, the pressure of pro-cyclical fiscal policy can be
much smaller than the constant debt-to-GDP case. This directly leads to more
stable consumption path for hand-to-mouth households. In the meantime, as
there is much smaller pressure of pro-cyclical fiscal policy under the flexible-
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debt-rule, the business cycle stabilising effects of NGDP-indexed bonds also
becomes smaller (or disappear), and so does the welfare gain. This shows that
our results rely highly on the assumption of the constant debt-to-GDP ratio.
4.5 Conclusion and Summary
In this chapter, we examined how a government can use NGDP-indexed bonds
as an alternative fiscal policy tool when it is constrained to keep a constant
debt-to-GDP within the new Keynesian framework. As Ricardian equivalence
holds in the standard new Keynesian DSGE models, the assumption of constant
debt-to-GDP is irrelevant to the business cycle in such models. However, when
a fraction of the population is non-Ricardian, the constant debt-to-GDP assump-
tion plays a role of making fiscal policy more pro-cyclical, and this makes the
disposable income of non-Ricardian households very volatile. Since they are not
able to smooth consumption intertemporally, their consumption becomes very
volatile as well. Under this situation, NGDP-indexed bonds can play a role of an
automatic stabiliser. That is to say, the use of NGDP-indexed bonds mitigates
the pressure of pro-cyclical fiscal policy and helps stabilise the consumption
of non-Ricardian households. This may increase the welfare of non-Ricardian
households as well.
In addition, in contrast to the previous papers with the presence of non-
Ricardian households, we assume that the hand-to-mouth households in our
model have a desire for consumption smoothing and do it at least intratem-
porally. For this reason, the use of NGDP-indexed bonds stabilises not only
the consumption of hand-to-mouth households, but also their supply of labour.
Moreover, as the labour supply of the two group of households are closely in-
terconnected through the labour market, the labour supply from the Ricardian
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households is stabilised as well. To sum up, the government with restricted
fiscal policy tools can rely on NGDP-indexed bonds to stabilise business cycle
and improve the welfare of at least a part of the households without damaging
the others. We also showed that the larger benefits can be obtained in an
economy with a larger share of hand-to-mouth households, a higher level of
debt-to-GDP ratio, and when the business cycle is mainly driven by demand
shocks.
One may point out several shortcomings of the analysis in this chapter. One
of them is the fact that the conclusion of this chapter is strongly dependent on
the assumption of constant debt-to-GDP ratio. In fact, we also showed that
the benefits have disappeared in the model with more relaxed fiscal policy
rule. Therefore, our results should not be interpreted that the government can
benefit from the use of NGDP-indexed bonds unconditionally. Nevertheless, as
many advanced countries are actually approaching their debt limits as Ostry
et al. (2010) shows, it may be reasonable to consider NGDP-indexed bonds as
part of their fiscal policy tools.
We want to close this chapter by discussing a few model extensions for the
future. In this chapter, our model does not explicitly include the possibility
of default. If there exists an endogenous mechanism through which a rise in
debt-to-GDP ratio raises the probability of default and related risk premium, we
can have a vicious cycle in which a positive shock to debt-to-GDP ratio raises
the government’s overall borrowing costs and further increases its debt-to-GDP
ratio. When such a mechanism is included to the model, we may expect a
lot larger benefits from the use of NGDP-indexed bonds as suggested by the
previous papers (Chamon and Mauro, 2006; Ostry et al., 2010; Barr et al., 2014;
Kim and Ostry, 2018).
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Another shortcoming we acknowledge is that our model is a closed economy
model and calibrated with the U.S. macroeconomic data which is believed to
have little or no possibility of government default. Therefore, the analyses and
results presented can be extended only to a set of advanced economies. By ex-
tending the model to a small open economy model and explicitly incorporating
foreign currency denominated debts, we may be able to discuss the benefits of
issuing NGDP-indexed bonds to the emerging market countries as well.
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g1t = (1 + λp) g
2
t (4.45)
23wt ≡ WtPtγt , rkt ≡
Rkt
Pt
, kt ≡ Ktγt , mct ≡ MCtPt
24yt ≡ Ytγt , Πˆt ≡ PˆtPt
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• Law of motion: price































































































































26ut ≡ Utγt(1−σc) , vt ≡ Vtγt(1−σc) , ct ≡ Ctγt , β ≡ βγ−σc
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(1− τr) rkt = δ1 + δ2 (zt − 1) (4.58)





































wthHt + wtlt − ωwthHt − (1− ω)wthRt︸ ︷︷ ︸

































































f1t = (1 + λw) f
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• Government budget constraint

































ct = (1− ω) cRt + ωcHt (4.70)
• Aggregate resource constraint





















1−α − y∗ (φp − 1)
spt
(4.72)
• Law of motion: price dispersion




















• Market clearing condition: labour
ωhHt + (1− ω)hRt = swt lt (4.74)
• Law of motion: wage dispersion
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a
t (4.78)





















• z∗ = 1 is assumed and Π∗ is an exogenously given parameter.
• The following steady state conditions are analytically given with pencil
and paper:













mc∗ = 1/ (1 + λp)



























































































, l∗ numerically from the following five equations:
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Figure 4.1: IRFs for benchmark model (I)
(Shock on productivity)


































































































































Figure 4.1: IRFs for benchmark model (II)
(Shock on spending)

































































































































Figure 4.1: IRFs for benchmark model (III)
(Shock on monetary policy)

































































(Shock on price markup)

































































Figure 4.1: IRFs for benchmark model (IV)
(Shock on wage markup)






























































Figure 4.2: IRFs for baseline model (I)
(Shock on productivity)









































































































































































Figure 4.2: IRFs for baseline model (II)
(Shock on spending)









































































































































































Figure 4.2: IRFs for baseline model (III)
(Shock on monetary policy)





















































































(Shock on price markup)



















































































Figure 4.2: IRFs for baseline model (IV)
(Shock on wage markup)





















































































Figure 4.3: Destabilising effect from the presence of hand-to-mouth
households
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